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Leniency Programmes have been introduced as a complementary measure in the 
enforcement of competition law in detecting cartels, on the basis that hard to find evidence will 
be provided by undertakings coming forward to confess, in exchange for immunity or reduction 
in fines. The advantages of leniency are deemed to be twofold, since evidence is thereby 
expected to be given voluntarily, and in turn it would save up the limited resources available 
to enforcement authorities, by reducing lengthy investigations in search of evidence. 
Therefore, the widely accepted view by regulators, economists, and lawyers alike is that 
leniency is by far the most effective method of detecting and deterring anticompetitive activities 
by undertakings. An ‘undertaking’ covers any entity engaged in an economic activity that offers 
goods or services in a given market. In the UK, Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 governs 
prohibitions that fall within the category of cartels of which price-fixing, market or customer 
sharing, agreements to restrict production or supply, and bid-rigging are the most serious 
‘hard-core cartels’. This study evaluates the efficacy of the Leniency Programme in the 
enforcement of competition law applied in respect of cartel infringements based on cases 
decided by the UK’s principal enforcement authority. Chapter I cases decided and published 
over a twelve-year period, since the Competition Act 1998 came into force, have been 
analysed in order to evaluate whether the leniency programme has been an incentive for 
colluders to apply for leniency. The results indicate that very few leniency applications were 
submitted voluntarily before an investigation was begun by the enforcement authority. 
Moreover, the detection rate of Chapter I cases on average has been very low over the twelve-
year period, less than 2 cases per year, excluding settlements. The research also shows that 
contrary to the accepted view that evidence relating to cartels is difficult to find, cartels studied 
in this thesis have left a trail of both electronic, and other evidence that the authorities were 
able to seize. Further, the leniency applicants were not always reliable witnesses, and despite 
leniency, the enforcement authorities had to conduct lengthy investigations, negating the cost 
saving assertion and taking resources away from ex officio interventions by the authorities. 
The conclusion drawn from this study is that rather than enhancing detection and deterrence 
of anticompetitive behaviour by undertakings, the leniency programme overlaps, and in effect, 
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In the enforcement of Competition Law, the Leniency Programme is an administrative 
procedure intended to incentivise businesses that infringe Competition Law prohibitions to 
come forward and confess, and cooperate with the investigation so that they would be 
rewarded with immunity from prosecution or reduction in fines. Under the Leniency 
Programme, the enforcement authorities expect to obtain hard evidence which would 
otherwise be kept well hidden from the authorities by those involved in such infringements, 
and that, as a result, it would also save the limited resources available to the enforcement 
authorities. This thesis investigates the efficacy of the Leniency Programme as a 
complementary enforcement procedure, introduced by the UK enforcement authorities, in 
detecting Chapter I infringements prohibited by the Competition Act 1998 (CA 98), and Article 
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
 
Under Chapter I, CA 98, agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings or concerted practices which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the United Kingdom are prohibited, unless exempt 
if certain conditions under section 3, CA 98 are met. According to the UK’s former principal 
enforcement authority, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), ‘undertakings’ and ‘businesses’ are 
interchangeable terms and mean any entity engaged in economic activity irrespective of their 
legal status.1 The infringements of Chapter I, CA 98, referred to as cartels, are price fixing, bid 
rigging, output restrictions, and market allocation,2 but the list is not exhaustive.3   
In 2001, the then Department of Trade and Industry has said, ‘… competition is a central driver 
for productivity growth in the economy, and hence the UK’s international competitiveness.’4 A 
House of Commons Library briefing paper has stated that ‘Competition law seeks to curb 
                                                          
1 OFT, Cartels and the Competition Act 1998: A guide for purchasers, (OFT435), 2005, p 2. 
2 Ibid, p 3; Competition Act 1998, section 2(2); Article 101 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union.  
3 OFT, Agreements and concerted practices: Understanding competition law, (OFT401) 2004, paras 2.2 and 2.3 
at 4, and para 3.3 at 13. 
4 Department of Trade and Industry White Paper, Productivity and Enterprise: A World Class Competition 




practices that would undermine competition.’5 It can safely be said, therefore, that the UK 
competition policy is intended on achieving economic success by maintaining competition in 
the market. The UK’s former Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) has stated 
that competition between businesses benefits consumers through providing greater choice, 
better quality products and services and helps to keep prices lower.6 
 
The Leniency policy has been adopted in accordance with the EU Leniency Notice,7 as a 
complementary procedure which was expected to expedite detection and deterrence of 
anticompetitive behaviour. The purpose of this thesis is to explore whether the Leniency policy 
has fulfilled that expectation of expediting the detection and deterrence of competition 
infringements prohibited by Chapter I, CA 98. 
 
This research does not seek to deal with the CA 98 prohibitions per se, but it attempts to 
elucidate, whether the Leniency Programme introduced subsequently into the enforcement of 
Chapter I, CA  98, as a complementary enforcement measure, has enhanced the detection 
and deterrence rate of anticompetitive behaviour. Therefore, the central focus is on the 
efficacy of the Leniency Programme in the enforcement of Competition Law in the UK.  
 
The UK competition law is governed by the Competition Act 1998 (CA 98), modelled in 
accordance with the European Competition law which has supremacy over that of its Member 
States, and the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA 02), along with the Enterprise Reform and Regulatory 
Act 2013 (ERRA 13). The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA 15) has also brought in new 
measures to strengthen the competition enforcement procedure in the UK. The element of 
‘dishonesty’ needed to be proved in cartel cases previously, has been removed by the new 
changes. This thesis states the law and legal situation on UK’s Competition Law up to the 
submission of this thesis in September 2016. 
 
Under CA 98, any business willing to do so may apply for Leniency if they are involved in an 
infringement, in exchange for immunity or reduction in fines. At the outset, EA 02 has given 
the UK’s principal competition enforcement authority at the time, the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT), which is currently the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), power to grant 
leniency to individuals who inform the OFT/CMA of their anticompetitive activities, and fully 
                                                          
5 Antony Seely, ‘The UK competition regime’ Briefing Paper No. 04814, House of Commons Library, 1 September 
2016. 
6 BIS, Ref: 12/512, Growth, Competition and the Competition Regime: Government Response to Consultation, 
2012, Executive Summary, p. 5. 
7 European Commission, Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases, [1996] OJ 
C207/4-6, (Leniency Notice). Subsequently revised in 2002, and 2006. 
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cooperate with its investigation. Under the leniency policy, a whistleblower of cartel activity 
can obtain full immunity by way of a ‘no action letter’8 from the OFT, similar to the leniency 
regime in operation in the US.  
 
Leniency programmes have been thus adopted by all but one9 of the current twenty-eight 
Member States, including the UK, in accordance with the cooperation policy with the 
Commission.10 The member states cooperate with one another via the European Competition 
Network (ECN) on a confidential basis as regards anticompetitive investigations which may 
affect two or more member states. The leniency policy was borrowed from the US antitrust 
leniency programme,11 and both EU and US enforcement authorities have hailed the Leniency 
Programme as the most effective tool in uncovering anticompetitive activities engaged in by 
businesses in breach of Competition Law.12 The leniency policy has also been adopted by 
many other countries worldwide which implement competition regulations, as evident from the 
participant member states in the International Competition Network (ICN).13  
 
The reason for the introduction of a Leniency Programme has been primarily due to the claim 
that enforcement authorities have found it difficult to detect anticompetitive activities by 
undertakings because such activities are operated in secret.14 Another advantage for the 
authorities is the claim that leniency is a measure that would enable saving up the limited 
resources available to enforcement authorities by reducing the workload involved in 
competition investigations.15  
By offering leniency, the offenders are expected to come forward and confess to their illegal 
activities so that enforcement authorities may take deterrent measures, while those who come 
                                                          
8 OFT1495, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases: OFT’s detailed guidance on the principles and 
process, 2013, pp 63 – 64.                 
9 Malta has drafted a Leniency Programme, but it remains unenforced as yet. See Ron Galea Cavallazzi and Liza 
Abela, ‘Malta: Cartels & Leniency 2018’ ICLG, 06.11.2017. 
10 Commission Notice on the cooperation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in 
the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, Official Journal C101 27/04 (2004). Of the current 28 Member States, 
only Malta does not have a Leniency Programme, although a draft has been made it remains unenforced as yet. 
See Ron Galea Cavallazzi and Liza Abela, ‘Malta: Cartels & Leniency 2018’ ICLG, 06.11.2017. 
11 Caroline Cauffman, ‘The Interaction of Leniency Programmes and Action for Damages’ (2011) 7(2) 
Competition Law Review 181-220, p.181. 
12 See Scott D Hammond, “Detecting and Deterring Cartel Activity through an Effective Leniency Program” 
speech at the International Workshop on Cartels, Brighton, England, November 2000; Alexander Italianer, 
‘Fighting Cartels in Europe and the US: different systems, common goals’ speech at the Annual Conference of 
the International Bar Association (IBA), Boston, October 2013. 
13 Hugh Hollman and William E Kovacic, ‘The International Competition Network: Its Past, Current, and future 
Role’ (2011) 20 Minnesota Journal of International Law 274-323, p.275.    
14 European Commission, ‘Cartels Overview’ < ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/index_en.html > last 
accessed 03.02.2014; OFT press release, ‘Leniency – confess your cartel to the OFT’ < www.oft.gov.uk/cartels-
leniency > last accessed 04.02.2014; Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law, (7th edn, OUP 2012), 
Ch. 10. 
15 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, ‘Optimal law enforcement with self-reporting of behaviour’ (1994), 
102(3) Journal of Political Economy 583-606, p. 584. 
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forward may be granted immunity from punishment or reduction in fines.16 Such applicants 
would also be protected by confidentiality from any disclosure to the public of their leniency 
statements submitted to the authorities, together with their business secrets. The applicants 
can also benefit from the additional Leniency Plus scheme if they reveal any other previously 
unknown cartels they are engaged in. Cartels are considered to be the most serious form of 
anticompetitive agreements by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).17 The most serious cartels can manifest in the form of price fixing, bid-rigging, output 
quotas or restrictions, and market sharing, according to the ‘Competition Act 1998 and Cartels 
Guidance, 2014’ issued by the OFT/CMA.   
This thesis examines the efficacy of the Leniency Programme in the enforcement of 
Competition law, applied in respect of Chapter I, CA 98 prohibitions in the UK, based on 
decided cases by the UK’s principal enforcement authority, which has been the OFT until its 
powers were transferred to the newly formed CMA, on 1 April 2014. Chapter I cases decided 
and published by the OFT over a 12-year period, since CA 98 came into force in 2000 up to 
2012, comprising 24 cases have been analysed. Two of these relate to applications for 
exemptions, which do not warrant leniency but are nevertheless included for procedural value. 
The results are remarkable in that the widely held belief that leniency plays a major role in 
detecting and deterring cartels is proved to be far from the truth.    
As cartels mainly operate in secret, enforcement authorities stress the difficulty in obtaining 
evidence for effective prosecution of those businesses that infringe the law.18 Scarcity of 
resources is blamed as another factor that hinders public enforcement. Kaplow and Shavell 
have put forward the view that easy access to evidence and reduction of enforcement costs 
can both be achieved by encouraging self-reporting.19 The law enforcers and commentators 
are of the view that leniency policy, which encourages self-reporting, has greatly increased 
the number of cartel cases that have been uncovered, much higher than prior to the 
introduction of the leniency policy into Competition Law.20   
                                                          
16 OFT1495b, Quick Guide to Cartels and Leniency for Businesses, July 2013; OFT1495i, Quick Guide to Cartels 
and Leniency for Individuals, July 2013. 
17 OECD Report: Hard Core Cartels, 2000, p.11. 
18 See James M. Griffin, ‘An Inside Look at A Cartel at Work: Common Characteristics of International Cartels’ 
Speech before the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law 48th Annual Spring Meeting, Washington, 
D.C. April 6, 2000.    
19 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, ‘Optimal law enforcement with self-reporting of behavior’ (1994) 102 (3) 
Journal of Political Economy 583-606; Contra, Steffen Brenner, ‘An Empirical Study of the European Corporate 
Leniency Program’ (2005), Humboldt-University Berlin. 
20 See James M Griffin, ‘The Modern Leniency Program After Ten Years - A Summary Overview of The Antitrust 
Division's Criminal Enforcement Program’ Speech at The American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law 
Annual Meeting, San Francisco, California, 12 August, 2003. 
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Both the US Department of Justice (DoJ) and the European Commission (hereafter the 
Commission), have extolled the success of their Leniency policies in uncovering cartels.21 
They provide data in support of the enhanced number of cartels uncovered since the 
introduction of their revised Leniency Programmes respectively, and the resulting increase in 
fines.22 According to DoJ’s James M Griffiin, the revised leniency policy of 1993 increased the 
number of cartel confessions, from one per year under the old programme (the policy of 1978), 
to three per month.23 In the EU, according to Joaquin Almunia, leniency application rate has 
risen to four per month.24 In the UK, although no comparative figures are proclaimed as such, 
the leniency programme has been hailed as the bedrock of the enforcement process of 
competition law, by the UK government’s Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS).25 
 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
It is clear from the pronouncements of the enforcement authorities that they view Leniency 
Programmes as playing a major role, if not the major role, in detecting cartels. However, it is 
possible that the enforcement authorities may be overstating their leniency policy success, 
particularly as their data are based on the detected cartels, and not much research has been 
done to investigate how widespread the problem is. On the other hand, the increase may well 
                                                          
 
21 Scott D Hammond, ‘Cracking Cartels with Leniency Programs’ presentation at the OECD Competition Committee 
Working Party No.3, Prosecutors Program, 18 October 2005, Paris, ‘Since its revision in 1993, the Antitrust 
Division’s Corporate Leniency Program has been the Division’s most effective investigative tool’, ‘Cooperation from 
leniency applicants has cracked more cartels than all other tools at our disposal combined …’ < 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/speeches-6 > last accessed 12.11.2017; Scott D Hammond, ‘Cornerstones of an 
Effective Leniency Program’, Speech before the ICN Workshop on Leniency Programs, 22-23 November 2004, 
Sydney. “companies have been fined over $2.5 billion … since 1997, with over 90 per cent of this total tied to 
investigations assisted by leniency applicants.”; Mario Monti, ‘Proactive competition policy and the role of the 
consumer’ Speech on the European competition day, 29 April 2004, Dublin Castle, Dublin, European Commission 
– SPEECH/04/212 29/04/2004; See also Wouter P J Wils, Efficiency and Justice in European antitrust enforcement 
(Hart Publishing 2008), p.70. 
22 Report on Competition Policy 2007, European Commission, (June 2008). The Annual Report reads 3,334 
million euros in fines for year 2007, and 2,271 million euros for 2008, and still rising; Joaquín Almunia, ‘Fighting 
against cartels: A priority for the present and for the future’, speech in Brussels, 3 April 2014, SPEECH/14/281 
03/04/2014; See David Burns, Joshua Hess and Geoffrey Weien, ‘Criminal antitrust enforcement in 2008: A race 
to higher fines and longer jail terms’ (2009) Global Competition Review 1, (in 2007, fines of $630 million 
approximately, and in 2008, fines of $686 million approximately were imposed by the US DoJ, and in the EU the 
Commission collected more than 3.3 billion euros in 2007, an 80 per cent increase from 2006 and an incredible 
388 per cent increase from 2005). 
23 James M Griffin, ‘The Modern Leniency Program after Ten Years: A Summary Overview of the Antitrust 
Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program’ Speech at the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law 
Annual Meeting, San Francisco, California, 12 August 2003.   
24 Joaquin Almunia, ‘Fighting against cartels: A priority for the present and for the future’ Speech to SV 
Kartellrecht, Brussels, 3 April 2014. 
25 BIS, Ref: 12/512, Growth, competition and the competition regime: government response to consultation. 




be due to the increased integration of markets in the EU, resulting in an increase in cartel 
activity within the EU countries, and also the increase in global market activity in the 1990s.  
A research by Connor found that in the 2000s, the Antitrust Division of the US DoJ only had a 
cartel budget share of about 29 per cent,26 and in terms of personnel, the Division grew only 
very slowly since 1990, and still below the authorised level in the late 1970s.27 Despite the 
DoJ’s claims that its corporate leniency programme has increased the detection rate of hard 
core cartels since the 1993 changes to the Leniency Program, the number of cases filed 
annually has actually fallen by about 60 per cent during 1990-2006.28 Moreover, due to a 
considerable backlog of pending criminal cases, the disposal of cartel cases have fallen far 
below the levels publicly claimed by the DoJ. However, the financial penalties on conviction 
for price fixing have grown, in part due to legal upper limits.29      
A report released by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) states as its main finding 
that the 2004 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act (ACPERA), has had 
little change in the number of wrongdoers applying for leniency.30 The report found 78 leniency 
applications were submitted in the 6 years prior to ACPERA as against 81 in the 6 years after. 
They, however, found there was an increase in successful leniency applicants reporting 
previously unknown criminal conduct, and higher penalties in criminal cartel cases. 
While the US DoJ imposes high fines, the volume of affected commerce by some of the 
suspected cartels is said to be over one billion dollars per year, and in some others over $500 
million per year and in more than half of the investigations, over $100 million for the term of 
the conspiracy.31  
 
According to an estimate by Bryant and Eckard, federal competition authorities are thought to 
detect only between 13 and 17 per cent of cartels in a given year.32 They based their finding 
on data reported for a large sample of DoJ cases. In the meantime, Bill Baer of the Antitrust 
Division of the US DoJ, has claimed that since January 2009, the Division has filed 339 
                                                          
26 John M Connor, ‘Anti-Cartel Enforcement by the DOJ: An Appraisal’ (2008) 5 (1) The Competition Law Review, 
89-121, p. 94.                                          
27 Ibid, p. 93. 
28 Ibid, p. 98. 
29 Ibid, p. 104. 
30 GAO, ‘Criminal Cartel Enforcement: Stakeholder Views on Impact of 2004 Antitrust Reform Are Mixed, but 
Support Whistleblower Protection’ US Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, 
July 2011 < www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-619> last accessed 13.06.2016. 
31 See Gary R Sprattling, ‘International Cartels: The Intersection Between FCPA Violations and Antitrust 
Violations’ Speech at American Conference Institute 7th National Conference on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
Washington, D.C. December 1999.   
32 See Peter G Bryant and Edwin W Eckard, ‘Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught’ (1991) 73 (3) The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 531-536.          
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criminal cases (presumably, 2009 to 2013), a more than 60 per cent increase over the previous 
five years.33 Fines secured during the period was $ 4.2 billion, with the money going into the 
Crime Victims’ Fund. However, Baer says, ‘Of course, we can never know for certain the full 
deterrent effect of our enforcement efforts. But we do know that self-reporting under our 
leniency program remains at high levels …’34 
Meanwhile in the EU, concern was raised regarding the increase in the workload with 45 case 
handlers working in case teams of two, expecting a production capacity at its best to be around 
10 decisions per year.35 Guersent has pointed out that although cartels are high on the 
Commission’s agenda, internal staffing decisions have to take account of competing priorities 
such as state aid and mergers, as well as non-cartel work, and basic functions of market 
surveillance including the detection of cartels, not reported through leniency or sector inquiries. 
He has emphasised that there is little prospect in the short term of a further sharp increase in 
the resources dedicated to anti-cartel enforcement, but warned cartelists not to feel a sense 
of security over these constraints. 
The latest research by Wils shows that from 1996 to 2015, there were only 34 European 
Commission cartel decisions concerning cartels detected exclusively through leniency, where 
the cartel was clearly ongoing at the time of the first leniency application.36 The report does 
not state the circumstances under which these applicants came forward to confess. There 
were 97 cartel decisions with fines during the same period,37 thereby indicating a low number 
of Leniency applicants over a near 20-year period. 
 
In the UK, the BIS has admitted that there is evidence that the UK typically brings a lower 
number of antitrust cases than many other regimes and that this is due to the burden on the 
competition authorities establishing and upholding a case.38 If Leniency applicants provide the 
necessary information and evidence there need not be such a difficulty in upholding a case. 
Therefore, the question remains about the expected ‘cooperation’ given by the leniency 
applicants in order for the authorities to expedite and uphold cases. 
 
                                                          
33 See Bill Baer, ‘Reflections on Antitrust Enforcement in the Obama Administration’, Speech to the New York Bar 
Association, 30 January 2014, New York.  
34 Ibid, p 3. 
35 See Olivier Guersent, ‘The EU Model of Administrative Enforcement against Global Cartels: Evolving to Meet 
Challenges’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2006: 
Enforcement of Prohibition of Cartels, (Hart Publishing 2007). 
36 Wouter P J Wils, ‘The Use of Leniency in EU Cartel Enforcement: An Assessment after Twenty Years’ (2016) 
39 (3) World Competition: Law and Economics Review 327-388, Table 2. 
37 Ibid, Table 1. 
38 BIS, BIS/11/758, A competition regime for growth: A consultation on options for reform – impact assessment, 
2011, paras 203 and 206. 
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It is also a contributory factor in weakening enforcement that the authorities are acting as 
investigator, prosecutor and decision maker in investigations into cases of anticompetitive 
behaviour. However, ERRA 13 has attempted to address this position by allocating two groups 
for case handling, namely, Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) to conduct the investigation, and 
a Case Decision Group to decide upon the investigation.39 Both groups will be appointed from 
within the CMA. Any improved outcome can only be awaited in CMA investigations over a 
period of time. 
 
There is also criticism that incidences of recidivism have not been dealt with severely enough 
in the enforcement of EU antitrust law, which raises the question of effectiveness of the 
financial penalties.40 The fact that there is recidivism at all belies the claim that leniency 
programmes eliminate cartels. Leaning heavily on cartel colluders to come forward under 
leniency policies may also open the possibility of exploitation of leniency programmes by 
cartelists.41 They could broaden their strategies to avoid detection, and only report in cases 
where detection is likely or an investigation has already started, while engaging in other 
separate cartel activity in different markets undetected. Under these circumstances, in the 
absence of sufficient good quality data, sound results of the actual success rate of the leniency 
programme would not be possible. 
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
 
The central hypothesis of this research is that the branch of public enforcement of competition 
law by the complementary means of Leniency is flawed, not only because leniency policy is 
not statutory but also because it weakens the full force of the law by rewarding the 
perpetrators. Moreover, it takes time away from interventionary investigations that the 
enforcement authorities are empowered to engage in. This study aims to identify the problems 
of depending on Leniency Programmes in detecting anticompetitive activities by businesses.  
 
It must be emphasised at the outset that the UK competition law is in a much stronger position 
than that of the EU, in that it has criminalised cartel activity under section 188 of the EA 02, 
whereas EU law is essentially administrative only. Under EA 02 an individual convicted of a 
Chapter I offence can be imprisoned for a period up to 5 years and/or ordered to pay an 
                                                          
39 CMA8, Guidance on the CMA’s investigation procedures in Competition Act 1998 cases, 2014, sections 5 and 
11.30. 
40 See Wouter P J Wils, ‘Recidivism in EU Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis’ (2012) 35(1) 
World Competition: Law and Economics Review 1-24. 
41 See John M Connor, ‘Recidivism Revealed: Private International Cartels 1991-2009’ (2010) AAI Paper 1-47. 
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unlimited fine. Once convicted, such an individual can also be disqualified from being a director 
of a given business or undertaking for up to 15 years.42 Although the large fines imposed by 
the EU have been likened to criminal fines by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),43 
the EU has no criminal legislation to prosecute anticompetitive behaviour. However, both EU 
and UK competition laws have strong investigative powers which include intrusive surveillance 
and search of premises to seize documents relating to an investigation.44 Therefore, these    
authorities are in a strong position to detect and deter cartels by means of ex officio 
investigations.  
 
The UK competition law as it stands provides a wide range of powers for the regulators to 
exercise in the enforcement of civil investigations under CA 98. These powers are similar to 
the Commission’s powers in the implementation of its civil investigations. They include the 
power to enter premises with a warrant, and enter and search premises without a warrant.45 
The entering of premises can be with or without notice.46 Such powers can be exercised to 
seize documentary evidence which include electronically stored material pertaining to the 
offence under investigation. Further, the regulators also have the power to use covert or 
directed surveillance of persons and/or business premises to monitor their activities over a 
period of time to enable gathering further evidence.47   
 
The findings of this research reveal that colluders do not come forward willingly unless there 
is a threat of investigation looming.48 Although in the past it may have been difficult to obtain 
evidence of secret dealings of cartels, the OFT cases reveal that colluders did leave behind 
large amounts of electronic evidence in almost all of the cases, along with other material 
evidence.49 As such, hard evidence is not difficult to obtain as claimed by the enforcement 
                                                          
42 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, (s 9A); See OFT510, Competition disqualification orders, 1 June 
2010. 
43 See Engel and others v The Netherlands [1976] ECHR 3; Menarini Diagnostics v Italy, No 43509/08, [38]-[42]; 
Case C-89/10 P KME Germany and Others v Commission, [133].                    
 
44 See Sandra Marco Colino, Competition Law of the EU and UK (7th edn, OUP 2011); Cosmo Graham, EU and 
UK Competition Law (2nd edn, Longmans 2013); Barry Roger and Angus MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy 
in the EC and UK (4th edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2008). 
 
45 Enterprise Act 2002, sections 192-194; See OFT guideline, ‘(OFT404) Powers of Investigation: Understanding 
competition law’ 2004, Part 4 and Part 5; OFT1263rev, A guide to the OFT’s investigations procedures in 
competition cases, October 2012, para 6.19; See also CMA8, Competition Act 1998: Guidance on the CMA’s 
investigation procedures in Competition Act 1998 cases, March 2014, para 6.1. 
 
46 S 27(3) of CA 98; See OFT1263rev, (n 39), para 6.22; See also CMA8 (n 39), para 6.32.                  
47 OFT515 – Criminal powers for investigating criminal cartels, 2004, Part 5.  
48 See Chapter 5. 
49 Ibid.   
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authorities. The OFT cases therefore form the core of this thesis, in revealing the hidden truth 
about the Leniency Programme in the enforcement of competition law. 
 
This study also highlights the negative impact on victims, as a result of the adherence to 
leniency as a method of enforcement, by preventing the victims’ access to much needed 
evidence if they wish to make a claim for compensation.50 This is more so, as the Commission 
and the CJEU have both actively argued for the right of an individual for bringing an action for 
damages.51 Moreover, Council Regulation No 1/2003 intended national courts to deal with 
private actions for damages by victims,52 with a view to enhancing compliance of competition 
law by undertakings. Thus, the objectives of this thesis can be summarised as follows:  
 
a) Disprove the claim that leniency is a more efficient method of detecting cartels than direct    
intervention by enforcement authorities in the enforcement of competition law, 
b) Illustrate how leniency further negates the enforcement of competition law by being an 
obstruction to private actions by victims, and  
c) Propose for a regulatory framework that could help improve economic governance, and   
lead towards easy detection of cartels, instead of relying on Leniency applicants. 
 
 
1.4 Research Design 
 
The chapters in this research are summarised below in order to give a concise map of the 
research: 
Chapter Two lays out the framework of the applicable law in respect of anticompetitive 
behaviour as set out in Chapter I CA 98 and Article 101 TFEU, the EU law taking supremacy 
over its member states in respect of EU legislation. The competition law laid down therein 
relates to breaches which are essentially cartels. Cartels and/or ‘hard core cartels’ are 
discussed with reference to the harm they cause to competition in the market. This Chapter 
                                                          
50 Commission, Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions 
of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA relevance.  
51 See C-453/99 Courage v Crehen [2001] ECR 1-6297; See also Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi 
and others [2006] ECR 1-6619. 
52 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, [2003] OJ L001/P001, para 7. 
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also examines briefly the goals of competition law and the historical approach in respect of 
leniency that has been carried forward to the present day, and why leniency policy is used in 
competition law cases. The detrimental effect on victims seeking damages due to leniency 
policy is dealt with briefly. The legislative bodies entrusted with enforcing competition law in 
the UK are also identified here. This Chapter also explores the reforms relevant to the offence 
of ‘cartel’ brought in by the new ERRA 2013, by removing the ‘dishonesty’ element used in 
proving the breach. 
 
Chapter Three is a review of the economic theories in relation to the application of leniency in 
cartel cases. Out of a large body of economic theories only a small cross section is reviewed. 
These theories or ‘laboratory tests’ called Stochastic Lemmas depict economic research which 
seek to establish the ‘optimal’ design of Leniency policies that are intended to detect and deter 
cartels. Economists have been the influence behind leniency programmes but their theories, 
although of value, vary significantly, partly due to the limitations on the availability of data.  
 
Chapter Four explores the UK’s principal enforcement authority, the OFT’s (now CMA) fining 
procedure, in order to gain an understanding of how penalty decisions are arrived at by the 
OFT/CMA. The penalty Guidance explained therein is an essential feature in the OFT cases 
detailed in Chapter Five. The categories of Leniency available to prospective applicants are 
also briefly set out in this chapter. 
 
Chapter Five is the core of this study which traces the OFT’s cases published since CA 98 
came into force until 2012, covering a 12-year period. The CMA which took over from the OFT 
in 2014 has taken over the OFT’s pending cases, but apart from those, no significant 
independent Chapter I decisions have been taken by the CMA as at the close of this thesis. 
There are twenty-four Chapter I cases (two of which are only applications for clearance), which 
are reviewed in this chapter. Each case has been carefully summarised to ascertain the 
procedural steps taken in arriving at the decision. However, due to redaction of parts of the 
published version of these case records not all details pertaining to most of the companies 
involved are available. Soft law approach of Leniency is essentially an administrative tool, 
therefore, legal arguments, if any, are not dealt with in great detail relating to the case study. 
 
Chapter Six critically analyses, and assesses the outcome of cases reviewed in chapter Five. 
The weakness in enforcement due to low penalties as opposed to gains made by colluders, 
and the need for stronger enforcement by way of criminal prosecutions are considered in this 
chapter. It is suggested that the proposals for making market structures open and transparent 
12 
 
by the finance sector are a better way for enforcement authorities to adopt in detecting 
concentrations in the market. 
 
Chapter Seven will discuss the tension between the leniency programme, and private actions. 
This chapter critically analyses several decisions and developments which led to the 
Commission Directive on damages actions and the upholding of the confidentiality of Leniency 
documents. While the Commission has claimed that private actions would enhance, and take 
forward the enforcement of antitrust law, the Leniency policy appears to be an obstacle in 
obtaining vital evidence needed by victims in proving the harm caused to them. 
 
Chapter Eight addresses the results of the study, and proposes possible solutions which aim 
to rectify, and remove the obstacles that prevent enforcement authorities in detecting and 
investigating anticompetitive behaviour in the market place. Some suggestions for future 
research are made at the close of this chapter. 
 
1.5 Methodology 
This work is crafted from a qualitative approach,53 taking in the historical perspectives through 
to legal and administrative features of the use of leniency as a mode of public enforcement. 
The application of Leniency Programmes, emanating from the EU Leniency Notice,54  is a 
feature of the administrative decisions of the enforcement authorities which are entrusted with 
the implementation of competition law. The question whether the Leniency Programme 
complements public enforcement of antitrust infringements, as postulated by its proponents 
could only be answered by carefully examining the extant primary and secondary sources of 
the law. The primary sources include the relevant legislative enactments, and published cases 
while secondary sources include texts written by experts within the subject area of Competition 
Law and Economics, as well as related areas that those authors and their texts refer to. The 
methodology used in this thesis, therefore, stands open and flexible, enabling the intended 
exploration, and discovery55 of the logic behind the use of the phenomenon called the 
Leniency Programme, and in the collation of relevant material in each of the Chapters that 
follow. The texts included books, journals, articles, speeches, newspapers, magazines, and 
Working Papers by scholars in the field of antitrust law and economics. 
 
                                                          
53 See Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods, (3rd edn, Sage Publications, 2002); 
Thomas A Schwandt, The Sage Dictionary of Qualitative Inquiry (3rd edn, Sage Publication, 2007). 
54 See n 7. 
55 See Juliet M Corbin and Anselm Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for 
Developing Grounded Theory (4th edn, Sage Publications, 2015). 
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For the purpose of this thesis, economic theories were of much assistance as leniency 
programmes have been promulgated by economists from the very outset.56 Competition law 
is intrinsically linked to economics,57 therefore review of economic texts and theoretical 
experiments in the subject was essential as illustrated in Chapter 3. Law and economics 
approach has been emerging as a dominant theoretical and scientific methodology for legal 
academia in the recent past leading to certain policy and law making.58 It is argued by some, 
that law has become the most important areas of applied economics.59 The economic 
methodology has, therefore, the advantage of easily crossing geographical borders and 
different legal systems, ‘game theory’ which developed the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ adopted in 
Leniency Programmes being one such example, among others.60 The review of laboratory 
experiments by economists in Chapter 3 is descriptive in order to draw on the conclusions 
arrived at by their laboratory experiments in relation to leniency applied in competition law. 
 
The British Library provided most of the texts, journals, articles and, the assistance in 
accessing material available online for developing and completing this thesis. The Brunel 
student registration helped access through JSTOR, to other university publications as well as 
journals published internationally, as did Westlaw and LexisNexis. The Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies (IALS) of the London University held many useful lectures and seminars and 
also made available access to its library resources through registration. The lectures and panel 
discussions held by the Centre of European Law, Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College 
London brought well-known authors, and experts on European Law to the sessions that were 
well attended by both students and professionals. The World Wide Web, was instrumental in 
accessing the published cases, some of the Working Papers, speeches as well as archived 
articles such as news reports, and Press Releases by enforcement authorities. It also gave 
access to videos of presentations such as the ICN Leniency Programme, and some of the EU 
Officials’ speeches. Seminars, Graduate School Learning Programmes, discussions with 
peers, and observations made in the work place as well as outside of it were great sources of 
assistance in collating the information gathered. The law Society Gazette was a source of 
                                                          
56 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, ‘Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behaviour’ (1994) 102 
(3), Journal of Political Economy, 583-606; Steven Shavell, ‘A Note on the Incentives to Reveal Information’ (1989) 
14 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 66-74; Steven Shavell, ‘Optimal Sanctions and the Incentive to Provide 
Evidence to Legal Tribunals’ (1989) 9 (1) International Review of Law and Economics 3-11; Joseph Farrel, 
‘Voluntary Disclosure: Robustness of the Unraveling Result, and Comments on Its Importance’ in Ronald Grieson 
(ed) Antitrust and Regulation, (Lexington Books 1986), 91-103; Paul Milgrom ‘Good News and Bad News: 
Representation Theorems and Applications’ (1981) 12 (2) Bell Journal of Economics 380-391.  
57 See Alexander Italianer, Opening address: ‘The interplay between law and economics’ Speech at Charles River 
Associates Annual Conference, Brussels, 8 December 2010. 
58 Eli M Salzberger, ‘The Economic Analysis of Law: The Dominant Methodology for Legal Research?’ (2008) 4 
Haifa Law Review 207, p 208. 
59 Richard A Posner and Francesco Parisi (eds), Law and Economics, (Edward Elgar, 1997) p ix. 
60 See Martin J Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory (OUP 2003). 
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constant update of changes in the law (in all areas) as well as affording the opportunity to 
attend organised events, some of which invited speakers from the European Union 
Competition Unit itself, so that questions could be asked directly for clarification of certain 
aspects of the subject under discussion. One seminar discussed a Commission proposal for 
shareholders to take responsibility to acquaint themselves with the type of investments their 
preferred companies were engaged in.61  
Starting from a position of value-neutrality, (as a new comer to the subject of Competition Law) 
this work was carried out objectively, and the truth about ‘Leniency’ in competition law became 
apparent as a phenomenon deeply and inextricably embedded in the enforcement of 
competition law, with both the enforcers and the economists extolling its value in the detection 
of anticompetitive behaviour.62 
The qualitative methodology employed in this thesis involves a number of methods that are 
coming into play in the collation of relevant material and the construction of each of the 
Chapters that follow. They include descriptive, expository, and evaluative methods and critical 
analysis in the main.  
In Chapter Two, descriptive method comes into play where it is aimed at providing a 
descriptive analysis of the technical and coordinated legal rules found in the primary sources.63 
The descriptive method is used here to collate, organise and describe legal rules and offer 
comments on the emergence and significance of the legal sources such as case law, with the 
aim of identifying the underlying system and the rules that are involved. By this process, the 
focus is on the primary sources; statutes, Directives, and case law in particular, and academic 
commentary as secondary sources. Chapter Three, deals with the economic theories of 
various economists. The method used here is expository,64 which in other words is explanatory 
writing, providing information about hypotheses, theories and processes of various 
economists who have arrived at their conclusions using stochastic lemmas. These lemmas or 
mathematical equations are very elaborate and are not dealt with in this chapter. Only the 
resulting theories are reviewed in order to gain an insight into, and inform critically the 
strategies that convey how leniency plays out in a given scenario. 
                                                          
61 Panel Debate, ‘Corporate Governance and Shareholders’ Rights Directive’, Panel Debate on ‘Shareholders’ 
Rights and Responsibilities?’ with Zsofia Kerecsen, Policy Officer in the European Commission (Company Law 
and Corporate Governance) responsible for the revision of the Shareholders’ Rights Directive, held on 14 
November 2013 at the Law Society, Chancery Lane. 
62 See n 23, n 24 and n 25. 
63 See Sherri L Jackson, Research Methods and Statistics: A Critical Thinking Approach (4th edn, Wadsworth 2012); 
See also Meredith D Gall, Joyce P Gall and Walter R Borg, Educational Research: An Introduction, (8th edn, 
Pearson, 2006). 
64 See Frances K Hubbard and Lauren Spencer, Writing to Inform (Rosen Publishing 2012).         
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Under Chapter Four, the UK policy and practice in relation to penalties in particular, are 
explained in order to enable an understanding of the decisions taken by the OFT in the cases 
set out in Chapter Five. For this purpose, the OFT’s procedure involved in arriving at its penalty 
calculations in its Guidance, OFT 423,65 is explored in this chapter. 
Chapter Five is the core of this thesis, where all 24 Chapter I cases dealt with by the UK’s 
principal enforcement authority over a period of 12 years are carefully examined, by way of 
content analysis66 The descriptive and observational methods used in the study of these 
cases, is an examination of those cases in order to determine the truth of a stated claim rather 
than to draw out hidden or unknown factors. The cases are very lengthy with complicated, 
sometimes even convoluted procedural details, recording seemingly endless evidence from 
witnesses which were then analysed in great detail. It was therefore necessary to explore the 
OFT’s procedure involved in arriving at its penalty calculations in its Guidance, explained in 
Chapter Four. The appeal tribunal CAT’s involvement in some of the cases sheds more light 
on the complicity, if not complexity of the ways in which the participants of cartels conduct 
such activities. The CAT’s decisions provide interesting material for analysis. 
These cases are explanatory of the methods used by the enforcement authority in arriving at 
a decision on the breach of the extant law. As Goodson and Walker state, ‘The task of research 
is to make sense of what we know’.67 As such it should be treated as a review of the cases in 
order to achieve the aim of the research. i.e. to assess the efficiency of the Leniency 
Programme in detecting, and investigating anticompetitive behaviour by undertakings. Indeed, 
it has been said that innovation resides within a professional domain.68 Decided cases provide 
ample opportunity for just such innovation, particularly in a local jurisdictional setting, in this 
case UK’s competition enforcement authority. Leniency, however, is essentially an 
administrative tool and, therefore, does not test the limits of legal rules explicitly.   
Chapter Six takes on the evaluation of the cases discussed in Chapter Five, using critical 
analysis to highlight certain aspects of the procedure adopted in the decisions. Critical analysis 
enables examining the similarities and differences between decisions and legal reasoning to 
glean new ideas by logical arguments.69 Hence, while theory may apply in one case or 
                                                          
65 OFT 423, OFT’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, 2012. 
66 See Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods, (4th edn, OUP 2012). 
67 Ivor F Goodson and R Walker, Biography, Identity and Schooling: Episodes in Educational Research (Falmer, 
London 1991) p. 107. 
68 See Jon Nixon, ‘The teacher as researcher: contradictions and continuities’ (1987) 64 Peabody Journal of 
Education 20. 
69 See Stella Cottrell, Critical Thinking Skills: Developing Effective Analysis and Argument (2nd edn, Palgrave 
Macmillan 2011); Jennifer Wilson Mulnix, ‘Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking’ (2012) 44 (5) Educational 
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instance it does not necessarily mean it can apply equally in all cases. It is only cautionary to 
assess theories, evidence and decisions in a logical and critical way in order to arrive at a 
balanced presentation. By questioning the set patterns, and not taking them at face value, 
allows the researcher to ascertain how a given situation could best be resolved. Chapter 
Seven addresses the issue of another aspect of enforcement hampered by leniency, i.e. 
private actions, where recent changes to the application of leniency are explored and analysed 
detailing relevant decisions. The concluding chapter draws on the findings of the thesis as set 
out in the preceding chapters by analysis and discussion, providing the implications of the 
results, leading to the conclusions aimed at by the thesis. 
The methods employed in this thesis are not neatly demarcated but fluid, particularly as legal 
scholarship essentially deals with ‘theories’ while analysis of those theories could be very 
complex.70 Legal theories in effect deal with practicalities, as demonstrated by the lengthy and 
arduous procedures taken by the OFT cases. It has been said that ‘the core business of legal 
doctrine is interpretation’ and, although, essentially it operates within geographical limits, legal 
doctrine can be defined as an ‘empirical-hermeneutical discipline.’71 In that sense, it embraces 
the conception of an argumentative discipline, which uses argumentation to support legal 
interpretation or solution that is emphasised, rather than the interpretation itself.72 Thus, it is 
submitted that methodology in legal disciplines do not have to take a defined path in achieving 
the end result.  
The OFT’s life span came to an end with the establishment of the CMA which came into force 
on 1 April 2014, with the result that this thesis has to be read as relevant during the period the 
OFT was in force, whose website ‘http://www.oft.gov.uk’ is now closed. Thus this thesis had 
to deal with the changing environment, as the end of the OFT’s term drew near and actually 
ended before the thesis was completed. With the closing of the OFT in 2014, the OFT cases, 
and its other publications have been archived, but they can be accessed via the new CMA 
website, ‘http://www.gov.uk/cma’. All pending investigations were transferred to the newly 
formed CMA. In addition to the change over from the OFT to the CMA, there were changes in 
the law and procedures, particularly by the new Consumer Rights Act 2015. Several of the 
sources which were easily available online related to OFT activities disappeared, with the 
                                                          
Philosophy and Theory 464-479; Peter A Facione and Noreen C Facione, Thinking and Reasoning in Human 
Decision Making: The Method of Argument and Heuristic Analysis (California Academic Press 2007). 
70 Robert Cryer and Tamara Hervey and others, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2011), p 5.  
71 Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’ in Mark Van Hoecke (ed), 
Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart Publishing 2013) p 3; 
See also Jaber F Gubrium and James A Holstein ‘Analyzing Interpretive Practice’ in N K Denzin and Y S Lincoln 
(eds) Handbook of Qualitative Research (2nd edn, Sage Publishing, 2000).  
72 Ibid, Van Hoecke, p 4; See also Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1st edn, Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press 1986).  
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closure of the OFT. Changes with regard to the Leniency policy also came about in the EU, 
with the introduction of the Commission Directive on damages actions and non-disclosure of 
leniency documents.73  
Leniency as a topic is largely related to economic theory and research, but limited in that these 
researches are mostly around ‘optimal’ designs of leniency policy with limited data, as data on 
hidden cartels are not available.74 In addition, there are few qualitative researches involving 
case studies or evaluation by interviews published in relation to Leniency, with this thesis 
encountering only two such published surveys, and the late discovery of a recent PhD thesis 
from Australia, on the effectiveness of the Australian immunity policy on cartel detection.75 In 
particular, there were no comparative researches into the circumstances under which 
Leniency was sought by colluders, where the spontaneous or voluntary nature of the 
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74 See Chapter 3. 
75 OFT, OFT962 ‘The Deterrent Effect of Competition Enforcement by the OFT, Delotte Report, 2007; See D 
Daniel Sokol, ‘Cartels, Corporate Compliance and What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement’ (2012) 78 
Antitrust Law Journal 201–240; See Pariz Lythgo-Marshall, ‘The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: A Critical Legal Analysis’ 2016, Doctor of Philosophy thesis, 











Leniency Programme as a Complementary Public Enforcement Strategy in the 




The central focus of this thesis is on the area of Leniency Programmes as applied in the 
enforcement of competition law. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the rules applicable 
to anticompetitive behaviour under EU and UK competition law as both these jurisdictions 
work together in order to deter such anticompetitive behaviour, with the EU law taking 
supremacy over UK competition law. This chapter will examine the different aspects of the law 
that come into play under Chapter I, CA 98, which is modelled on Article 101 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Both EU and UK regulations have  embraced 
the concept of leniency by introducing Leniency Programmes into their respective competition 
law regimes as a method of complementary public enforcement.76 Although there are some 
differences with regard to different Member States that have adopted a leniency policy in 
respect of the enforcement of EU competition law, the basic principles are common to all of 
them as EU law takes primacy over its Member States.77 Effects of the EU’s attempt at 
promoting private actions, in order to enhance enforcement of competition law under 
decentralization are also perused. This chapter will discuss the nature of cartels as well as the 
use of leniency in arresting deviant behaviour from a historical point of view. 
The UK’s enforcement authorities, and some of the new changes brought about by the ERRA 
13 are set out briefly, the biggest changes being the replacement of the principal enforcement 
authority, the OFT, by the CMA, and re-defining of the cartel offence itself with the removal of 
                                                          
76 Alexander Italianer, ‘Fighting cartels in Europe and the US: Different Systems, Common Goals’ Speech at the 
International Bar Association, Boston, 9 October 2013; Ali Nickpay, ‘UK cartel enforcement – past, present, future’ 
Speech to the Law Society Anti-Trust Section, 11 December 2012, p 6. 
77 See Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585; Alexander Italianer, ‘Completing Convergence’ Speech at the 
European Competition Day, Rome, 10 October 2014; See also Alexander Italianer ‘The Independence of National 




the ‘dishonesty’ requirement from it. Essentially, this chapter explains the legal framework 
within which cartels are dealt with under competition law, and why cartels are undesirable and 
difficult to detect, which has led the enforcement authorities to apply a leniency programme. 
 
2.2 Legislative Instruments 
In the UK, Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 (CA 98), prohibits any agreement or 
concerted practice which has the object or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting 
competition unless an exemption from the prohibition applies.78 Further, the Enterprise Act 
2002 (EA 02) along with the new ERRA 13 make it a criminal offence to engage in such 
anticompetitive activities.79 The CA 98 prohibitions are modelled upon those contained in 
Articles 101 of the TFEU.80 Where the effect of anticompetitive behaviour extends beyond the 
UK to other EU member states, UK competition authorities, and the courts are also 
empowered to apply and enforce the entirety of Articles 101. For the purpose of this thesis, 
only anticompetitive activities under Chapter I of CA 98 (as amended by EA 02), and Article 
101 of the TFEU apply. 
Article 101(1) of the TFEU prohibits agreements between undertakings that have as their 
object or effect to prevent, restrict or distort competition between the Member States.81 ‘Object’ 
and ‘effect’ must be taken separately as they are not cumulative, but constitute alternative 
requirements. Thus, where an agreement has as its object, to restrict or distort competition82 
it is not necessary to analyse its effects. If the object does not appear so to restrict competition, 
then it must be considered whether that agreement affects competition.83 Under Article 101(2) 
                                                          
78 The meaning of “agreement or concerted practice” is to be determined in accordance with s 60 of CA 98, in a 
manner consistent with the decisions of the CJEU, GC and the Commission under Article 81 (1) EC (now Art 
101(1); JJB Sports plc and Allsports Ltd v Office of Fair Trading, [2004] CAT 17, para 150; Case 48/69, ICI v 
Commission (Dyestuffs), [1972] ECR 619, [64-66]; Case 47/73, Suiker Unie v Commission [1975] ECR 1663, [283]. 
79 However, criminal prosecution is the least used provision by the UK enforcement authorities.  
80 Arts 101 and 102 (ex Art 81 and 82) are the main competition law provisions contained in the TFEU. Both Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU are enforceable in parallel with Chapters I and II of CA 98. Article 102 (ex Art 82) prohibits 
conduct which amounts to abusive behaviour by a dominant undertaking in a relevant market. It may be useful to 
note here the evolution of Arts 101 and 102 which were Articles 81 and 82 prior to the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, and 
they were Articles 85 and 86 respectively before the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999; Case 6/72 
Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215, [11], The ECJ stated that ‘Articles 85 and 86 seek to achieve the 
same aim on different levels, viz. the maintenance of effective competition within the common market.’; See also 
Stephen Weatherill, Cases & Materials on EU Law, (10th edn, OUP 2012). 
81 Case 56/65 Société Technique Miniere v Mascinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235, [249]. 
82 Case C-501/06 P GlaxoSmithKline v Commission [2009] ECR 1-9291, [59]; Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands 
and Others [2009] ECR I-4529, [28]; Case 209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry [2008] ECR I-8637, [15] 
[16]. 
83 See Case 56/65 STM v Maschinenbau [1996] ECR 235; Case T-328/03 O2 (Germany) GmbH v Commission 
[2006] ECR II-1231; See also Damien Geradin and Ianis Girgenson, ‘The Counterfactual Method in EU Competition 




all such agreements that come under Article 101(1) are void.84 However, Article 101(3) 
exempts agreements under Article 101(1) provided certain conditions are met. 
 
2.2.1 Modernisation and Decentralisation Aimed at Restitution of Victims? 
Until the modernisation Regulation 1/2003 replaced the centralised enforcement system set 
up by the previous Regulation (EEC) No. 17/62, only the Commission could award an 
individual exemption under what was then Article 81(3), now Article 101(3).85 Regulations 
(EEC) 19/65 and 2821/71 empowered the Commission to issue block exemptions under 
Article 81(3) to certain categories of agreements.86 It was meant to ensure that the then 
Articles 81 and 82 (now Art 101 and 102) were applied effectively and uniformly across 
Member States. However, the centralised scheme was found to hamper the application of 
competition rules by the competition authorities and the courts. This was mainly due to the 
fact that the Commission was overloaded by administrative work and the centralised 
enforcement of competition law, leading to an increasingly inefficient way of enforcement 
procedure in a Community (now European Union) currently consisting of 28 Member States.87  
Further, the lack of uniformity in the enforcement of competition law in the Member States was 
another motivation for adopting a centralised system to ensure consistency and coherence.88 
Regulation 1/2003 was therefore brought in to replace the centralised system with a directly 
applicable exemption scheme whereby the national competition authorities (NCAs) and the 
national courts of the Member States were empowered to apply Article 101(3).89 This brought 
in decentralisation, together with the already existing power of direct effect of Articles 101 and 
                                                          
84 It should be noted however, that the presence of an anticompetitive term in a contract does not necessarily 
invalidate the whole agreement, as decided both by the ECJ in Case 56/65 Société Technique Miniéré v 
Maschinenbau [1966] ECR 235, and by the English court in Chemidus Wavin Ltd v Société pour la Transformation 
[1977] FSR 181 (CA); [1978] 3 CMLR 514; See also Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 
130; The English courts’ practice is the severing of the illegal provisions from otherwise lawful agreements;  Richard 
Whish, Competition Law, (5th ed), , LexisNexis, London  2003) p. 289. 
85 Council Regulation (EEC) No 17 of 6 February 1962, First Regulation Implementing Article 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty (Articles 81 and 82 after the Treaty of Amsterdam) [1962] OJ L13/204; Pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation 
17, only the European Commission could grant an individual exemption under Article 81(3). 
86 Council Regulation (EEC) No 19/65 of 2 March 1965 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain 
categories of agreements and concerted practices [1965] OJ 36/533. See Council Regulation (EC) No 1215/1999 
of 10 June1999 amending Regulation No 19/65 [1999] OJ L148/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2821/71 of 20 
December 1971 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices [1971] OJ L285/46. The Regulation was last amended by the Act of Accession of 1994. 
87 Recital 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1; See ‘White Paper on Modernisation of 
the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty’ Commission Programme No 99/027 COM (1999) 101 
final [1999] OJ C132/1.  
88 See Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1; See also Procureur de la Republique v Giry 
and Guerlain [1980] ECR 2327. 
89 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, [2003] OJ L001/P001, which replaced Regulation 17 of 1962. 
Consequently, the UK’s OFT adopted its ‘Modernisation, (December 2004): The OFT’s application of EC 
Regulation 1/2003 and the United Kingdom legal exception regime.’   
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102, as has been decided by the CJEU in its case law.90 The removal of the centralised block 
exemptions under Article 101 (3), which hampered private actions was meant to enable, to a 
greater extent, those individuals harmed by the anticompetitive behaviour of companies, to 
seek damages.91 Nevertheless, decentralisation though necessary, is found to be an 
insufficient tool to promote private enforcement. Regulation 1/2003 did not dramatically 
change the outlook for more private actions.92  
 
2.2.2 Supremacy of the EU Law Safeguarded under s 60 of CA 98 
In applying Chapter I, CA 98 and Article 101 TFEU, the OFT/CMA and the national courts are 
bound by the fundamental principle of supremacy of the European law (Union law) and must 
follow the case law of the CJEU in interpreting EU legislation. The rule was first laid down in 
Costa, and confirmed in subsequent cases.93  
Under Article 16(2) of the Modernisation Regulation 1/2003, where the Commission has taken 
a decision on an agreement or conduct under Article 101 or Article 102, NCAs cannot take a 
decision in respect of the same agreement or conduct which would run counter to the decision 
taken by the Commission.94 This position has been incorporated in section 60 of the UK’s CA 
98. Hence UK authorities are under a dual obligation in dealing with questions arising from 
competition law within the UK. First, they must ensure that there is no inconsistency with either 
the principles laid down by the EU Treaty and the CJEU, or any relevant decision of the 
CJEU.95 Second, the UK authorities must have regard to any ‘relevant decision or statement’ 
of the Commission that has the authority of the Commission as a whole, as for example 
individual cases under Articles 101 and 102, Commission Notices, and policy statements 
published in its Annual Reports on Competition Policy.96 The governing principle, therefore, is 
that UK law should not deviate from EU law in its substantive application. 
                                                          
90 Case 127/73 BRT v SABAM [1974] ECR 51; Case C-282/95 P Guérin Automobiles v Commission [1997] ECR 
1-1503; Case C-453/99 Courage v Crehan [2001] ECR 1-6297. 
91 Ibid, Courage.  
92 Ashurst: ‘Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules’ 
Comparative Report, 2004, (Prepared by Denis Waelbroeck, Donald Slater and Gil Even-Shoshan). 
93 See Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585; Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECE 1, 13; R v Secretary 
of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame Ltd [1989] 2 All ER 629; 2 WLR 997; See McCarthys Ltd v Smith [1981] 
QB 199; See also Garland v British Rail Engineering [1982] 2 All ER 402.   
94 Competition Law Modernisation: OFT 442, (2004), p 9. 
95 Commission Notice on the cooperation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the 
application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, Official Journal C101 27/04 (2004); Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 
December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 
[2003] OJ L001/P001.    
96 See Case Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195; 3 WLR 247; 1 CMLR 50; Case 41/74 Van Duyn 
v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337; See also Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629; Joined Cases C-6/90 and 
C-9/90, Francovich and others v Italy; 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Netherland [1963] ECE 1. 
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The acquis communautaire applies to core policies, but in other areas Member States may 
choose to participate or act.97 The CJEU has recognised in a consistent line of judgements, 
though very rarely by name, the ‘procedural, remedial and institutional autonomy’ of the 
Member States to identify the remedies, courts and procedures that are necessary for the 
exercise of Union law rights at the national level.98 Also CJEU has imposed demanding Union 
law limits and safeguards upon that autonomy, on principles of ‘equality and effectiveness’.99 
The obligation to ensure consistency applies only to the extent that this is possible, having 
regard to any relevant differences between the provisions concerned.100 Consistency, it may 
be said, is a by-product of the general EU principles of ‘effectiveness and equivalence’, which 
in competition law has developed in a specific manner, not only as a policy objective but as a 
true requirement on issues such as the ability of competition authorities to defend their 
decisions before review courts and the method of calculation of penalties.101  
Union law at national level should not be submitted to more onerous procedures than the 
enforcement of comparable national law. The second principle which is a direct consequence 
of the principles of` ‘direct effect and supremacy’ is a much harder test., i.e. it must be effective 
and must not render the remedies impossible or onerous. To these must be added Article 267, 
TFEU preliminary reference procedure, paramount to a private enforcement. The CJEU has 
proceeded further, for example, in Francovich102 and Factortame,103 it recognised certain 
autonomous Community law remedies for Community Law104 based rights, and has delegated 
to national law only the very specific conditions for their exercise as well as the procedural 
framework rules within equality and effectiveness.105 
                                                          
97 See Stephen Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law, (10th edn, OUP 2012), p 626. 
98 Assimakis P Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by 
National Courts (Hart Publishing, 2008), p 147; Indeed, the ECJ did not hold in Case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd v 
HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000] ECR I-11369, that national courts must always consider themselves bound by 
Commission decisions, but only indirectly through the Court of Justice’s intervention, to which they can always 
have access by means of the preliminary reference procedure. 
99 Ibid; Case 130/79 Express Dairy Foods Ltd v Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce (1980) ECR 1887, [12]. 
100 See Komninos, (n 98).       
101 Commission Staff Working Document, Enhancing competition enforcement by the Member States' competition 
authorities: Institutional and procedural issues. Accompanying the document, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 
1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives {COM(2014) 453} {SWD(2014)230},  paras 9,10,11 and 62 
respectively. 
102 See Case C-6/90 Francovich v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 
103 See Case C-213/89 Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport [1990] ECR I-2433; See also Joined 
cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur SA and Factortame Ltd [1996] ECR I-1029; See Case 6/64 
Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585; cf. Macarthys Ltd v Smith [1981] QB 180 – Lord Denning MR. 
104 ‘Community Law’ is now referred to as ‘Union Law’ since the Lisbon Treaty of 1 December 2009, and will be 
referred to as such except when quoting past cases and texts; See Weatherill, (n 97), p 3.  
105 See Komninos, (n 98), p 148. 
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A key difference between CA 98 and EU rules is that CA 98 has no requirement of an effect 
on inter-state trade. This is significant as the unstated objective behind much of EU law is the 
achievement of a single market.106  
 
2.2.3 What are the Goals of Competition Law? 
The goals of Article 101 TFEU are not clearly stated.107 However, the pronouncements of 
enforcement authorities suggest that competition law is intended, essentially, to ensure 
consumer welfare.108 A Commission report states that ‘maximising consumer welfare’ should 
be considered in its competition policy.109 Under Article101(3) TFEU, in particular, one of four 
cumulative conditions that should be met for exemption is that consumers must receive a fair 
share of the resulting benefits.110 The concept of fair share indicates that the benefits must at 
least compensate consumers for any harm caused by the efficiencies generated by the 
anticompetitive agreement. Passing on benefits to consumers by way of distribution of the 
gains can take the form of improved or new products or lower prices. According to BIS, ‘It 
(competition) ultimately benefits consumers through greater choice, better quality and lower 
                                                          
106 Core goal of the Treaty of Rome, 1957; See John McCormick, European Union Politics (Palgrave Macmillan 
2011) p 75; See also Council Recommendation [C(95)130/FINAL] which states that ‘anticompetitive practices may 
constitute an obstacle to the achievement of economic growth, trade expansion, and other economic goals of 
Member countries’. 
107 The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, formed what is now known as the European Union (EU). The primary 
goal of EU competition policy was to enable a common market within the EU by eliminating obstacles pertaining 
to member state borders. The Treaty of Rome also created what is now called the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), formerly the European Court of Justice (ECJ), as the official court to interpret the Treaty 
on questions of EU law. CJEU decisions applying Article 101 reflect interpretation in light of the EU’s goal of 
market integration. However, over the decades, the CJEU has taken a much broader approach to interpreting 
Article 101; Case C-501/6 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P, and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v 
Commission [2009] ECR I-9291, [63]; Rein Wesseling, The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law. (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing 2000), p. 48-49. 
108 Alexander Italianer, ‘Competition Policy for Consumers’ and Citizens’ Welfare’ speech on European 
Competition and Consumer Day, Dublin, 24 May 2013; Philip Lowe, ‘Consumer Welfare and Efficiency - New 
Guiding Principles of Competition Policy?’ speech at 13th International Conference on Competition and 14th 
European Competition Day, Munich, 27 March 2007. 
109 Commission, ‘Report on Competition Policy 2008’ COM (2009), {SEC(2009) 10004} COM(2009) 374 final, 
para 108 at 27; Roger D Blair and D Daniel Sokol, ‘Welfare Standards in US and EU Antitrust Enforcement’ 
(2013) 81 Fordham L Rev 2497, pp 2510-11. 
110 Commission, Communication of the Commission, Notice, Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty, (2004/C 101/08), OJ C 101 , 27/04/2004 P. 0097 - 0118; Under Article 101 (3), prohibitions under Art 101 
will not apply to any agreements, decisions or concerted practices between undertakings, ‘which contributes to 
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned 
restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the 
possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.’ OJ 115, 
09/05/2008 P. 0088 – 0089. 
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prices.’111 However, only objective benefits are to be considered as providing consumer 
welfare.112  
Whish and Bailey identify several policy goals and are of the view that governments use 
competition policy to further a variety of objectives, stating, ‘… competition policy does not 
exist in a vacuum: it is an expression of the current values and aims of society and is as 
susceptible to change as political thinking generally.’113 Over the years, The CJEU decisions 
have widened to include the protection of the ‘structure of the market, and in so doing 
competition as such’ as seen in GlaxoSmithKline,114 and has moved away from purely a 
consumer welfare paradigm in T-Mobile.115 
Neelie Kroes has said, ‘Consumer welfare is now well established as the standard the 
Commission applies when assessing mergers and infringements of the Treaty rules on cartels 
and monopolies. Our aim is simple: to protect competition in the market as a means of 
enhancing consumer welfare and ensuring an efficient allocation of resources’.116 
 
According to Lianos, ‘… the EU courts have moved to a more pragmatic view of the objective 
of market integration and have employed reasoning that may be compatible with a welfare 
perspective.’117 In the meantime, European Parliament Fact Sheets inform that from the point 
of view of the EU competition policy objectives, ‘It is a condition for achieving a free and 
dynamic internal market and is one of several instruments promoting general economic 
welfare’.118 
In the UK, in accordance with section 25(3) of ERRA 13, ‘The CMA must seek to promote 
competition, both within and outside the United Kingdom, for the benefit of consumers.’ In a 
Command Paper published in 2001, the UK’s Department of Trade and Industry has stated, 
                                                          
111 BIS, Ref: BIS/12/644, ‘A Competition Regime for Growth: A Consultation on Options for Reform, Impact 
Assessment’ 2012, para 1 at 10.  
112 See n 110, paras 20-23 (Guidelines); Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission 
[1966] ECR 299, [349]. 
113 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (7th edn, OUP 2012), p 20. 
114 Case C-501/06P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2010] 4 CMLR 2 [63]. 
115 Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v Raad [2009] 5 CMLR 11 [43].  
116 See Neelie Kroes, ‘European Competition Policy – Delivering Better Markets and Better Choices’ 
SPEECH/05/512. 
117 Ioannis Lianos, ‘Some reflections on the question of the goals of EU Competition Law’ (2013) CLES Working 
Paper Series 3/2013, p 14. 
118 See Stephanie Honnefelder and Roberto Silvestri, ‘Fact Sheets on the European Union: Competition Policy’ 
(2017) European Parliament < 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_3.2.1.html > last accessed 
04.07.2017; See also ‘European Union Competition Law: The Goal (or Goals) of Article 101’ New York Law 




‘Vigorous competition between firms is the lifeblood of strong and effective markets. 
Competition helps consumers get a good deal. It encourages firms to innovate by reducing 
slack, putting downward pressure on costs and providing incentives for the efficient 
organisation of production.’119 Thus, the preservation of competition appears to be the basis 
for the Chapter I prohibitions, with the consumers benefiting as a result. 
 
‘Consumer welfare’ is not universally accepted as the intended goal of competition law.120 One 
argument is that the term should be ‘consumer surplus121’ and some economists believe the 
appropriate description should be ‘total surplus’ or ‘aggregate welfare’.122  ‘Consumer surplus’ 
refers to the perceived welfare of buyers in a particular market, while ‘total surplus’ or 
‘aggregate welfare’ refers to the perceived welfare of both buyers and sellers in a given 
market.123 Therefore, total surplus disregards wealth transfer between consumers and sellers. 
Economists argue that antitrust law cannot maximise consumer welfare. ‘The antitrust 
methodology focuses on one market; although conceptually it may maximise consumer 
surplus or total surplus, it cannot maximise consumer welfare …’124 These arguments go 
against the consumer welfare theory first put forward by Bork,125 and accepted by the US 
Supreme Court’,126 leading to an intense debate among economists.127 Economists 
recognised the term as allocative efficiency which they interpret as ‘social welfare’. Yet, 
economists do not view social welfare as a basis for antitrust analysis. They argue that the 
ultimate standard by which anticompetitive practices should be judged is their effect on 
                                                          
119 DTI, ‘A World Class Competition Regime’ Cm 5233 (2001), para 1.1 < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-world-class-competition-regime > last accessed 07.07.2016. 
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competition and not on consumer welfare.128 However, according to Hammer, ‘Antitrust law is 
not a forum to test the limits of economic theory. The theory must fit in an appropriate doctrinal 
setting and it must be administrable within the context of litigation, which is predicated upon a 
system of lay factfinders.’129 Hammer opines, ‘total welfare’ should be advanced as a defence 
in antitrust cases.’130  
Despite the on-going controversy on the goals of competition by economists, and certain 
decisions embracing wider issues by the CJEU itself,131 EU enforcers emphasise on the 
‘consumer welfare’ paradigm.132 Further, in a report prepared by the ICN, it is noted that of the 
57 authorities in different jurisdictions who responded to the ICN questionnaire, only one 
country did not refer to consumer welfare in its mission statement, legislation, or the goal of 
its Authority.133 
Although relevant arguments contribute towards clarity and refinement of the law, these 
arguments do little to help in the actual enforcement of competition policy which is meant to 
deter cartels. For markets to function properly and efficiently it is anticompetitive behaviour 
that needs to be eliminated and the focus must be on achieving that end if a market economy 
is to be maintained. CJEU decisions indicate that the court weighs circumstances surrounding 
each case in order to ascertain whether the alleged abuse has distorted competition within the 
internal market rather than the welfare of the consumer.134 The UK cartel decisions follow a 
similar assessment to those in the EU cases, in arriving at a finding, as seen in the cases 
discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
The rationale, however, is that if there is no distortion, the market runs efficiently, providing 
good quality products and services which in turn benefit consumers. Whish and Bailey have 
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said, ‘A related benefit of competition is that it may have the dynamic effect of stimulating 
innovation as competitors strive to produce new and better products for consumers:’135 
Therefore, active detection and deterrence of cartel formation is central to the enforcement of 
competition law. There is also the need to focus on the economic assessment of the 
infringements concerned, and evaluate whether such infringements have caused harm to 
consumers or not. A method to establish the damage caused that can be applied consistently 
would greatly reduce the time involved in investigations. Economic experiments may assist in 
realising such an analytical measurement to the advancement of competition enforcement. In 
order to deter collusion, the fines imposed must reflect the harm caused. 
 
2.2.4 What is a Cartel / Hard Core Cartel? 
A cartel is an association of two or more legally independent entities that explicitly agree to 
coordinate their prices or output for the purpose of increasing their collective profits.136 The 
OFT describes a cartel in its simplest terms as, ‘an agreement between businesses not to 
compete with each other.’137  Article 101(1) TFEU and section 2 (2) of CA 98 set out examples 
of agreements, decisions or practices that constitute cartel practices, which involve price-
fixing, market sharing, bid rigging or limiting the supply or production of goods or services.  
The EU definition of cartels is, ‘Arrangement(s) between competing firms designed to limit or 
eliminate competition between them, with the objective of increasing prices and profits of the 
participating companies and without producing any objective countervailing benefits.’138 
Further, the Glossary of Terms states that ‘Cartels are harmful to consumers and society as a 
whole due to the fact that the participating companies charge higher prices (and earn higher 
profits) than in a competitive market.139  
In Cityhook,140 the UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal has said that the term ‘hard-core’ is used 
to refer to the most serious object-based prohibitions of Article 101 TFEU, and Chapter I CA 
98. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), states that ‘Hard 
core cartels are anticompetitive agreements by competitors to fix prices, restrict output, submit 
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collusive tenders, or divide or share markets.’141 The terms ‘cartel’ and ‘hard core cartel’ are 
thus interchangeable.  
 
2.3 Why Cartels are Harmful 
Cartels negate competition and are therefore considered to be ‘the most serious violations of 
competition law.’142 An agreement that forms a cartel need not be in writing and could be 
verbal or even a tacit conspiracy. Being illegal, cartels mainly operate in secret, using various 
means to conceal their existence, as revealed in the Lysine143 cartel where the senior most 
executives fabricated aliases and front organizations to hide their activities. Experience of the 
US Antitrust Division with cartels has shown that cartels often use extreme measures to 
conceal their existence. The Division uncovered cover-ups ranging from; creating bogus trade 
associations, using code names to conceal evidence, and sophisticated ruses to keep 
evidence out of reach of the law, wholesale destruction of incriminating documents, witness 
tampering, and even hiding incriminating evidence in the attic of a cartel member’s 
grandparent’s home.144 These revelations were mostly from the Lysine cartel, which raised 
lysine prices 70 per cent within their first nine months of collusion.145 
Thus, cartels between undertakings (businesses) operate in order to achieve greater profits 
and with less effort, which could result in harm to consumers, and to the economy in general. 
The effect of cartel activity is to defeat the State’s attempt to allow free and undistorted markets 
which bring benefits to the consumers by keeping the prices down, improving the quality of 
products and services.146  By their very nature cartelists depend on one another’s agreed 
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course of action which reduces their incentives to produce new or better products and services 
at competitive prices.147  
Existence of cartels means the abuse of market power so that consumers have less choice 
and pay more for the affected products or services, more than the competitive price. This 
results in the transfer of benefits from the consumer to the producers by way of profits, and 
inefficient allocation of resources which is a loss to the society in general referred to as the 
‘deadweight loss’ in economic terms (see Fig. 1, below).148         
                                                    
                                                      Deadweight Loss  
 
                                               
 
                                                                    Figure 1 
  
When consumers move away from purchasing goods and services if they feel the price is not 
justified compared to their expected utility, it affects trade, reducing the level of trade leading 
to a reduction of overall welfare within a society. 
 
The former Commissioner Kroes has said:  
 
‘[C]artels are always changing shape – adapting like viruses to fight our attempts to kill 
them off. Always building up resistance, always trying to outsmart us. Our 
investigations show that cartels try to cover their tracks using encrypted e-mail, 
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attributing code names, using fake or misleading e-mail accounts, pre-paid mobile 
phones … it is a long list of deceptions. Today’s fight is nothing new – cartels have 
plagued capitalism since industrialisation began. From the ‘conspiracies to raise 
prices’ noted by Adam Smith and onwards, cartelists have had a long time to perfect 
their tactics.’149  
Cartels have also been compared to “theft” or “cancer” by other prominent competition law 
authorities.150 
Cartels are not a new phenomenon. Adam Smith, philosopher and one of the earliest 
economic writers known, has referred to cartel activity by employers of his time. In his book 
The Wealth of Nations written in 1776, he wrote that masters (employers), who wield the 
power, combine to sink the wages of labour even below the actual rate: ‘These are always 
conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy till the moment of execution: and when the 
workmen yield, as they sometimes do without resistance, though severely felt by them they 
are never heard of by other people.’151 Adam Smith’s well-known quote from The Wealth of 
Nations is, “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, 
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise 
prices.”152  
The UK has a long history of the use of the doctrine of restraint of trade where the founding 
precedent is identified as the Dyer’s Case in 1414.153 The doctrine, though of limited scope in 
economic theory, has provided a basis for the courts to reconcile the freedom to trade with the 
freedom to contract.154 It is believed the US antitrust laws were influenced by this doctrine,155 
particularly by the Statute of Monopolies of 1624 which allowed triple damages and double 
legal costs to victims harmed by an unlawful monopoly. 
 
More recently, in the UK, in the House of Lords debate on CA 98 Bill, Lord Lucas has said that 
‘the more concentrated the market is, the more likely it is that the firms will be able successfully 
                                                          
149 Neelie Kroes, “Tackling Cartels – A Never-ending Task” Commission’s press release, SPEECH/09/454, 8 
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to agree to dampen or restrict competition.’156 Some authors have defined a cartel as ‘an 
explicit arrangement designed to eliminate competition.’157  
 
2.3.1 Detection of Cartels by means of Leniency Programmes 
Despite the availability of stringent regulations, enforcement authorities have found it difficult 
to detect and investigate cartel activities due to the secretive nature of such anticompetitive 
behaviour,158 resulting in poor enforcement records, according to a study by Ashurst.159 With 
a view to overcome or at least reduce the difficulties surrounding the uncovering of cartels, 
the EU introduced a leniency programme by a Leniency Notice into the enforcement of EU 
Competition Law (following the US example) in 1996.160 The Leniency Notice was later revised 
on two occasions, in 2002 and the last in 2006.161 The UK adopted its own version of leniency 
policy, helped by the decentralisation Regulation 1/2003 which enabled National Competition 
Authorities (NCAs) of the Member States to frame their own rules in accordance with EC law. 
Nevertheless, some scholars have found the detection rate of cartels in the EU to be in the 
range of 12.9 per cent to 13.2 per cent, in a given year.162 
The Leniency Programme was expected to encourage firms engaged in cartel activity to come 
forward and confess to the enforcement authority, providing information and evidence for a 
successful investigation in return for which the infringing company will receive immunity (or 
amnesty) from sanctions. In addition, the leniency applicant is given full confidentiality in 
respect of all the evidence supplied under the leniency agreement.163 By granting leniency, 
the expectation was that companies would come forward with more and more revelations of 
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anticompetitive activities, prompting enforcement authorities to investigate, and bring 
convictions more quickly. This was also meant to make it possible for victims harmed by those 
activities to bring private damages claims, by way of follow-on actions. 
 
2.3.2 Leniency and Confidentiality  
Under European antitrust policy, confidentiality is granted to leniency applications and 
business secrets provided under such applications by companies involved in antitrust 
breaches. Regulation 1049/2001 provides for confidentiality in principle, and under Article 339 
TFEU leniency documents are confidential on the notion of ‘professional secrecy’.164 This 
position was further strengthened by a ‘Resolution of the Meeting of Heads of European 
Competition Authorities of 23 May 2012.’165 Finally, the Commission Directive of 2014 has 
made it clear that information provided in Leniency applications must never be disclosed.166 
For the protection of confidentiality, leniency applicants are able to give oral evidence brought 
in by Article 32 of the revised Leniency Notice of 2006. Such statements may be archived, and 
access will only be granted to an addressee of the Statement of Objections, and such 
addressee or his counsel cannot make copies, either mechanical or electronic, of that 
evidence. This is a problematic area for complainants who are not permitted access to such 
evidence by Article 33 of the 2006 Leniency Notice. Hence, confidentiality granted to leniency 
applicants can be a hindrance to victims harmed by the activities of those companies thereby 
restricting claimants accessing the very documents that could help them bring successful 
actions. 
There are also at least three areas of procedural safeguards with varying degrees of protection 
afforded by member states namely; legal privilege, the right against self-incrimination, and the 
principle of inviolability of the home.167 These issues may come into play when the 
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Commission or the NCAs conduct inspection of premises which they can conduct with or 
without notice to the undertakings concerned.168 The enforcement authorities can conduct 
‘dawn raids’ as well for such inspections.169 In two recent cases, the GC has ruled that the 
Commission must delimit their inspection to the subject matter under investigation.170 The 
Court also ruled that an aggrieved party in respect of the seizure of unrelated documents 
(“seize and sift”) may appeal only after the final Commission decision of the investigation 
concerned. In March 2013, the Commission revised its guidance on dawn raids to include 
electronic data as well.171 
 
2.3.3 Leniency Programme: The Rationale  
Leniency Programme is open to those businesses who come forward and reveal to an 
enforcement authority their participation in cartel activity, and provide evidence and cooperate 
fully with the ensuing investigation.172 The first such business to come forward can expect to 
be rewarded with full immunity from prosecution and/or fine. Those who apply subsequently 
may also be eligible, not for full immunity but on a sliding scale of 50 per cent to 20 per cent 
reduction in fines, according to the level of ‘value added’ evidence and cooperation given to 
the investigating enforcement authority.  The eligible parties will be given full confidentiality to 
any evidence provided to the authority in their investigation. However, no party who has 
engaged in coercing another to take part in the illegal activity will be eligible for leniency. 
Nevertheless, this rule has not been followed up strictly in the UK since the leniency policy 
revision in 2002.173  
The concept behind leniency is not new and has been used historically, mainly in war 
situations. Julius Caesar used a divide and rule strategy to weaken tribal unity by striking deals 
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with some of them, his motto being Divide et Impera.174 The same strategy was in use and 
still used in more recent and current situations in dealing with not only in war but also in many 
other spheres including breaking up of organised crime.  
Such strategic behaviour has been applied in recent history through microeconomic analysis 
to legal problems. Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern175 are considered to be the founding 
fathers of both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory by using mathematical 
models.176 The Game Theory developed into the operation of a particular branch of economic 
theory, the ‘Nash Equilibrium’.177 Casting the prisoner as always one step ahead of the cop, 
reward of lenient treatment in exchange for information to facilitate prosecution is a common 
practice in many countries. Thus, if two prisoners were to be interrogated separately, they will 
respond according to the likely payoff, (See Fig. 2, below).178 
                                          
                                     
                               Figure 2.  -   Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix                                     
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The strategy will be for each prisoner to confess, since that would minimize the average length 
of time in prison for both.                         
In order to obtain the information necessary for effective investigation and prosecution, a 
leniency policy was first introduced in the US in 1978 (later revised, in 1993), whereby 
informants would be granted leniency if they confess or reveal the existence of their illegal 
activities to the US Antitrust Division of the DoJ, but essentially, they were precluded from 
amnesty if the Antitrust Division had already begun an investigation into the suspected 
cartel.179 By the revised leniency programme in 1993,180 full immunity would be granted only 
to the first to confess before an investigation has begun by the DoJ, and cooperate in the 
investigation, but did not automatically preclude leniency to others who came forward after the 
investigation had begun, allowing leniency on a sliding scale to those who reveal themselves 
subsequently, depending on any additional information and cooperation they provide in that 
investigation. 
Following on from the US experience, a Leniency Programme was first introduced into 
European Competition Law in 1996,181 but its introduction did not lead to a rush of applicants 
as expected. The policy was then revised in 2002182 and again in 2006,183 to increase 
incentives for companies to self-report, following the revision in the US Leniency policy, which 
resulted in uncovering a greater number of cartels, according to the US DoJ Antitrust Division. 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Gerald F Masoudi claimed that the DoJ’s leniency policy 
‘The greatest single driver of our success … is our Corporate Leniency Program.’184  Similarly, 
Gary R Spratling has said in a speech that in the US, the Corporate Leniency Policy has been 
the most effective generator of cartel cases and is believed to be the most successful program 
in US history for detecting large commercial crimes.185  
Meanwhile, in Europe, similar praise has been attributed to the EU Leniency Programme. 
Deputy Head of Unit for the Cartels Directorate of the Commission, Sari Suurnakki noted that 
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the five-year period from 2005 to 2009 saw three times the number of cartel cases as the 
equivalent five-year period a decade before.186  
UK has adopted its own Leniency policy, as have other Member States of the EU (except 
Malta)187 independently of one another, but in accordance with the EU regulations. The 
principle of applying Leniency by different enforcement authorities in cartel cases is the same 
in different jurisdictions, while there are certain operational and punishment differences. 
Varying antitrust regimes and different leniency policies have resulted in some uncertainty as 
to which NCA, a business operating in a number of EU countries wishing to make an 
application should choose. In this situation, it can only be expected that a canny infringer would 
select the jurisdiction that would be most advantageous for him, or ‘forum shopping’ to apply 
as the first mover in order to obtain full immunity. 
The presence of different models in the EU Member States has raised problems for applicants 
who have engaged in businesses across a number of Member States, and, therefore, having 
to apply to the NCAs of each of those jurisdictions, in order to avoid prosecution in multiple 
jurisdictions as well as by the Commission.188 However, where parallel actions are instituted, 
a member state or other member states may stay proceedings until a decision is made by 
another member state or may agree to allow one member state to proceed with the action.189 
If the Commission itself has taken an action against a cartel, member states will not take 
parallel action against that cartel.190 
 
2.3.4 The New Cartel Offence under ERRA 2013  
Under the new Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, which came into force on 1 April 
2014, the UK cartel offence will be redefined in a number of significant ways. A major change 
is the removal of the element of ‘dishonesty’ so that the prosecution no longer needs to prove 
that the defendant acted dishonestly in entering into the cartel under investigation. This 
removes the ‘Ghosh’ test that the prosecutors have had to prove in the past, that the defendant 
dishonestly entered into the cartel agreement in question.191 The proposal to remove the 
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Commission, evidencing its intention of taking a decision. 
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‘dishonesty’ element in  proving a cartel was on the grounds, inter alia,  that it ‘introduces 
significant lack of certainty …’,192 and that ‘criticism of the Ghosh test has persisted and 
intensified in the field of cartels ...’193 This may be a change for the good, considering that 
cartels by definition, ‘have as their object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
and therefore neither the (Leniency) applicant nor the OFT will be required to assess the actual 
effect of the cartel activity before proceeding with the application.’194 It must be noted, 
however, that the CMA has brought a prosecution initiated by the OFT against three 
individuals in which one has pleaded guilty, and two others were acquitted following trial by 
jury.195 The case was brought under the old regulations (carried over from the OFT) showing 
that the old rules could have been effective had the Enforcement Authority so wished.196  
A second change is the introduction of Section 188A, which sets out additional circumstances, 
under which no cartel activity is deemed to have taken place.197 Under ERRA 13, therefore, 
no cartel offence would be committed where; a) the defendant’s customers are given ‘relevant’ 
information about the agreement before they purchase the product or service, b) in bid-rigging 
arrangements, the person requesting bids is given ‘relevant’ information, about the 
arrangements at or before the time when a bid is made, or c) in any case ‘relevant information’ 
about the (cartel) agreement is published, before it is implemented, in the manner specified at 
the time of the making of the agreement in an order made by the Secretary of State.  
Such information will include the names of the undertakings concerned, the product or service, 
and a description of the nature of the agreement. This change may go a little way to open up 
and introduce transparency to company agreements, although how the companies will handle 
their future agreements in view of these changes are yet to be seen. 
The changes, however, do not stop here. Section 47 of the ERRA 13 also provides three new 
defences to cartel colluders. First, that the defendant did not intend to conceal the nature of 
the agreement from customers at all times, before entering into an agreement for the supply 
of the product or service to them. Second, the defendant did not intend to conceal the nature 
of the agreement from the CMA, and third, that the defendant took reasonable steps to ensure 
                                                          
192 BIS/11/657, ‘A Competition Regime for Growth: A consultation on options for reform’ Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills, March 2011, para 6.12. 
193 Ibid, para 6.14. 
194 OFT’s detailed guidance on principles and process, (2013), para 2.2 
195 This is after a lapse of six years since OFT’s attempt at prosecuting three British Airways executives 
collapsed. 
196 CMA Case Reference: CE/9623/12. A parallel civil investigation for cartel activity regarding the same matter 
was settled, CMA Case Reference: CE/9691/12, Supply of galvanised steel tanks for water storage, 2014. 
197 S 188 EA 02, revision in s 47 ERRA 2013, (now 188A and 188B). 
38 
 
that the nature of the agreement was disclosed to professional legal advisers for the purpose 
of obtaining legal advice prior to implementation.198  
The first and the second defences are not controversial in that defendants would normally tend 
to put forward those arguments anyway, as evident from some of the cases investigated by 
the OFT, discussed in the succeeding Chapter Five of this work. Therefore, there should have 
to be guidelines in order to avoid cartelists wriggling out of their responsibility by devious 
methods. 
The third defence stipulated has no strong basis, as it may be that the defendant totally 
disregarded the legal advice given or even worse, where the legal adviser never responded 
to the request in the first place.199 It is also possible that both lawyer and client may plead legal 
privilege. Moreover, the legal adviser is not likely to be asked to give evidence in the case, all 
of which raise the question as to why this third defence is stipulated. A much better defence 
would have been if the defendant company had a rigorous compliance programme which the 
defendants pleaded they tried to observe at all times.      
 
2.4 Private Enforcement as a Necessary Adjunct to Public Enforcement of 
Competition Law? 
One of the important objectives of the Modernisation and Decentralisation Regulation 1/2003 
was to pave the way for more private competition law enforcement. The CJEU has held in 
Courage200 that the full effectiveness of Article 101 would be at risk if it were not open for a 
victim of anti-competitive behaviour in proceedings before a national court to claim damages 
for any loss suffered by that victim, which was deemed to have resulted from that 
anticompetitive behaviour, either by way of a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort 
competition. Following the reform, private litigants were expected to play a pivotal role in aiding 
the enforcement of Articles 101 (and 102) by bringing private actions for damages for harm 
caused by competition law infringements.201 The European Commission considers such 
private enforcement as a useful and necessary adjunct to the enforcement activities of the 
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Corporation [1994] ECR I-1209. 
39 
 
Commission and the NCAs.202 Enhancement of private actions was expected to maximise 
enforcement by way of a complementary measure to public enforcement.203 Private antitrust 
actions can arise in a number of ways, such as from franchise agreements,204 licensing 
agreements,205 distribution agreements,206 and partial function joint ventures.207 The 
Commission has stressed that national courts have an important role to play in the 
enforcement of EC Competition law, inter alia, by emphasising the advantages of 
complainants bringing private actions so as to direct more ‘claims’ to the courts.208 These could 
be, for example, by way of damages, legal costs and/or interim measures.  
In 2005, The Commission published a Green Paper and an accompanying Commission Staff 
Working Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules.209 The Commission 
Staff Working Paper noted that ‘Articles 81 and 82 EC create directly effective obligations on, 
and rights for, individuals. The principle of direct effect means that individuals can assert these 
rights and enforce these obligations directly before a court in a Member State ...’ Further, it 
states that ‘In order to ensure the ‘effectiveness’ (effet utile) of directly applicable Community 
law rights, national courts must provide adequate remedies for their protection.’ The UK 
Government responded to the Green Paper expressing its support for ‘the wider aim of the 
paper, namely to encourage and facilitate private damages actions to those (consumers and 
businesses) who have suffered loss due to infringement of competition rules’.210 The 
Commission published its White Paper in 2008 with the aim of identifying the appropriate 
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incentives for private antitrust damages claims,211 which resulted in the Commission issuing a 
Directive212 on antitrust damages actions signed into law on 26 November 2014. 
Private actions remain the least forthcoming effect of competition law, both in the EU and the 
UK. According to Ashurst findings, this is mainly due to the ‘lack of clarity, either because what 
the legal basis actually is for such claims is unclear or because the interaction between the 
specific legal basis and general provisions on conditions for liability is unclear.’213 
The UK’s new Consumer Rights Act 2015 has introduced an ‘opt-out’ system subject to certain 
conditions, in the hope of boosting private actions, the results of which can only be observed 
in the future. Claimants can choose between the existing ‘opt-in’ or the new ‘opt-out’ system. 
There will be no exemplary damages awarded to victims under the new regulations.  
 
2.4.1 Private Enforcement and Leniency: Problems for Victims  
Once a company has been granted leniency for coming forward and providing evidence of its 
anticompetitive activities, all the evidence provided under that leniency agreement will remain 
confidential, so that no third party can have access to it.214 Further, the defendant companies 
are provided confidentiality over their business secrets. Thus a victim who wishes to bring an 
action for damages may be unable to prove her case without access to that vital evidence. In 
CDC Hydrogene Peroxide the General Court of the European Union, annulled the 
Commission's refusal to grant a damages claimant access to the contents list of the 
Commission's file regarding the hydrogen peroxide cartel.215 Indeed, in that case the General 
Court noted that leniency programmes are not the sole way of ensuring compliance with EU 
competition law, and that private damages actions before the courts of Member States can 
make a significant contribution to ensuring such compliance.  
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A victim must present all the evidence before the court that the breach in effect caused harm 
to her. The claimant must therefore, prove that she suffered harm due to the breach the 
company was found guilty of. The complexity of competition cases which demand economic 
evidence,216 and the reliance on substantial quantities of documentary evidence incurring 
lengthy delays in the conclusion of cases are a disincentive for victims. 
Further, the cost of bringing a damages action in itself may discourage victims, particularly 
given the difficulty in obtaining sound evidence. As the Ashurst report217 revealed, in all 
Member States costs had to be paid upfront and, except for two Member States, the English 
rule of ‘the loser pays’ applied.218 English courts have so far adopted the rule loser pays in 
civil claims, which is another dilemma for victims to consider before making a claim.219   
A research by the OFT found that companies, and their advisers view private actions as the 
least effective aspect of the competition regime in achieving compliance.220 However, when 
asked for suggestions as to what could be done to improve compliance with competition law 
in the UK, the most frequent responses included encouraging private actions!221 Although 45 
of the 202 companies surveyed by the OFT (22 per cent) thought that their company had been 
harmed by a breach of competition law by someone else, only five companies decided to bring 
an action. The most commonly cited reason for not bringing an action was that the expected 
costs outweighed the benefits. It can be assumed that a consumer would be in a worse 
position than a company, to be able to afford a private action. Under the new reforms, a 
broader range of representative actions including individuals, and trade associations may ask 
the CAT to include all UK victims affected by an infringement. 
2.4.2 The UK Enforcement Authorities: OFT replaced by CMA 
In the UK, the principal national enforcement authority has been the OFT, until changes were 
made by the ERRA 13, which received the Royal Assent on 25 April 2013, combining the 
existing Office of Fair Trading (OFT) with the Competition Commission (CC) to form a single 
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unit called the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), which began its operations on 1 
April 2014.222  
The sectoral enforcement authorities have concurrent powers with the OFT/CMA,223 but 
during the OFT’s lifetime they mainly dealt with sector-specific legislation, rarely venturing into 
competition decisions. The ERRA 13 expects to bring sector regulators in line with the 
enforcement of competition regulations. 
Since the establishment of the CMA, a new networking system between the CMA and the 
sector regulators have been launched, named the UK Regulators Network (UKRN), to bring 
cross-sector regulation closer together.224 The UKRN is tasked with improving coordination 
across regulated sectors to enhance investment and efficiency for the benefit of consumers, 
belated but worthwhile aim if it is implemented effectively.  
Importantly, under the Competition Act 1998 (Concurrency) Regulations 2014, the sector 
regulators and the CMA have established a UK Competition Network (UKCN) as a forum for 
exchange of information and best practice.225 Previously, sector regulators have generally 
been reluctant to exercise their CA 98 functions, relying instead mainly on their sector-specific 
legislation.226 The NAO has found that there is a perception among Regulators that the 
competition process including appeals to be onerous.227 Under the new regime, the CMA has 
the ability to remove a competition case from a sector regulator if the CMA considers that 
doing so will further the promotion of competition.228   
Since the CMA came into being in April 2014, apart from the cases transferred from the OFT, 
it has started some cases of its own including a number of wide ranging sector specific cases 
particularly energy and banking sectors. The CMA has brought its first prosecution under s 
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188 of EA 02 where three defendants were charged for operating a cartel in the supply of 
galvanised steel tanks.229 One of the defendants has pleaded guilty while the other two have 
been acquitted following trial by jury. A parallel civil investigation is also on going for 
infringement of CA 98. Under a consumer offence, the CMA has also brought a criminal case 
before the Bristol Crown Court in which a number of defendants were convicted.230 Both cases 
were started during OFT’s term in office, which shows if the OFT were so minded prosecutions 
were possible even minus the subsequent changes brought on by the ERRA 13. 
Interestingly, the CMA has publicly stated its intention to reduce relying on leniency, stating 
that Leniency Programmes have their limitations and tend to catch ‘late stage’ or failing cartels 
only. Further, the CMA expressed its intention of being proactive in detecting cartels by 
evolving fully into a ‘mainstream criminal enforcement agency’.231 However, thus far the CMA 
appears to have opted for settlements of cases on grounds of administrative priority.232 The 
NAO has made the observation that the CMA has so far not produced a substantial flow of 
enforcement decisions or fines.233 For the purpose of this thesis the term OFT will still be used 
as OFT decisions come under its purview. 
 
2.4.3 Key Provisions Available to the OFT/CMA under CA 98 
The Director (formerly Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT), with the assistance of the 
OFT/CMA has primary responsibility for enforcing the Chapter I prohibitions and has extensive 
powers of investigation, which include the power to carry out ‘dawn raids’, or on-the-spot 
investigations at the premises of businesses suspected of infringements. If it finds sufficient 
evidence of an infringement, it has the power to order the infringement to be terminated, and 
to impose on the infringers a fine of up to 10 per cent of their UK turnover for each of the 
previous three years. In cartel cases, the Director can grant leniency in the form of immunity 
from fines and prosecution, or reductions in fines where a participant in the cartel has provided 
the OFT/CMA with ‘significant evidence’ which enables a finding of breach of CA 98 at an 
early stage of the investigation. 
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Under CA 98, the OFT/CMA shares its investigative powers concurrently with certain sector 
authorities such as Ofgem for gas and electricity, OFCOM for communication, Ofwat for water 
and ORR for railways.234 Further, s 60 of CA 98 applies to all UK authorities which are involved 
with the enforcement of Part I of the CA 98, i.e. the OFT/CMA, the sector Regulators, 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) and the domestic courts. Decisions taken by the OFT are 
appealable to the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), by an aggrieved party.  
 
2.5 The CAT            
The Competition Appeal Tribunal deals with all appeals connected to competition law matters. 
Section 46 CA 98, and judicial review principles under s 120 EA 02, apply to procedure taken 
by the CAT in deciding appeals on competition law matters.235 
The CAT is directed to determine such an appeal on the merits by reference to the grounds of 
appeal. The CAT is allowed to confirm or set aside the decision which is the subject of the 
appeal, or any part of it, and may remit the matter to the OFT/CMA or any other regulator. The 
CAT could impose or revoke, or vary the amount of a penalty imposed by the OFT/CMA, and 
can give such directions or take such other steps as the OFT/CMA could itself have given or 
taken, or make any other decision which the OFT/CMA itself could have made. Even if the 
CAT confirms the OFT/CMA decision, it may still set aside a finding of fact made by the 
OFT/CMA.236 When the appeal is on the merits, the CAT’s function is not limited to applying 
the principles of judicial review nor to the heads of review contained in Article 263 TFEU.237 
The CAT emphasised in Freeserve that it was an appellate tribunal and that if it felt the 
Regulator was incorrectly informed, it should in general remit the matter to the Regulator to 
decide again, rather than make its own decision.238 In Floe Telecom the CAT set aside the 
Decision of OFCOM and decided to ‘remit’ the matter to OFCOM under paragraph 3(2)(a) of 
Schedule 8 of CA 98, ‘on grounds of incorrect and/or inadequate reasoning.’239 However, the 
CAT has desisted from thus remitting in JJ Burgess on the basis that it should, if necessary, 
take its own decision rather than remit, ‘if: i) it has or can obtain all the necessary material, ii) 
the requirements of procedural fairness are respected, and iii) the course the Tribunal 
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proposes to take is desirable from the point of view of the need for expedition and saving 
costs.’240  
Third parties, as well as undertakings subject to enforcement authorities’ decisions, may 
appeal to the CAT under s 47 CA 98. Decisions of the CAT may be appealed, on a point of 
law to the Court of Appeal, under s 49 CA 98.241 
 
2.5.1 CAT’s New Claws under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 
Changes to the powers and procedures of the CAT have been brought about by amendments 
in the CRA 15.242 While victims of anticompetitive behaviour by undertakings could only bring 
‘follow on’ actions before the CAT up until these reforms, the CAT can now take on ‘stand-
alone’ actions as well. Along with this important development, the CAT will have power to grant 
injunctions, particularly with regard to fast-track cases that may help small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). An opt-out system for victims is also made available provided certain 
conditions are met. The new powers of the CAT have been strengthened to equal that of the 
High Court in dealing with competition matters. Henceforth, the CAT can issue search 
warrants also under CA 98 in cartel investigations. 
 
2.5.2 Conclusion 
UK competition law is fashioned in accordance with the EU competition law which takes 
precedence over Member States. The most important sources are derived from EU legislation 
and have direct effect within the UK. Apart from adopting the EU legislation into its own law 
by way of CA 98, the UK enforcement authorities are empowered to implement Articles 101 
(and 102) of the TFEU fully where the effect of an infringement committed in the UK extends 
beyond its territory into one or more other member state or states. Both Chapter I, CA 98 and 
Article 101 TFEU deal with cartels which are considered to be the most serious of 
anticompetitive infringements which prevent, restrict or distort competition. Cartels are 
agreements by two or more economic entities in order to make profits with less effort. Being 
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illegal, undertakings engage in cartels in secret, making it difficult to detect them. Because of 
this secrecy which makes it difficult to gather evidence, enforcement authorities employ 
leniency programmes to uncover evidence. In the UK, under EA 02 cartel activities are 
deemed criminal, and prosecutions can be brought against offenders, although this aspect of 
the law has barely been implemented. Under the new ERRA 13, cartel offence has been 
redefined, removing the element of ‘dishonesty’ previously alleged in infringement cases, 
which is expected to ease some of the difficulties surrounding convictions. The CMA which 
has replaced the OFT in 2014 as the principal enforcement authority in the UK, has expressed 
its intention to bring about more prosecutions. The CMA has been formed combining the 
former OFT with the former Competition Commission (CC), so that it is now invested with 
some of the powers held by the CC in addition to most of those held by the OFT.  
The Leniency Programme is not embodied in EU competition law, but introduced by a 
Commission Leniency Notice. While Commission notices are not binding on member states, 
they nevertheless act as guidance for member states which are expected to work in 
cooperation with Commission regulations and guidance rules. Leniency is an old concept to 
induce offenders to confess on offer of rewards. Leniency is offered to those who act in breach 
of the competition legislation, to come forward and confess in return for amnesty or reduction 
of penalty. On obtaining leniency, applicants are provided confidentiality of the leniency 
agreements, making it hard for victims to access such documents to produce as evidence in 
private actions. Despite leniency, a research by Ashurst has shown that fewer cartel cases 
are coming to light than expected. Decentralisation brought in by Regulation 1/2003 was 
meant to empower national courts to directly apply exemptions under Article 101(3), and bring 
about uniformity in the implementation of EU antitrust law among Member States. It was also 
expected to enable more private actions by individuals harmed by anticompetitive activities. 
Nevertheless, the expected increase in private actions has not materialised, with victims 
unable to access vital evidence.     
The intended goal of EU competition law has not been clearly stated giving rise to various 
interpretations by economists. However, the EU, and consequently the UK enforcement 
authorities have stressed that their main goal is consumer welfare, although CJEU decisions 
show competition in the internal market play a major role in most of the decisions243 
UK’s competition law is enforced by the principal enforcement authority, the OFT/CMA and 
the sector authorities concurrently. Appeals from any competition law decision made by the 
enforcement authorities can be heard by the CAT. Under CRA 15, the CAT may now also hear 
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‘stand-alone’ actions, whereas before only ‘follow-on’ damages actions were allowed before 
the CAT. The CRA 15 has also put in place an ‘opt-out’ system to allow for Collective 
Proceedings in addition to the ‘opt-in’ system which was the only course available for class 
actions before.  
This chapter has outlined the sources of law relating to cartels, and why leniency would be 
granted to colluding businesses. The chapters that follow will be on the topic of leniency as 
applied in competition law in the main, and the effect leniency has in detecting cartel activity 
by undertakings. Chapter Three will discuss the economic theories postulated by economists 




















Economic Tests and Theories - Stochastic Lemmas 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Economists have been at the forefront of the introduction of a leniency programme in the 
enforcement of competition law. Leniency programmes are intended to encourage firms 
involved in anticompetitive behaviour to come forward and confess, providing evidence of their 
anticompetitive activities in exchange for amnesty or reduction in fines. Most economists 
theorise in favour of leniency but cannot quite agree to what extent it should be applied. Each 
economist argues that his particular intuitive proposition can be proved by a stochastic lemma 
(formula). Economists keep experimenting on mainly the formation and destabilisation of 
cartels in the context of how participants react to leniency programmes. It is not the intention 
of this chapter to decipher the elaborate lemmas used in the many and varied economic 
theories, but to examine the theories themselves, beginning with some of the earlier theories. 
Most of the following theories have been based mainly on intuitive propositions of the 
respective authors which have then been put to experiment (referred to as ‘laboratory 
experiments’) by scientific formulae which have given the desired effect or proof. One of the 
more recent theories which draws on what is called Theorem 4 is an interesting, and a 
plausible one which tallies with conclusions arrived at by Conner244 and Guersent.245 This 
chapter also refers to a few empirical studies, as the authors suggest, but they are in effect 
examinations of detected cartels (statistical studies), and as such do not reveal any unknown 
characteristics or phenomena that could improve detection per se.  
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3.2 Self-reporting as a means of Detecting Infringements 
 
Steven Shavell is considered to be the first proponent of self-reporting as a viable mode of 
detecting anticompetitive behaviour.246 Although not a new concept, the analysis of the effects 
of self-reporting schemes for individual crimes was advanced, following on from Becker, by 
economists Malik, Kaplow and Shavell. Kaplow and Shavell demonstrate that when the 
expected fine equals the harm, an individual will commit a harmful act if, and only if, the gain 
he would derive from it exceeds the harm he would cause. Assuming that fines are the form 
of sanction, and assuming individuals are risk neutral, then the optimal fine f is h/p, the harm 
divided by the probability of detection, whereby the expected fine equals harm.247 This fine is 
optimal because, when the expected fine equals the harm there will be no gain for the colluder 
if he is caught and fined. If individuals are risk averse, optimal fine could be lower than for risk 
neutral case. When greater law enforcement is not associated with a significant reduction in 
crime, the explanation could be either that deterrence and incapacitation are relatively 
unimportant, or else that their importance is masked because enforcement effort, and 
sanctions are increased in response to higher crime rates. They suggest that incentives of law 
enforcers, including the problem of corruption should be investigated.                           
3.2.1 Cost Effectiveness and Hard Evidence 
Kaplow and Shavell regard that the main benefits of the leniency policies are twofold, i.e. the 
cost effectiveness, and that self-reporting provides hard evidence for successful 
prosecution.248 If colluders come forward and confess, the enforcement authorities save up 
on resources by not having to look for them and as hard evidence is provided voluntarily by 
the colluders there will be savings on investigations which the authorities would otherwise 
have to carry out. Kaplow and Shavell equate self-reporting to the model of probabilistic law 
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enforcement.249 However, Kaplow and Shavell recognise the disadvantage of self-reporting in 
that the enforcement agencies would incur administrative costs with certainty when an 
individual reports his behaviour and pays a sanction, whereas without self-reporting, society 
bears administrative costs only with a probability.250 They do not explain the long-term impact 
of leniency on criminal behaviour. Leniency has been in use over centuries, in war and other 
criminal activities,251 without any obvious reduction in such activities to date. 
Toffel and Short in their Working Paper suggest that self-reporting indicates effective self-
policing.252 Firms that voluntarily disclosed regulatory violations were committed to self-
policing and improved their regulatory compliance. They find that self-reporting can be a useful 
tool for reliably identifying and leveraging voluntary self-policing efforts by companies. This 
theory implies that rather than adhering to compliance in the first place, firms could make their 
decisions regardless and self-report later, on sensing trouble? The US Antitrust division has 
said that international cartels tend to be complex, highly sophisticated, and extremely broad 
in their impact both in geographical scope and the amount of commerce affected.253 It is 
difficult to contemplate that such sophisticated colluders are unaware of compliance rules or 
the consequences of getting caught.  
3.2.2 Desistance Deterrence and Costless Penalties 
A different view by Motta and Polo, shows that leniency enhances desistance but harms 
deterrence.254 Using a dynamic model they show that a programme which restricts itself to 
spontaneous reporting before an investigation is started cannot deter incentives to enter into 
a cartel. A cartel that is stable which has no intention to report will not be affected whether a 
leniency programme exits or not. Further, post-investigation leniency may even provide 
incentives to collude as the expected fines are reduced. The main reason for self-reporting 
(in this situation) occurring due to a change in the equilibrium of probability that a conviction 
would result on the screening of an industry. Leniency may have affected short-run cartels 
more, but consolidated the stable, long-run ones. Motta and Polo’s theory does not appear to 
take into consideration that distrust between colluders could be a factor in self-reporting, 
where one or more participants may wish to take advantage of leniency by undercutting 
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another. Nevertheless, the OFT cases examined in Chapter 5 of this thesis show that very 
few cartels self-report unless there is a threat of being found out.255  
 
Aubert, Rey and Kovacic support the proposition that positive rewards have a larger 
deterrence effect than reduced fines, and that rewards for individuals (whistleblowers) can be 
more effective than corporate rewards.256 In their model, they attempt to show that reward 
programs can be adapted to mitigate potential adverse effects (such as generating additional 
incentives to collude). According to their model, rewards are stronger tools than leniency 
programs to deter cartel formation. Rewards should be large enough to be effective and to 
avoid potential adverse effects. They even suggest keeping large rewards secret from the 
public to avoid unrest! Their proposition of large rewards for individuals, for example 
employees, may prove right in some cases. However, firms can simply adopt tacit non-
cooperative strategies that lead to a coordinated outcome as happened in Woodpulp 257 in 
which the Commission asserted that parallel evolution of prices charged by the wood pulp 
industry between 1971 and 1981 in Europe was evidence of collusion. But the decision was 
overruled by the CJEU, thereby giving life to the principle that parallel pricing cannot be taken 
as anticompetitive.  
3.2.3 Optimal Leniency and Whistleblowers 
Spagnolo, points to an optimal leniency programme where a well-designed program must 
maximise incentives to betray the cartel by reporting important information to the Antitrust 
Authority, while at the same time limiting as much as possible the reduction in fines on the 
whole cartel. Spagnolo is of the view that such an objective can be achieved by maximizing 
the benefits an individual cartel member can receive from reporting under the leniency 
program, but restricting such maximal benefit to one, and only one reporting party, the first 
comer.’258   
He argues that the best deterrence could be achieved by promising the first informant a reward 
equal to the sum of fines levied from other participating firms. In an earlier paper (2005) under 
the same title, Spagnolo provides a whisleblower scheme to improve leniency programmes, 
and states that the same format could be extended to fight other forms of multi-agent 
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organised crime like auditor-manger collusion, financial fraud, or long-term corruption that 
share with cartels the crucial features that leniency programmes are targeting.259  
The OFT/CMA has a reward scheme whereby an informer could receive £100,000 for 
reporting a cartel.260 It would be interesting to know how this reward has helped the UK 
authorities in detecting cartels, but no such data is available, probably due to the informer 
confidentiality. 
3.3 Collude and Report Strategy and Carrot and Stick Method 
Hinloopen and Soetevent show that ‘collude and report systematically’ is a strategy that could 
be adopted by cartelists when leniency programs are too generous.261 Reporting the cartel 
becomes part of the cartel agreement, and the participants collude and apply for leniency in 
every period to benefit from the reduction of fines. They contend that the increase in the 
number of cartels detected in the US and in Europe since the introduction of leniency 
programmes cannot be ruled out being due to increased cartel activity. In their experiment 
they find, however, that fewer cartels are formed when a leniency programme is in place, and 
cartels that do exist are less successful in charging prices above the static Nash equilibrium 
price and these cartels have lower survival rates. If the penalties are severe enough, 
particularly with criminal sanctions,262 clearly there is an incentive to self-report. Strategic self-
reporting has been found to exist, in a survey by Sokol, the only published survey outside the 
UK (as far as this research was able to find), involving interviews with practitioners.263  
Sauvagnat hypothesises that higher the leniency, with a more generous carrot or a harsher 
stick (higher fine), the more it reinforces the firms’ incentives to betray the cartel.264 Full 
amnesty is optimal in that it triggers applications, and the increase in the conviction rate 
outweighs pro-collusive effect of granting greater leniency. He puts forward the proposition 
that comparative statics of the probability of initial evidence reaching the enforcement authority 
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shows that leniency programmes and whistleblowing schemes play a complementary role in 
public enforcement. Hence, firms are more likely to self-report when enforcement authority is 
more likely to be informed by third parties about their illegal activities. He argues that the 
optimal leniency should be only given to a single informant, i.e. a unique cartel member. 
If the self-reporting takes place only owing to a third party informer, this can happen even in 
the absence of Leniency, where other, non-corporate criminal activity caught through 
informers also receive lenient sentences on admitting guilt before the court. Even when there 
is a generous carrot, if the cartel is stable, and there is no fear of betrayal, then no self-
reporting is likely to occur. It is, therefore, important that there should be a credible threat of 
detection, that of vigorous enforcement and severe penalties, not merely a threat of betrayal 
by a fellow colluder. Additionally, the threat of individual sanctions may have a deterrent effect 
on employees265 who could otherwise succumb to corporate pressure to engage in illegal 
activity, even if the cartel is stable, for fear of betrayal. 
3.3.1 Let them Cheat and Cheat Again! 
Chen and Rey argue that the best way to fight collusion is to induce firms to cheat and to 
report the cartel activity, which is why leniency is desirable – stricter regulation encourages 
alternative strategies - therefore optimal leniency to the first comer is best.266 Firms will form 
a cartel if the benefits from it exceed the expected penalty under antitrust enforcement. 
Therefore, deterring collusion ‘as much as possible’ amounts to maximising the threshold on 
collusive benefits below which collusion is deterred. In their model, Chen and Rey characterise 
the optimal degree of leniency, and show that both pre and post investigation leniency can 
help prevent the formation of some cartels and increase welfare unambiguously. They also 
advocate granting leniency to repeat offenders, because if no amnesty is allowed for repeat 
offenders this may prevent ‘collude and report’ strategy, but could result in reporting once, and 
never after. In this respect, Wils also argues against barring repeat offenders from leniency 
programmes.267 If companies cannot apply for leniency because they are repeat offenders, 
this second cartel will thus be more stable than the first. He states that excluding recidivists 
from leniency may encourage recidivism.  
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The contention that deterring collusion ‘as much as possible’ appears to be that the authors 
themselves are rather uncertain about their own theory or merely hoping for the best outcome. 
It also opens for the colluders to speculate that cartel activities are rife among businesses and 
the authorities may not take collusion as a serious matter. As for repeat offenders, a harsher 
penalty than for the previous infringement is called for,268 even if a reduction may be allowed 
for admitting the second offence. The Commission’s 2006 Fining Guidelines have set higher 
fines for recidivists,269 although whether strict adherence to the rules has taken place is subject 
to question.270 
3.3.2 Higher Revelations and Shorter Duration 
Brenner conducted an empirical survey of investigated cases by the European Commission 
before and after the introduction of leniency policy, taking a sample of 245 firms which were 
involved in 53 cartel infringements.271 These cases were dealt with by the Commission 
between 1990 and 2003. The survey found there was a high level of information revealed 
under leniency than without, but the impact of leniency on investigation cost was found to be 
weak. Further, the stability of cartels did not differ pre and post leniency. Interestingly, cartel 
duration shortened by one year after the introduction of leniency programme. The shortest 
observed cartel lasted only a quarter of a year while the longest running cartel lasted for 23 
years.  
Brenner notes, however, that economic theories provide no conclusive answer on whether 
leniency programs are sufficient incentives for firms to refrain from cartel activity.  It may be 
some factors help towards deterrence, and some others do not. This is due to the fact that no 
empirical study could be taken of the hidden cartels for an accurate survey. What was 
important to come out of this survey was the observation that there was no statistically 
significant relationship between investigation duration, and cooperation by the infringing firms, 
although the average duration of an investigation decreased after the introduction of the 
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leniency policy. Significantly, the impact on investigation costs, has not been found to be 
strong, and the duration of cartels do not seem to be affected much by leniency either. 
In general, the number of cartels detected before and after a certain regulatory event is a poor 
indicator of whether firms’ propensity to collude has increased or decreased. The increase 
may be because the new regulation is efficient or because there is an increase in cartels of 
which either more of them or relatively less number were detected. Barriers to trade and 
investment were lowered between the national markets within the EU in the 1990s which could 
have given rise to an increase in cartels EU wide.  
3.3.3 Average Cartel Duration  
According to a study by Levenstein and Suslow, the average cartel duration has not changed 
substantially over the past century.272 The average duration of cartels estimates between 5.3 
and 8.3 years, therefore the rise in convicted cartels may be due to the natural break down of 
these cartels. They find that cartels put substantial effort into monitoring one another’s 
activities in order to increase observability of events relating to demand variability, and 
changes in their competitors’ prices, enabling the stability of the cartels. The fact that the 
antitrust authorities take an action which ultimately puts an end to the cartel does not vitiate 
the economic analysis, resulting in the antitrust authorities becoming the instrument of the 
defecting firm. They found that cartels broken up by amnesty applications were relatively long-
lasting cartels, with an average duration of 10.3 years. 
The fact that colluders put considerable effort into monitoring to keep the stability of the cartel 
shows that cartels are well organised, so that betrayal is prevented and the cartel can continue 
for as long as profitable to do so. The average duration is testimony to the sophistication with 
which cartels operate. Leniency could be used strategically273 by such cartels for their own 
gain. 
In a study by Evenett, Levenstein and Suslow,274 of a sample of forty private international 
cartels investigated and prosecuted in the US and the EU in the 1990s, twenty-four lasted at 
least for four years. For twenty of these cartels where sales data are available, the annual 
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worldwide turnover in the affected products exceeded US $30 billion. They believe 
criminalising cartels is critical to strengthening enforcement. Conceding that economic theory 
does not identify deterministic relationships between industry or company structure and cartel 
success, they argue for a more comprehensive approach to attacking distortionary cartels in 
the international market place rather than limiting deterrence measures to domestic markets. 
It may be pointed out that the US has dealt with international cartels in the main, albeit to 
protect the US market which has networks around the globe. Even with stricter regulations in 
place in the US than in the EU, there appears to be no abatement or deterring of hard core 
cartels even in the US. Although criminal in nature, the US Antitrust Division encouraging ‘Plea 
Bargaining’ or ‘plea agreements’275 may have a diluting effect on the enforcement of antitrust 
law as with ‘settlement agreements’ in the UK,276 similar to EU antitrust settlements.277 The 
colluders who are usually large companies with huge annual turnovers will not fear paying up 
under such agreements, gaining immunity under Leniency as well. 
3.4 Theorem 4  
By their latest experiment, a more illuminating theorem has been produced by Harrington and 
Chang, in November 2013.278 They suggest that success should be judged by lesser cartels 
and not by greater number of leniency applications. If probability of investigation is low, then 
a fewer number of colluders will apply for leniency. The impact of leniency is intrinsically tied 
to the level of non-leniency enforcement. If leniency policy is successful, resulting in fewer 
cartels that means enforcement authority will have more resources for effective investigation. 
The fact that an enforcement authority’s attention will shift from non-leniency cases to leniency 
cases does not mean that non-leniency enforcement is weaker.  
Contrary to existing results in economic theories and the general impression of practitioners, 
Harrington and Chang find that a leniency programme can result in more cartels, and that it 
can occur at the same time that a leniency programme is generating many applications. They 
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then identify situations, and policies that an enforcement authority can pursue in order to bring 
about a leniency policy which will have the intended effect of reducing the number of cartels.  
There are nine steps or theorems in all in their paper, of which theorem 4 is the main topic 
discussed here as it covers several aspects in the stochastic model.     
Collusion is incentive compatible if the current market condition is sufficiently low. Firms do 
not use leniency when market conditions result in the cartel being stable but may use it when 
the cartel collapses. If the cartel continuation is less productive or it collapses, a firm will apply 
for leniency if it reduces the penalty. Discussing the usage of the leniency program in 
equilibrium, Harrington and Chang note that an equilibrium either has no firms applying for 
leniency or all firms doing so because if at least one firm applies then another firm can lower 
its expected penalty by also applying for leniency. This implies that it is always an equilibrium 
for all firms to apply for leniency.  For all parties to apply, means to minimise the penalty. A 
firm pays a fraction of the standard penalty (or zero penalty if full immunity is granted) when it 
receives leniency, and pays a fraction when all firms apply for leniency.  An industry does not 
apply for leniency when it is still effectively colluding. That it is dying cartels that apply for 
leniency is consistent with EC experience.279   
Maximum profit realisation ensures stability of a cartel, and it is stable for all market conditions 
so it never collapses internally. If a cartel is degenerative or less profitable, it could collapse 
under any market condition, and then will never collude. A leniency program reduces the 
frequency of cartels when non-leniency enforcement is fixed. The basis for this is, a leniency 
program increases the payoff to cheating because now a firm can reduce its penalty by 
simultaneously applying for leniency. This shrinks the set of market conditions for which 
collusion is stable, thereby reducing expected cartel duration and the value of colluding. Due 
to the lower value of colluding, a cartel no longer forms or has shorter duration leading to lower 
aggregate cartel rates.  
There is a differential across the industries where a leniency programme can make collusion 
more difficult specifically for some, but not for others. Leniency programmes can be 
counterproductive when penalties are not severe enough, and the amount of resources saved 
by prosecuting a leniency case is not large enough. In that situation, a leniency programme 
raises the cartel rate. In their Theorem 4, Harrington and Chang state that; ‘A leniency 
programme can have a perverse effect because, while it generally promotes deterrence, it can 
actually result in fewer cartels being shut down.’280 This is because leniency applications are 
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coming from dying cartels, and therefore prosecution of these are not shutting down active 
cartels. Leniency applications are adding to the enforcement authorities’ case load and result 
in less room for prosecuting non-leniency cases which would have disabled well-functioning 
cartels. It is therefore better to take on fewer leniency cases, and more non-leniency cases 
because the latter would shut down more cartels and deter some cartels from forming.  
If an enforcement authority is not actively engaged in enforcement, then introducing a leniency 
programme is sure to be effective in reducing the frequency of cartel forming, specifically if 
penalties are sufficiently severe, and the cases are handled with (case specific) less 
resources. The authors (Harrington and Chang) contend that other policies should also be 
considered, such as screening for cartels which would result in an increase in the probability 
of discovery. 
Harrington and Chang’s Theorem 4 could plausibly hold in some jurisdictions. A leniency 
programme raises cartels where; a) a leniency case takes up a reasonable amount of 
resources so that there is crowding out of resources for non-leniency cases; and b) penalties 
are not so severe that they do not significantly deter cartel formation. It seems quite likely that 
jurisdictions with active leniency programmes could be experiencing weakened non-leniency 
enforcement because of the crowding out of non-leniency methods of enforcement. As per b), 
many countries which have set legal caps on fines that are far below the incremental profit 
from colluding, do little to deter cartel formation. Thus a leniency programme is not assured of 
reducing the frequency of cartels, instead it can raise the cartel rate. To avoid this outcome, 
and to ensure that a leniency programme serves the cause of fighting cartels, a procedure 
that will expeditiously handle leniency cases must be set up. 
In a previous paper, Chang and Harrington argued that the implementation of a leniency 
program may make collusion harder because the probability of detection increases. However, 
Harrington noted that leniency may also increase cartel formation, because the antitrust 
agency might focus the bulk of its efforts on prosecuting cases brought within the leniency 
program rather than investigate potential cartels outside of those discovered by leniency 
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3.4.1 Non-leniency Methods 
 
Friederiszick and Maier-Rigaud, two members of the DG Comp recommended in their working 
paper that DG Comp should step up non-leniency enforcement methods, such as being active 
in detecting cartels.282 They believe in ex officio enforcement based on economic criteria 
through proactive market monitoring. A robust enforcement strategy outside leniency can 
motivate compliance that would deter cartel formation. As Mariniello finds, EU fines account 
for a tiny proportion of the turnover of affected markets and in order to speed up investigations 
the Commission should increase resources dedicated to inquiries and, that fines should also 
be raised.283 Aggressive ex officio investigations would be the more effective way to deter 
cartels. Therefore, the need is to adopt a better and efficient methodology in detection at an 
early stage of anticompetitive behaviour. 
Sokol and Fishkin provide qualitative survey evidence of antitrust law firms, that supports 
Harrington’s theoretical insights, albeit the survey relates to mergers in antitrust law.284   
Almost all the prior empirical researches have focused on detected and prosecuted cartel 
cases. They state, therefore, it is difficult to imply and conclude the impact of antitrust policy 
on collusion from only observed cases. Mariniello’s assertion that, ‘No reliable estimate exists 
of the probability of detection by antitrust authorities. By definition, such an estimate would 
require information on cartels that have not been uncovered.’285 is an affirmation of Sokol and 
Fishkin’s conclusions.  
 
3.4.2 Increase in Cartel Conviction a Result of Increased Cartel Formation? 
Marvao and Spagnolo suggest that:  
‘Since every instance of collusion cannot be observed, interpreting an increase in the 
number of convicted cartels following a policy innovation as a ‘success’ – an interpretation 
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adopted by some in relation to the reform of the US leniency policy in 1993286 – is an 
elementary logical mistake.’287  
An increase in cartel convictions may be the result of an increase in cartel formation which 
again could be the result of lenient law enforcement. What matters for welfare is deterrence 
and prices, not the number of self-reports which by themselves increase the workload of 
enforcement authorities and prosecution costs. Therefore, the regulators should be focused 
on improving welfare, by increasing cartel deterrence and lowering prices. Having evaluated 
a number of economic theories, Marvao and Spagnolo admit that laboratory experiments in 
themselves have several drawbacks, and should be carefully examined. Nevertheless, they 
conclude that there is increasing importance of leniency policies for competition authorities’ 
daily enforcement work. They point to the growing number of leniency applications by firms in 
exchange for information and cooperation. They conclude that it is important to ensure that 
leniency policies are well designed, and properly administered for effective cartel deterrence. 
A poorly designed leniency policy or too generously administered leniency policy will allow 
cartelists to escape or offer reduced fines, and thereby encourage cartels that would not 
otherwise form. Generous leniency with mild sanctions are likely to maintain or increase 
deadweight loss from administration, prosecution and litigation costs with no balancing benefit 
to the tax payer. 
3.4.3 Market Surveys More Effective than Leniency 
Market uncertainty and detection uncertainty determine cartels. Xiaowei Cai states that 
government does not have to spend equal amount of resources on cartel detection and 
investigation across industries. Based on the market structure such as the concentration level, 
demand elasticity, industry size and the cost of entry which determine excess profits jointly, 
the enforcement agency might be able to use appropriate damage multiplier, and allocate just 
a small amount of resources to dissolve cartels without leniency. With leniency, even less 
resources would be enough to deter cartels.288 This is an important observation that can be 
adopted by regulators for better detection of concentrations in the market. 
                                                          
286 US DOJ, ‘Corporate Leniency Policy’ 1993 < http://www.juctice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.htm > last 
accessed 16.06.2016. 
287 See Caterina Moura Pinto Marvao and Giancarlo Spagnolo, ‘What Do We Know About the Effectiveness of 
Leniency Policies?’ A Survey of the Empirical and Experimental Evidence’ (2014), Part III Experimental Evidence 
on Leniency Policies < SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2511613 > last accessed 16.06.2016. 
288 See Xiaowei Cai, ‘Effect of Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Dissolution under Market Uncertainty’ 
(2012) 2(4) Advances in Management & Applied Economics 141-160.       
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Given that market surveys are conducted by regulators, for example the OFT/CMA, their 
impact has not been impressive. Before the changeover to CMA, the OFT would carry out a 
market study which was Phase 1, and if found necessary, the OFT would refer it to the 
Competition Commission (CC) for an investigation which is Phase 2. A key element of the EA 
02 policy was to relaunch market investigations as an instrument by the CC. High expectations 
fell short as there were only nine, by 2008. The former Chairman of the CC has regretted the 
tardiness in completing the investigations as well as the small number they were able to deal 
with. He was happy with the results of the investigations though, which were resolved without 
going into trial.289  
The current CMA has taken over both Phases 1 and 2 of market surveys from the OFT and 
the CC, and has expressed its intention to make full use of it.290 If a mechanism produces 
good results it is worthwhile adopting it, with proper training for staff and maintaining such staff 
for long term, and using resources intelligently. The CMA is now entrusted with this task, and 
as it has already declared on reducing dependence on leniency, it is hoped market studies will 
be put to good use.291 Correct case selection would be the key element in achieving success 
in this respect.         
3.4.4 Pro- collusive Effect of Antitrust Law 
Results from an experiment designed to analyse the general deterrence, and price effects of 
different antitrust policies by Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le Coq, and Spagnolo show their main 
findings to be that: antitrust laws without leniency caught by fines following successful 
investigations have significant deterrence effects, and the number of cartels formed are 
reduced. However, antitrust laws also have a significant pro-collusive effect. Prices of the 
cartels formed increase, net welfare effect of antitrust laws appears negative.292 They found, 
with leniency for the first party self-reporting, increases deterrence, leads to lower average 
prices, improves welfare, and reduces cartels. However, it yields no lower prices as against 
laissez-faire, as cartels formed under leniency regime are more stable than without.  
                                                          
289 Peter Freeman, Chairman, Competition Commission, ‘Competition policy and interesting times- the role of the 
CC’ Speech at the Competition Forum, 2 December 2008; See also CC report, ‘Market investigation into the 
supply of groceries in the UK’ 30 April 2008.  
 
290 David Currie, CMA Chairman ‘Open, competitive markets benefit consumers and businesses, and promote 
innovation and economic growth’ Speech at the Law Society’s Competition Section, 3 December 2014. 
291 Ibid. 
292 Maria Bigoni, Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Chloé Le Coq and Giancarlo Spagnolo, ‘FINES, LENIENCY, and 




Deterrence may not always feed back into lower prices, the real goal of policy. They find, when 
rewards for whistleblowers financed by fines from competitors are introduced, average prices 
fall to competitive levels. Under this format, cartels are still formed mainly to cash the reward 
at partners’ expense. 
Ex ante deterrence is not an observable factor as usually victims are not aware, and therefore 
empirical research is difficult in this area compared to many other law enforcement policies. 
The deterrence effects of antitrust/leniency policies are difficult to evaluate as cartels, and 
changes in them are unobservable. Experiments that economists do can only take into 
account the observables, i.e. the detected cartels, therefore they have limitations. Maria Bigoni 
and others thus concede that deterrence effects of antitrust policies are particularly difficult to 
evaluate because the population of cartels and changes in it are unobservable. Hence, 
laboratory experiments are valuable but they have limitations. Although valuable, ‘They can 
only estimate the effects of policies actually implemented, not those of the many available 
alternatives, and they focus on cartel formation rather than welfare.’293 They conclude 
therefore, generally under leniency, cartels are rarely re-formed, greatly reducing recidivism. 
And the prices on average are significantly lower. But culture may affect optimal law 
enforcement in different regions or countries. It can be concluded that in jurisdictions where 
enforcement is vigorous, or even aggressive, Leniency may help deterrence. 
Thus, economic experiments can only estimate the effects of policies that are actually 
implemented, and the focus would be on cartel formation or their destabilisation, but not on 
competition or consumer welfare.  
 
 3.5 Conclusion       
Leniency as a viable theory for detecting anticompetitive behaviour is based on an early 
formula, and developed later by subsequent economists. It has been postulated by economists 
such as Kaplow and Shavel that colluders will only commit a harmful act if, and only if, the 
gain they derive from it exceeds the likely fine they would receive on probable detection. They 
have claimed that leniency serves two purposes. One is that hard evidence will be provided 
by the applicants, which would otherwise be difficult to obtain as cartels are secret 
agreements. The other is, that if evidence is thus freely made available, the enforcement 
authorities would not have to expend their scarce resources in lengthy investigations, making 
it a cost-effective method. Toffel and Short suggest that self-reporting indicates effective self-
                                                          
293 Ibid, p 369 (footnote not included). 
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policing. Aubert and others are fiercely supportive of large rewards to individual applicants 
rather than corporations, and even suggest keeping such rewards secret from the public to 
avoid unrest. Chen and Ray believe both pre and post investigation leniency can help prevent 
the formation of some cartels and increase welfare unambiguously. 
From a reading of the various economic theories, it is interesting to note that while the earlier 
theorists show mostly positive results for leniency, the latest theorists find both positive and 
negative outcomes. The theories set out in this chapter are only a small cross section of the 
volume of lemmas postulated by a large number of past and present economic scholars. It is 
clear that the theories keep evolving with time and new experiences, so that each theory has 
its own story, the result being no two lemmas can produce exactly the same result. What is 
illuminating is that more and more of the new theories find that leniency has several 
drawbacks. Hinloopen and Soetevent show that generous leniency can prompt cartels to 
adopt a strategy of ‘collude and report systematically’. Brenner, Harrington and Chang, Marvo 
and Spagnolo are some of those who find leniency a costly method. Evenett and others have 
found that cartels earning high turnover last longer, even up to 10 years or more. Harrington 
and Chang also found leniency applications come mainly from dying cartels and those that 
are less stable and weak, and they believe cartels are reduced when non-leniency methods 
are fixed. According to them, leniency policy can result in more cartels forming even as they 
generate more leniency applications. Harrington and Chang suggest that if leniency is 
effective, then there should be more resources available to enforcement authorities due to 
reduction in cartels. They opine that screening increases detection rather than leniency. 
Xiaowei Cai finds that market surveys based on market structure are more effective, and 
reduce costs than do leniency applications. This, as with Harrington and Chang’s proposition 
can be a proactive method by which the risk factor for cartels is raised, and therefore, may 
lead towards deterrence.  
Importantly, some of the economists themselves concede that economic theories do not 
provide conclusive answers to the question whether leniency programs are sufficient 
incentives for firms to refrain from cartel activity. This is mainly because economists have to 
rely on detected and prosecuted cartels, and it is difficult to conclude accurately the impact of 
policies from only observed cases without taking into account the hidden cartels. As Bigoni 
and others observe, economic experiments can only estimate the effects of policies actually 
implemented but not those of other alternatives, nor do they deal with consumer welfare. 
Moreover, as Evenett and others point out, economic theory does not identify deterministic 
relationships between market structure and cartel success. They believe criminalising cartels 
is critical to strengthening enforcement. 
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While economic experiments are a useful tool in proving intuitive propositions they are limited 
in scope, having to work with only existing policies, and observed cases. Given different 
localities, product markets or industries, and political and cultural differences in those 
localities, designing a leniency programme to suit all such complex factors is not feasible. 
Leniency policies will have a positive effect on cartel deterrence only if they reduce collusive 
activities by firms. If detection is improbable, and colluders wish to remain silent despite 
leniency because collusion is more profitable, then the enforcement authorities’ dependence 
on the leniency policy to break up the cartel fails.   
It can be safely concluded therefore, that the enforcement authorities could maximise 
detection and deterrence by creating an environment of high risk of detection, and prosecution.   
The next chapter will examine the Penalty Guidance which helps the UK’s principal 
enforcement authority, the OFT/CMA, in setting fines in competition investigation decisions. 

















The OFT/CMA Penalty Guidance 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The procedural measures in the UK enforcement system, dealing with penalties in particular, 
after a finding of anticompetitive behaviour are explored in this chapter, as this helps better 
understand the decisions taken by the former OFT in the cases set out in chapter 5.  The 
Penalty Guidance (Guidance) is fashioned according to the guidelines adopted by the 
Commission itself in setting fines for cartel participants on conviction. The Guidance has come 
up for much criticism by defendants and the CAT alike on a number of occasions, leading to 
several revisions of it. The Guidance is divided into two parts, one dealing with calculating the 
penalty, and the other with lenient treatment. Nevertheless, the Guidance comes into play 
when setting a fine whether leniency is granted or not. 
4.1.1 Overview of the Penalty Guidance294 
Under s 38 of CA 98, the Director of the OFT/CMA has to publish, after consultation with the 
relevant persons and with the approval of the Secretary of State, a Guidance as to the 
appropriate amount of a penalty, and the OFT must have regard to the Guidance on Penalties 
for the time being in force when setting the amount of a penalty. This is so, as under s 38(2) 
of CA 98, the OFT/CMA may alter the Guidance at any time. Indeed, the OFT has revised its 
Guidance several times, ‘The Director General of Fair Trading’s Guidance as to the 
Appropriate Amount of a Penalty, OFT 423, March 2000’ and the revised ‘Guidance as to the 
                                                          
294 OFT423 Guidance is still called OFT’s Guidance but applies to the current CMA also. For convenience, the 




Appropriate Amount of a Penalty, OFT 423, December 2004’ have been applied consecutively, 
to the OFT cases discussed in Chapter 5 of this research.295   
The latest guidance, ‘OFT's guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, OFT423, 
September 2012’ applies a new six step procedure as opposed to the five step Guidance of 
2000 and 2004. The ‘2012 Guidance’ has amended the starting point for penalties to a 
maximum of 30 per cent of the relevant turnover, clarifies the relevant turnover to be used, 
revises the methodology for reflecting the duration, and introduces a new aggravating factor 
for persistent and repeated delays to the OFT’s investigation by the defendants. With regard 
to the leniency policy, the new Guidance provides for settlement discounts, and reductions for 
financial hardship. The Guidance clarifies its leniency policy in some respects, and has made 
some small amendments. However, there is no provision to impose a penalty equivalent to 
the harm caused, or to enable the calculation of the harm. 
The 2012 Guidance came into operation after the OFT decisions under the purview of this 
thesis, and as such, those decisions were governed by the earlier, 2002 or 2004 Guidance in 
force at the time, as the case may be.  
4.1.2 Penalty and Lenient Treatment  
In granting a percentage of leniency to those who cooperate with the investigation, OFT must 
first calculate the likely penalty each colluder will have to pay. The OFT’s policy objectives of 
the Guidance are stated to be twofold: i) imposing penalties on infringing undertakings to 
reflect the seriousness of those infringements, and ii) deterrence for both the infringing 
undertakings, and other undertakings that may be considering engaging in anticompetitive 
activities. 
Once the OFT has found that an undertaking has breached the Chapter I prohibition, s 36 of 
CA 98 provides that the OFT may require the undertaking concerned to pay a penalty to the 
OFT in respect of that breach. An undertaking comprises those legal bodies forming a single 
economic entity with the person found to have breached the Chapter I prohibition.  
                                                          
295 Following criticism by the CAT, and also to bring the appropriate penalty in line with the Commission, and 
several other competition authorities such as in France, Germany and Spain, the OFT started a consultation prior 





4.1.3 Legality of Penalties 
The principle of legality in EU law requires that where an EU rule imposes or permits the 
imposition of penalties, that rule must be clear and precise, so that the persons concerned 
may be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and take steps 
accordingly.296 The principle applies not only to provisions of a criminal nature but also to 
specific administrative instruments, as for example, in the enforcement of EU competition law, 
whereby such ‘administrative penalties’ may be imposed.297 The Commission’s previous 
decision-making practice is not formally binding on the Commission when it determines the 
amount of a fine.298 However, in setting such ‘administrative penalties’ pursuant to Regulation 
1/2003, the Commission is bound by the general principles of law, particularly the principle of 
equal treatment, in any determination as to the criteria and the method of calculation to be 
used. With a view to transparency and to increase legal certainty for the undertakings 
concerned, the Commission has also published guidelines setting out the calculation method 
which it has to follow in determining the penalties in a given case.299 
While the OFT/CMA (or any other NCA) does not have to follow the Commission’s own 
guidelines in calculating the penalties, the OFT has formulated its guidelines based on the 
same principle of equal treatment, now similarly adopted by the CMA.  
Further, in any decision imposing a fine, the Commission is obliged in accordance with Article 
296(2) TFEU, to state the reasons for its decision, particularly with regard to the amount of 
fine and method of calculation. The statement of reasons must be clear and unequivocal, so 
that those concerned can know the justification for the measure taken in order to decide 
whether it would be expedient to refer the matter to the CJEU and allow that Court to exercise 
its power of judicial review.300 
The OFT has recognised the importance of setting the penalties proportionately and not 
excessively. No penalty which the OFT may fix exceed the maximum 10 per cent of the 
worldwide turnover of the undertaking, calculated in accordance with the provisions of CA 
                                                          
296 Case 169/80 Gondrand, [1981] ECR 1931, [17]; Case -143/93 Van Es Douane Agenten, [1996] ECR 1-431, 
[27]. 
297 Case 137/85 Maizena v Commission [1987] ECR 4587, [14]-[15]. 
298 See Case T-23/99 LR AF 1998 v Commission [2002] ECR II-1705; Case T-203/01 Michelin v Commission 
[2003] ECR II-4071. 
299 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 
65(5) of the ECSC Treaty fines [1998] OJ C 9 14/98, pp 3-5. 
300 See Case T-43/02 Jungbunzlauer v Commission [2006] ECR II-3435; See also Case C-367/95 P Commission 
v Sytravel and another [1998] ECR I-1718. 
68 
 
98.301 Although the maximum percentage has since been revised,302 the penalty of 10 per cent 
maximum of the turnover applies to all the OFT cases discussed in this thesis.  
The Commission further refined and elaborated its fining policy in its 2006 Fining 
Guidelines.303 In the UK therefore, the OFT has also issued various circulars giving guidance 
on its approach to the enforcement of competition law within the UK, including Guidance as to 
the appropriate amount of a penalty under discussion here (OFT 423).  
In accordance with s 38(8) of CA 98, the OFT must have regard to the Guidance on Penalties 
under s 38(1) of CA 98, for the time being in force when setting the amount of a penalty.  
4.1.4 Steps to be Followed in Calculating a Penalty – Step 1 
The penalties Guidance sets out the approach to calculating a financial penalty imposed under 
s 36 of the CA 98. According to the Guidance, there are five steps (now extended to six, under 
OFT 423, Guidance 2012), to be followed in determining the amount of a penalty. 
Under Part 2.1 of the penalties Guidance, a financial penalty imposed by the OFT under s 36 
of CA 98 will be calculated following a five step approach. Step 1 is the calculation of the 
starting point, by applying a percentage determined by the seriousness of the infringement to 
the ‘relevant turnover’ of the undertaking, in the relevant product market and the relevant 
geographic market affected by the infringement in the last financial year.  According to the 
Penalties Order, the last financial year is the business year preceding the date when the 
infringement ended.   
4.1.5 Percentage Rate of Turnover 
The actual percentage rate which is applied to the relevant turnover depends upon a number 
of factors relating to the nature of the infringement. The more serious the infringement, the 
higher the likely percentage rate. The factors that determine the assessment include the 
nature of the product, the structure of the market, the market shares of the undertakings 
involved, entry conditions, and the effect on competitors and third parties. An important 
consideration will also be the damage caused to consumers, whether directly or indirectly.304 
                                                          
301 Competition Act 1998 (Determination of Turnover for Penalties) Order 2000 (SI 2000/309) as amended by the 
Competition Act 1998 (Determination of Turnover for Penalties) (Amendment) Order 2004 (SI 2004/1259). 
302 OFT penalty guidance of 2012 has raised the maximum percentage rate to 30; See OFT 423: OFT’s guidance 
as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, September 2012. 
303 Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 
1/2003, [2006] OJ C 210/2; See Commission Press release IP/06/857, 28.06.2006. 
304 In the majority of the OFT cases, the resulting damage to consumers could not in effect be assessed. 
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An assessment of the appropriate starting point for each undertaking involved will be carried 
out, in order to take account of the real impact of the infringing activity of each undertaking on 
competition.305 
4.2 Duration and Other Factors 
Step 2 is an adjustment for duration, according to which the figure arrived at may be multiplied 
by not more than the number of years of the infringement, in cases where the infringement 
has lasted more than 1 year. (Part years may be taken as full or quarter year). 
Step 3 is an upwards adjustment for other factors, in particular to ensure that the penalty has 
the appropriate deterrent effect. The deterrent effect is not only intended for the firm under 
investigation but also for those who may intend to engage in anticompetitive behaviour in the 
future. 
Step 4 is an adjustment for further aggravating or mitigating factors. It sets out  aggravating 
factors which include: persistent and repeated unreasonable behaviour that delays the 
investigation; role of the undertaking as a leader in or an instigator of the infringement; 
involvement of directors or senior management; retaliatory or other coercive measures taken 
with the aim of ensuring other undertakings continue with the infringement; continuing the 
infringement after the start of an investigation, and; repeated infringements by the same 
undertaking or other undertakings in the same group.306 Mitigating factors under Step 4 
include: where the undertaking is acting under severe duress or pressure; genuine uncertainty 
as to whether the agreement or conduct constituted an infringement, and; adequate steps 
have been taken to ensure compliance with Article 101 (and 102) and the Chapter I (and 
Chapter II) prohibitions.307  
Step 5 is a cross-check to ensure that the maximum penalty permitted under the Penalties 
Order is not exceeded, and to avoid double jeopardy. (The new Step 5, ‘adjustment for specific 
deterrence and proportionality’ introduced into OFT 423, September 2012, does not come into 
play in the OFT cases discussed in this thesis, as will not, the 30 per cent penalty increase in 
that Guidance (para 2.11).  
                                                          
305 Under s 60 of CA 98, the OFT is not required to calculate penalties in the same way as those imposed by the 
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the OFT in increasing the penalty unless there are exceptional cases. Such exceptional circumstances could 
include situations where compliance activities are used to conceal or facilitate an infringement, or to mislead the 




4.2.1 Avoidance of Double Jeopardy 
Under s 38(9) CA 98 if a penalty or fine has been imposed by the Commission or by a court 
or another body in another Member State in respect of an agreement or conduct, the 
OFT/CMA must take that penalty or fine into account when setting the amount of a penalty in 
relation to that agreement or conduct. This is to ensure that, where an anticompetitive 
agreement or conduct is subject to proceedings resulting in a penalty or fine in another 
Member State, an undertaking will not be penalised again in the UK for the same 
anticompetitive effects.308 The Court of Appeal in its judgment in the Replica Kit and Toys 
cases,309 stated that s 38(8) of the CA 98 does not bind the OFT to follow the Penalty Guidance 
in all respects in every case, but that in accordance with general principle, the OFT must give 
reasons for any significant departure from the Penalty Guidance. 
4.2.2 Penalty Must Correspond to Relevant Financial Year 
 
The CJEU has held, specifically within the context of EU competition law enforcement, that it 
is a fundamental right not to have penalties applied which are more punitive than those which 
might reasonably have been expected to have been applied at the time of the offending 
conduct.310 Hence at Step 1, the OFT adopted a specific year under s 36 (8) CA 98, for 
calculating the relevant turnover of an undertaking, i.e. the financial year prior to the 
infringement.311 However this (the ‘Penalties Order’) has been amended subsequently by the 
substitution of a new Article 3, to the business year preceding the date on which the decision 
of the OFT is taken or, if figures are not available for that business year, the one immediately 
preceding it.312 The object of the amendment was to bring the Penalties Order in line with EU 
regulation.313 However, this change met with criticism by the CAT in the Constructions 
cases.314  
 
                                                          
308 Gransden & Co Ltd and another v Secretary of State for the Environment and another (1985) 54 P. & C.R 86, 
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309 See Joined cases Argos Ltd and Littlewoods Ltd v Office of Fair Trading, JJB Sports v Office of Fair Trading, 
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In applying the steps to individual undertakings in multi-party cases, the OFT has to observe 
the principle of equal treatment as articulated by the Court of First Instance (now the General 
Court), in Tokai Carbon.315  
 
4.2.3 Relevant Market Essential in Ascertaining Turnover 
The OFT has no obligation to define the relevant market in price-fixing agreements as these 
agreements by their very nature have the object of prevention, restriction and distortion of 
competition.316 However, market definition is the first step in the process of assessing the 
penalties (OFT’s Guidance, para 2.3), as per the Commission Notice of 1997.317 which means 
the OFT addresses the definition of both the product market and the geographic market, in 
order to set the percentage of penalty on the relevant turnover.  
 
In Continental Can318 it was stated that the definition of the ‘relevant market’ was a key step 
and of essential significance for judicial understanding of the concept, since the characteristics 
of the products in question are particularly apt to satisfy an inelastic need and are only to a 
limited extent interchangeable with other products.  
 
A typical increase in demand can be illustrated in a simple supply and demand diagram319 as 
shown in Figure 3 below:                                                            
                                                          
315 Case T-236/01 Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd and Others v Commission [2004] ECR II-1 181 [219]; See Kier Group 
plc and others v Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 3, [177].     
316 Case T-62/98 Volkswagen AG v Commission [2000] ECR II-2707, [230]. 
 
317 Market definition – ‘is to identify in a systematic way the competitive constraints that the undertakings involved 
face.’ See Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the purpose of Community 
Competition Law (1997) OJ C 372/5.   
318 Case 6/72 Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215, (Summary), [14]. 
319 See ‘Market Structure – Economics’ Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia; See also MICROeconomics 19 Minute 
Review < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JRlREpsr348 > last accessed 06.05.2017; Richard V Eastin and 
Gary L Arbogast, ‘Demand and Supply Analysis: Introduction’ CFA Institute, Exhibits 16 and 17 at 33-34. 
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                                                 Supply and Demand curve     
                            
                                                   
                                                                              Figure 3                                                       
The price of a commodity is determined by the interaction of supply and demand in a market. 
Identifying the ‘relevant market’ can be a contentious issue with defendants, as has been seen 
in some of the OFT cases in Chapter 5 of this thesis.320 The defendants, understandably, 
argue for the relevant market to be narrower or wider perhaps in an effort to show their 
activities have not had any significant damaging effect. To overcome such resistance, markets 
need to be regulated to be open and transparent, which will enable authorities to spot risk of 
concentration speedily. 
4.2.4 Relevant Product Market and SSNIP 
The relevant product market is to be defined by reference to the facts in any given case. The 
question to ask is whether the products concerned sufficiently compete with each other to be 
sensibly regarded as being in the same market.321 In order to deal with the problem of 
subjectivity (of the product), both EU and UK have adopted (as used by US DoJ) what is 
known as the ‘hypothetical monopolist’ test as a conceptual framework to try and understand 
what consumers in the market will do when there is a ‘Small but Significant Non-transitory 
Increase in Price’ referred to as the SSNIP test.322  In defining the relevant market, the OFT 
                                                          
320 See OFT Decision No. CA98/01/2011, (Sec 5.15); OFT Decision No. CA98/01/2006, (Sec. 5.19); OFT 
Decision CA98/04/2005, (sec 5.23). 
 
321 Aberdeen Journals v Director General of Fair Trading [2002] CAT 4, paras 96-7. 
322 The SSNIP test defines the relevant market by determining whether a given increase in product prices would 




adopts the hypothetical monopolist test,323 by establishing the closest substitutes to the 
product in question. 
 
4.3. Relevant Geographic Market 
The relevant geographic market is the territory where all traders in question operate in a 
sufficiently homogeneous condition, and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas 
because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those areas. Citing the two 
Tetra Pak324 cases, the Court of First Instance said in British Airways that the geographic 
market ‘…may be defined as the territory in which all traders operate in the same or sufficiently 
homogeneous conditions of competition in so far as concerns specifically the relevant products 
or services, without it being necessary for those conditions to be perfectly homogeneous …’325 
It is necessary to define the market only where it is impossible to determine whether an 
agreement is liable to affect trade in the UK without such a definition, and that its object is the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. Both the product and geographic ‘relevant 
markets’ are complex economic issues that may involve many possible relevant markets for 
the purposes of administering justice.  
 
4.3.1 Cooperation with Other Jurisdictions via ECN 
The OFT/CMA cooperates with the Commission, and with the NCAs in other member states 
through the ECN. Confidential information can be exchanged relating to investigations in 
different member states, with the consent of the investigating member state or member states 
concerned via the ECN. Within the ECN, the European Model Leniency Programme has been 
set up to provide a harmonising effect on all European leniency programmes, and it is 
designed to ensure that potential applicants are not discouraged from applying as a result of 
discrepancies between the existing leniency programmes within the ECN. The English courts 
have shown a readiness to take a wide view in relation to accepting jurisdiction. There have 
been a number of cases in which an English domiciled subsidiary of a Commission cartel 
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infringement Decision was used as an anchor defendant in English courts, for the purpose of 
asserting jurisdiction over non-English domiciled addressees of that infringement decision.326  
In addition, the UK is party to mutual assistance arrangements relating to competition law 
enforcement with a number of non-European countries including the US, Australia, Canada, 
China and New Zealand. The OFT will not pass on information supplied by leniency 
applications to an overseas agency without the consent of the provider except in one situation, 
i.e. that such information may be disclosed within the ECN in accordance with the provisions 
and safeguards set out in the Commission’s Network Notice.327   
Chapter I, CA 98 can apply to agreements between undertakings located outside the UK if 
they may have an impact on competition within the UK. It can apply wherever the agreement, 
decision or practice is, or is intended to be implemented in the UK. 
4.3.2 Small Agreements 
S 39 of CA 98 provides that a person is immune from the effect of s 36 if he is party to a ‘small 
agreement’ and, that agreement is not a price-fixing agreement. As such provisions applicable 
to s 39 of CA 98, do not apply to infringements of Chapter I prohibitions.328 ‘Small agreements’ 
are agreements between undertakings whose combined turnover for the business year ending 
in the year preceding the one in which the infringement occurred does not exceed £20 million. 
However, this rule does not apply in the case of hard core cartels, as has been the stance of 
the Commission which revised the De Minimis Notice in 2014,329 after a consultation following 
the CJEU judgement in Expedia,330 that agreements containing one or more “by object” or 
hard core restrictions cannot benefit from the safe harbour of the De Minimis Notice.331 
4.3.3 Intentional or Negligent Infringement pre- ERRA 
Prior to ERRA 13, the requirement under s 36(3) CA 98 was that the OFT may impose a 
penalty only if it is satisfied that the infringement had been committed intentionally or 
negligently. Nevertheless, the OFT is not obliged to specify whether it considers the 
                                                          
326 KME Yorkshire v Toshiba Carrier [2012] EWCA Civ 1990, [20]-[21]. 
327 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C101/04, paras 40 and 
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330 See Case C-226/11 Expedia v Autorité de la concurrence [2012] ECR 795. 
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infringement to be intentional or merely negligent, as observed by the CAT in Napp 
Pharmaceutical.332 The requirement of ‘dishonesty’ is no longer in force under the new ERRA 
13, but the OFT cases discussed in this thesis fall within that category as they have all been 
concluded prior to the new Act.                                                                                   
4.4 OFT/CMA’s Three Categories of Leniency 
The Penalty Guidance also sets out the basic requirements for the grant of lenient treatment 
by the OFT under its leniency programme. The aim of the leniency programme is to encourage 
undertakings to come forward with information relating to any cartel activity in which they are 
involved. Therefore, the Guidance is effectively divided into two parts, namely; ‘Steps for 
determining the level of penalty’ and ‘Lenient treatment for undertakings coming forward with 
information’. 
Part 3 of the penalty Guidance contains a number of separate, and self-standing provisions 
which govern the circumstances in which the OFT may grant leniency to undertakings that 
come forward and provide information about cartels under Type A, Type B or Type C. 
Type A is for first applicants where there is no pre-existing investigation, and who supply 
sufficient evidence for the OFT to carry forward an investigation. There are five conditions that 
such an applicant must comply with, namely, accept participation of the cartel, provide OFT 
with all relevant evidence, maintain complete cooperation throughout the investigation, stop 
the wrongful activity immediately (or as directed by the OFT) and the applicant should not 
have coerced another party to take part in the cartel activity. Type B is also for a first applicant 
who applies where there is a pre-existing investigation but the application is made prior to the 
statement of objections is sent out to them, and the applicant’s evidence has significant added 
value to the investigation. The third, Type C is available to a later applicant (or a coercer) who 
applies before the statement of objections, and must comply with four of the above conditions 
(except being a coercer) that apply to a first applicant under Type A and Type B.333 
While a Type A applicant is granted full immunity from financial penalties, blanket immunity 
from criminal prosecution and protection from disqualification proceedings, Type B applicant 
may also obtain similar leniency but that will be at the OFT’s discretion. Type C applicant will 
get discretionary leniency with a reduction of fines up to 50% and discretionary immunity from 
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455 and 457; Aberdeen Journals Limited v Office of Fair Trading [2003] CAT 11, paras 484-5. 
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prosecution for specific individuals, and protection from director disqualification if corporate 
leniency reduction is granted.334 
4.4.1 Marker System for Leniency Applicants 
A marker system is also in place for those who are seeking to apply but are not sure if they 
would be eligible. Enquiries can be made (usually by a prospective applicant’s lawyer) to the 
OFT/CMA, even giving a hypothetical scenario in order to ascertain the possibility of gaining 
leniency, without having to disclose the names and addresses of the actual party involved. 
Once the availability of leniency is confirmed, names can be disclosed and a marker is given 
so that the applicant gains time for preparing, if and until an investigation begins. This 
secures a first applicant’s place in the line of applicants. 
4.4.2 Leniency Plus 
The OFT also provides Leniency Plus for applicants who disclose evidence about other 
separate cartel activity not related to the ongoing investigation which, if it fell within Type A or 
Type B would enable them to obtain a further reduction of the penalty on the first investigation. 
Whether leniency is granted or not, the OFT calculates the amount of fine that each perpetrator 
of the antitrust breach should be ordered to pay, according to a set guideline. 
4.4.3 Reasons for Granting Leniency  
 
The OFT states in its Guidance that it is in the interest of the economy of the UK and the 
European Union more generally, to have a policy of granting lenient treatment to undertakings 
which inform the OFT of cartel activities, and cooperate with any ensuing investigation. It is 
the secret nature of cartel activity which makes it difficult to detect them, and as such the OFT 
believes this policy to be justified. Further, the interests of customers and consumers in 
ensuring that such activities are detected and prohibited outweigh the policy objectives of 
imposing financial penalties on colluding undertakings.335  
The procedure for applying for leniency is given in a separate Leniency Guidance. The 
leniency guidance was revised in 2008 to clarify and expand the policy with a view to giving 
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maximum predictability and transparency for leniency applicants.336 The revision offers 
additional explanation on issues such as: the need for ‘genuine intention to confess’ and of 
‘continuous and complete cooperation’; criteria for discounts for those who are not the first to 
apply; the requirements for criminal immunity, and when the OFT will advise individuals that 
they are not at risk of criminal prosecution; the timing for entering into agreements with the 
OFT, and; the use to which leniency information may be put. Confidentiality is afforded to 
leniency applicants as set out in Part 3.24. 
4.4.4 The CAT’s Dissatisfaction with the Guidance 
Questions have been raised by the CAT both with regard to the OFT’s penalty Guidance 
calculations and the relevant financial year in some of the OFT decisions. In the Constructions 
Industry337 cases, the CAT was of the opinion that the relevant financial year should be the 
business year prior to the ending of an infringement by the undertaking concerned. The OFT 
had, in its decisions in those cases taken the financial year to be the one prior to the OFT’s 
Decision, following a change in the Penalties Order in 2004. The CAT described the 
calculation of the penalty as inconsistent with the 2004 Guidance for penalties, and 
mechanistically arrived at in those cases, by using a Minimum Deterrent Threshold (MDT).338 
The CAT was not bound to follow the OFT penalty guidance,339 although the OFT did. 
Interestingly, the CAT does not explain itself how it arrives at the conclusions relating to the 
amount of penalties or reduction of penalties imposed in the appeal cases.  
The CAT retains jurisdiction under Schedule 8, paragraph 3(2) of CA 98 to fix the penalty. In 
its decision in Napp Pharmaceutical,340 however, the CAT did take into account the OFT 
Guidance when reaching its own conclusions as to what the penalty should be. In JJB Sports 
and Allsports appeals, the CAT held that the OFT must have regard to the Guidance which 
imports a stronger obligation than merely to take it into account.341 Nevertheless, the OFT 
retains a margin of appreciation, as to its interpretation and application of the Guidance. Under 
the new reforms, however, the CAT must have regard to the Guidance when deciding cases 
that will come before it, thereby getting its just deserts! 
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Whatever the merits and the demerits of the penalties Guidance, it is the only guidance the 
OFT has at its disposal to do the necessary calculations. Apart from the requirement to abide 
by the five step rules, and the associated rules in the Guidance, there is no way for anyone to 
ascertain how the penalty amounts are arrived at when leniency is granted to cooperating 
parties, as these amounts together with relevant turnovers are redacted from the published 
version of the decision, in a number of the OFT cases. Percentage rates made at each of the 
steps in the Guidance for penalties, except for step 2 for duration, are in reality arbitrary (within 
the permitted 10 percent), and therefore at the discretion of the OFT, depending on the 
circumstances of each case. The guidance does not differentiate between violations such as 
object and effect based infringements. Moreover, it does not provide for compensation or 
separation of retribution and deterrence goals. Perhaps there should be a rethink about the 
Penalty Guidance with a view to revise it or adopt a newer and better mechanism which is 
more transparent and easy for a Tribunal to accept without the problems that the CAT appears 
to have encountered. 
4.4.5 Conclusion 
In the UK, in addition to various other rules governing the OFT/CMA, the penalty Guidance 
plays an important role once the OFT/CMA makes a finding of infringement by a company. 
The Guidance, as the term indicates, only serves the OFT/CMA to keep within a certain margin 
in calculating the penalty it intends to impose on the infringing party. There is a certain degree 
of discretion which the OFT/CMA enjoys in setting the percentages at each of the Steps 1, 3, 
and 4 in particular, depending on the seriousness with which it regards the infringement in 
question. This very discretion, however carefully applied, has led to some serious controversy 
raised both by the defendants at the receiving end of it, and also by the CAT in several of the 
appeals that have been brought before it by those defendants.342   
This is a particular drawback for an enforcement authority to endure, particularly given the 
unpopular press coverage the OFT has received whenever the CAT has reversed or reduced 
the fines imposed by the OFT on high profile cases, sometimes with severe criticism levelled 
against the OFT’s calculation process.343  More importantly, the case decisions suffer after 
having gone through lengthy and costly investigations, resulting in either the decision being 
quashed or penalties reduced drastically. There is also no method of calculating the harm 
caused by the cartel activities under investigation or an attempt to set the fine proportionate 
to the harm caused which may have a better deterrent effect. Perhaps, a method by which 
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penalties can be calculated by a viable economic calculation, as opposed to the damage 
caused, should be developed. The assessment of damage is a difficult area in large scale 
cartel activities, and penalties imposed according to the Guidance may not be sufficient.  By 
using stochastic lemmas, a method that can be used consistently in damage assessment 
could greatly improve the imposition of optimal fines. 
The next chapter will focus on the UK’s published decisions of Chapter I cases by its principal 
enforcement authority, the then OFT (now CMA), over a period of 12 years detailing the 





















OFT’s Leniency Programme in Practice – Chapter I Cases 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the Chapter I, CA 98 cases investigated and published by the OFT 
between 2001 and April 2012. Under s 188(1) of the EA 02 as amended by the ERRA 2013, 
criminal cartel offence constitutes certain prohibited cartel arrangements namely, price fixing, 
market sharing, bid-rigging, and limiting output. The maximum penalty on conviction is five 
years’ imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine under the provisions of EA 02, as these offences 
are considered to be the most serious of anticompetitive breaches. However, the cases under 
this chapter are administrative investigations, with no parallel criminal prosecutions that the 
OFT/CMA is empowered to effect, except in one, Airline Fuel Surcharge (sec 5.11), which 
failed.  
Most of the cases dealt with in this chapter involve price fixing, and in the construction sector 
cases the offences concern bid rigging or cover pricing in the main, involving a large number 
of construction companies. A few other cases of market sharing, non-compete agreements, 
and restrictive trade practices are also found. In some of the cases, the same parties were 
found to have been involved in several offences. Two of the cases originated as applications 
for exemption, which do not involve leniency, however one of them turned into a full 
investigation due to a subsequent complaint by an interested party. Both cases led to appeals 
before the CAT.  
The purpose of revisiting these OFT decisions is to examine whether the leniency programme 
has been the key to discovering the infringements pertaining to these cases. As such, the 
cases set out in this chapter form the core of this thesis for verification of the statements made 
by enforcement authorities in the UK, that the leniency programme plays an essential part in 
the discovery of anticompetitive behaviour by companies.344 The question of whether leniency 
serves the purpose it says is important for two reasons. First, the infringing companies can 
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keep the profits of their illegal activities on leniency being granted, and in addition they do not 
have to pay any costs towards the investigation proceedings. Second, leniency comes with 
the proviso of nondisclosure of the leniency documents other than with the consent of the 
party/parties providing them. This aspect of leniency can be a hindrance to private actions by 
victims, who are thereby unable to access vital evidence that may contain within those 
documents, in order to prove their claims. It is also noteworthy that those companies granted 
immunity are protected from criminal prosecution.  
In the UK, the enforcement record of the principal antitrust authority, the OFT/CMA, has been 
the subject of much criticism by the National Audit Office over the years.345 The main reason 
for such criticism has been its poor record of cases, along with low detection rates and 
investigations, and also the prolonged length of time taken to arrive at final decisions by the 
OFT. UK being one of the largest economies in the EU, it could be expected to have a high 
level of enforcement, but the OFT notified the least number of Decisions to the Commission 
out of eleven EU countries between the period of 2004 and 2011.346 During the same period, 
the UK opened only 56 new investigations, fewer than did Hungary, despite the fact that the 
UK’s economy was more than ten times bigger than that of Hungary,347 and the UK’s former 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) stating that it has inherited a ‘world class’ 
competition regime.348 This could mean that the UK has a far better competitive economy than 
elsewhere in Europe. However, Consumer Association, ‘Which?’ may disagree, and the 
plethora of financial scandals by banks that are uncovering since the 2008 financial crisis tell 
a different story.  
The OFT, on its part, has stated it selects a small number of more high profile cases, in order 
to save up resources, and to make the public and the companies more aware of the 
                                                          
345 NAO, ‘UK Competition Authorities: The UK competition regime’ (HC 737), 5 February 2016, para 21; NAO – 
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Competition rules. In the Construction industry349 cases alone, the OFT detected some 1,000 
companies involved in anticompetitive behaviour but due to the sheer volume of work involved, 
it selected only some, where the evidence was more likely to be forthcoming 
The government’s consultation paper for reform pre ERRA 13, records Chapter 1, CA 98 
infringement decisions between 2000 and 2010, numbering 21, excluding settlements.350 In 
an updated Table are recorded 29 formal infringement decisions (comprising of both Chapters 
I and II), including two decisions made in April 2012.351 Altogether, there are 24 cases involving 
Chapter I infringements, and the companies concerned come from a number of different 
sectors including private schools. Of these, 19 of the defendant companies were fined on 
conviction, (with no public disclosure of the fine imposed in one case). In almost all of these 
cases either one or more of the parties were granted leniency in varying degrees, and a pattern 
emerges that appears to be applied in all cases irrespective of the type of anticompetitive 
breach. The reason for this pattern seems to be the Penalty Guidance which the OFT/CMA 
has to follow. The procedure in calculating the penalties is discussed in some of the cases 
(restricted to the first 4 cases in the main), as these calculations have been redacted in some 
of the other cases, and no penalties were imposed on some others.                                                          
 
5.2 Arriva plc and First Group plc - Market Sharing Agreement 
The first cartel case investigated by the OFT in July 2000, since CA 98 came into force, started 
due to an anonymous letter of complaint to the OFT, regarding an alleged agreement to swap 
bus routes  (market sharing agreement) by two bus companies operating in the Leeds area, 
namely Arriva plc and FirstGroup plc.352  For the purpose of the OFT investigation, the product 
market was the supply of commercial local bus services, and the geographic market was the 
relevant bus routes.353 The two parties held 100 per cent market shares in the relevant 
geographic market.  
Despite the senior managers of both companies having undergone compliance training and a 
compliance training programme in place for the staff, evidence came to light that directors 
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from both companies took part in a secret meeting in a hotel, to come up with the swapping 
agreement, followed by a second meeting. The parties had, therefore, entered into the 
agreement intentionally or negligently.  
 
The OFT found the agreement had the object of prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition in the UK, within the meaning of section 2(1) b of CA 98. The two parties had 
agreed to engage in market sharing or market dividing of the bus services in the Leeds area 
along the routes concerned. However, both companies benefited from the OFT’s Leniency 
Programme, with FirstGroup’s fine completely wiped off, and Arriva’s penalty reduced by 36 
per cent. Further, the parties were provided with confidentiality under section 56 of CA 98,354 
and as a result certain redactions have been made in the published version of the case record. 
At the start of the investigation, the DGFT (the Director General of Fair Trading)355 made an 
application to the High Court and the Court of Session for warrants under s 28 of CA 98 to 
enter the premises of the two companies, and made unannounced visits to seize relevant 
documents. The OFT also issued a Notice under section 26 of CA 98, in order to obtain 
specified documents from the specialist consultants in public transport. In addition, documents 
had to be obtained from the Traffic Commissioner of the relevant area. The two defendant 
companies made oral and written submissions in response to Rule 14 Notice. They both 
provided further information and clarification of the operation of the bus routes concerned in 
the investigation. 
Both Arriva and FirstGroup were two arms of much bigger entities, Arriva’s operations 
spreading across the UK and a number of EU countries, and FirstGroup was operating across 
the UK. The annual total turnover for Arriva was £1,534.3 million of which UK turnover was 
£1,355.9 million for the preceding year (ending March 1999). The total turnover for FirstGroup 
for the immediately preceding year (1999) was £1,480.3 million of which £1,470.4 million was 
generated in the UK. The total turnover in the following year (2000) for FirstGroup was 
£1,817.8 million, of which £1,548.7 million was UK turnover.  
Hence, neither party could benefit from immunity from penalties for small agreements under s 
39(1), CA 98, and in any case such immunity does not apply to a cartel offence which was the 
situation here. The maximum penalty that the OFT could impose under CA 98, at the time was 
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10 per cent of the turnover under section 36(8) of the CA 98).356 Both parties had turnovers of 
almost equal size, and both parties took part in the agreement willingly although Arriva was 
the instigator. Initially, as a starting point both parties were given a sizable penalty as a 
deterrent, and later adjusted in keeping with the OFT’s penalty Guidance according to 
aggravating or mitigating factors which left FirstGroup with a bigger fine at the next step. 
However, the OFT took into consideration the fact that FirstGroup was the first to apply for 
leniency after the investigation started and provide evidence, hence granted 100 percent 
immunity to FirstGroup. Arriva approached OFT with a leniency application later, and complied 
with the conditions to the same extent as FirstGroup, but their penalty was reduced only to the 
extent of 36 per cent.  
How did the defendants obtain leniency if the OFT had to go to great lengths to obtain the 
documents, and start the investigation before the defendants responded with their 
submissions and admitted their involvement? At what stage in the case did OFT grant leniency 
to the infringers? Taking the second question first, it appears that the two parties were Type 
B applicants for leniency (who apply after the investigation has started), the first to apply 
gaining total immunity, in this case FirstGroup, and Arriva being the second applicant, gaining 
a reduction in fines. In answering the first question, it appears granting leniency negates all 
other considerations.  
The OFT’s five step Guidance rules applied in the case show both parties’ starting point set at 
10 per cent.357 The actual percentage rate applied to the relevant turnover depends on the 
nature of the infringement. The more serious the infringement, the higher the percentage, and 
the OFT considered in the case that ‘…market sharing to be amongst the most serious 
infringements caught by the Act due to the significant harm it may inflict on the competitive 
process.’358 The actual amounts of penalty imposed at this first step are subject to excision in 
the case record. The second step has no losers as both parties had ended the infringement 
at the point of FirstGroup applying for leniency. The third step, where deterrence objective is 
applied to reflect the seriousness of the infringement, was weighed as equal since both parties 
participated equally and, consequently the penalty was increased, (the sum redacted from the 
record) the OFT merely stating that a sum over £500,000 between the two parties was 
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imposed. The penalties were then adjusted according to paragraph 2.8 of the Guidance,359 so 
that after step 3, Arriva’s penalty stood at £318,175 and that of FirstGroup at £529,852.  
The OFT’s approach to step 4 is interesting. Step 4 involves taking aggravating or mitigating 
factors into consideration in order to increase or decrease the penalty respectively.  The OFT 
considered the taking part of senior executives (including divisional directors), of two major 
transport companies in a serious infringement to be an aggravating factor, and therefore the 
penalties were increased by 10 per cent. However, the OFT recognised from the evidence 
and copies of training manuals submitted that both parties had genuine compliance systems 
in place which were generally followed, and therefore, the OFT held that to be a mitigating 
factor and reduced the penalty by 10 per cent. This, despite the fact that participating 
executives and directors in the infringement had themselves undergone compliance training. 
It is incomprehensible that these two contradictory factors – training in compliance procedure, 
and acting against it to take part in a serious infringement – were reconciled in order to cancel 
out a penalty. If anything, they should have been taken as combined aggravating factors. 
In paragraph 67 of the Decision (under the heading Mitigating Factors) the OFT also mentions 
that normally it is minded to give a reduction in penalty when a party has cooperated with an 
investigation (in this case both parties did). However as both Arriva and FirstGroup were 
granted leniency on the basis of agreeing to cooperate, no additional reductions were due. 
Thus after completing four of the calculation Steps, the OFT arrived at penalties for the two 
parties as £318,175 for Arriva and £529,852 for FirstGroup. 
The final step, Step 5 was for adjustment to prevent maximum penalty being exceeded and to 
avoid double jeopardy. Here it was decided that the above penalties did not exceed 10 per 
cent of the applicable turnover of either party, 10 per cent of relevant turnover being the 
maximum amount of penalty allowed under section 36 of CA 98. 
The story does not end here as the next stage comes under the heading of Leniency.360 As 
FirstGroup approached the OFT after it had started the investigation with a leniency 
application first, and provided information, FirstGroup were granted 100 per cent immunity, 
and thus their penalty was reduced to nil. Arriva made their leniency application second and 
leniency was granted to them on the same conditions as FirstGroup, but being the second to 
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apply, their penalty was only reduced, and by 36 per cent. Arriva was therefore left with a 
penalty of £203,623 to be paid to the OFT. 
It is not clear why Arriva was behind time in making its leniency application to the OFT, as this 
information is not available, nor would it be of any consequence (had it been made available 
to the OFT) because the regulations only require a party to apply first in order to obtain 
immunity. The rule is strict, whatever the circumstances are. The moral of the case is, the first 
past the post wins notwithstanding any foul play along the way. This feature in leniency will be 
played out again and again in the cases that follow, where leniency applications have been 
made. Even where no leniency applications were made, the OFT has readily given reductions 
in the penalty if parties cooperated with the investigation. 
Under Step 4 of the OFT penalty guidance, involvement of directors and senior management 
is considered to be an aggravating factor. Therefore, the fact that senior managers (who were 
also directors) from both parties were involved in the infringement is a serious matter. It is 
even more serious when they had undergone compliance training, and had compliance 
programs in place for the staff as well in their respective companies. It also leaves a question 
mark over the readiness with which the OFT reduces penalties over claims by companies that 
they have put compliance programmes in place.361  
If the OFT were to take a stand on deterrence, this would have been a good opportunity if 
criminal proceedings were brought against the directors.362 As the first cartel case since the 
CA 98 came into effect, the publicity generated by prosecuting, and may be disqualifying the 
directors, was an opportunity missed for both deterrence and making businesses and the 
general public more aware of Competition rules.  
It is important to note here that neither party came forward with a leniency application until 
after the OFT started its investigation.  
 
 
                                                          
361 The Commission on the other hand does not recognise such a claim as a mitigating factor, due to unreliability; 
See Commission brochure, “Compliance matters – What companies can do better to respect EU Competition 
rules.” 
362 If not a criminal prosecution under EA 02, at least a Director Disqualification Order under s 9A of the Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986 could have been sought by the civil investigation. In this regard it is interesting 
that a senior official of the OFT claiming that the OFT’s experience in civil cases over the years was that the conduct 
in question was not carried out at a sufficiently senior level. See Ali Nickpay, ‘UK cartel enforcement – past, present, 





5.3 John Bruce (UK) Ltd, Fleet Parts Ltd and TTC - RPM Agreement 
This cartel case has no leniency applicants. That fact did not prevent the OFT rewarding two 
of the parties with reductions in the penalties imposed on them. This case involved three 
parties, John Bruce (UK) Limited, Fleet Parts Limited and Truck and Trailer Components who 
had entered into resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements.363 One of the parties, Fleet 
Parts made a complaint to the OFT providing documents of the existence of a price-fixing 
cartel between these undertakings. The OFT sent Notices under section 26 of CA 98 to John 
Bruce and Fleet Parts requiring them to produce specific documents. The documents provided 
consisted of letters, e-mails, internal communications, memoranda distributed to sales staff 
marked ‘private and confidential’ and also policy evidence.  
John Bruce was the supplier of imported slack adjusters (safety devices fitted to breaking 
systems of trucks, trailers and buses), and in the statement submitted to the OFT, admitted it 
had written to all its dealers to adopt a common pricing policy with special prices set up by 
John Bruce. Separately, by a letter to the OFT (dated 28 August 2001) John Bruce also 
admitted that it ‘adopted a policy of giving distribution to any and all legitimate candidates in 
the market but asked them to maintain resale prices’. The OFT sent section 26 notices to the 
dealers and on the strength of their statements and evidence, selected Truck and Trailer (TTC) 
as the third party who acted on the agreement. 
John Bruce’s defence was an interesting one, quoting Vervaecke,364 the defendant argued 
‘even a “hard core” restriction may escape the prohibition if it has an insignificant effect on the 
market, taking into account the weak position of the parties’. John Bruce claimed it was in a 
very weak position as against Haldex (a Swedish company) which virtually monopolised the 
relevant market, driving out potential competitors, and believed that its conduct could not be 
in breach of any competition law since it was developing competition where next to none had 
previously existed. The defendant was of the opinion that exemption under section 9 of CA 98 
or Article 81(3) TFEU (now Article 101(3), was warranted if there was an infringement, and 
the case should have been dealt with by the European Commission as a competition matter 
between Sweden and the UK, namely imports into the UK of Haldex products. 
                                                          
363 OFT Decision No. CA98/12/2002, Price Fixing Agreements involving John Bruce (UK) Limited, Fleet Parts 
Limited and Truck and Trailer Components, (Case CP/0717/01), 13 May 2002. 
364 See Case 5/69 Volk v Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295.                                                                                                                
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In the OFT’s decision John Bruce’s claims were rejected. First, the OFT did not accept the 
argument based on Vervaecke as that decision was based on the fact that the product 
(washing machines) covered a tiny part (0.6 per cent) of the total sales of the territory 
concerned, whereas John Bruce had significantly greater market shares. Second, as the 
agreement between the parties was implemented in the UK, they may affect trade within the 
UK under section 2 of CA 98. John Bruce’s claim that they may affect trade within or between 
other EU Member States did not affect OFT’s jurisdiction under CA 98. The OFT next 
considered the fact that the agreements consisted of both horizontal and vertical elements, 
and whether the vertical agreements could benefit from an exclusion under CA 98.365 As the 
agreements were for price-fixing, no such exclusion was applicable to them.366 
With regard to the claim for exemption under section 9, the OFT held that John Bruce did not 
provide evidence to demonstrate that the product could not have been able to compete with 
the Haldex brand without the (price-fixing) agreements, and therefore, did not qualify for 
exemption under section 9 of CA 98, and in any case the OFT was not able to take a decision 
on whether the agreements satisfy the criteria for individual exemption without formal 
notification. 
Having decided that all three parties had entered into price-fixing agreements which are 
among the most serious infringements under Chapter I prohibitions, the OFT imposed 
penalties on all three parties under section 36(1) CA 98, calculated according to the 5 Step 
guide. However, the amounts of penalties are not included in the case record (redacted) and 
are not available to the public, as are the respective annual turnovers of the parties involved. 
In fact, the case record is subject to heavy redaction so that not only parts of the documentary 
evidence but also all price lists, market shares, and annual turnovers are unavailable to the 
public (It is assumed here that these are commercially sensitive information).367  None of the 
parties had applied for leniency, with Fleet Parts’ complaint instigating the OFT investigation  
(complaint appears to be owing to Fleet Parts being replaced by a bigger customer by John 
Bruce). 
The OFT considered the relevant market in the case; the relevant product market being 
automatic slack adjusters for commercial vehicles, and the relevant geographic market 
included the whole of the UK.   
                                                          
365 (Land and Vertical Agreements Exclusion) Order 2000, SI 2000/319. 
 
366 Articles 3 and 4 of the (Land and Vertical Agreements Exclusion) Order 2000, SI 2000/319. 




The OFT found that the parties acted intentionally or negligently. As the agreements were for 
price-fixing, there was no limited immunity available under section 39(1) of CA 98 to any of 
the parties. The OFT imposed penalties on the parties in accordance with section 38(8) of CA 
98, having regard to the Guidance on penalties issued under section 38(1) of CA 98.  
At Step 1, the penalty is set at a percentage rate (maximum 10 per cent) of the relevant 
turnover of the undertaking in the relevant product market, and the relevant geographic market 
affected by the infringement in the last financial year. In accordance with CA 98 (Determination 
of Turnover for Penalties) Order 2000, the OFT determined the financial year as the business 
year preceding the date the infringement ended, based on the date of a letter sent by John 
Bruce.  
The actual rate is set depending on the seriousness of the infringement. A number of other 
factors such as; the nature of the product, structure of the market, market shares of the parties, 
entry conditions and the effect on competitors and third parties, and more importantly, damage 
caused to consumers directly or indirectly, have to be considered.   
Step 2 is where adjustment for the duration of the infringement is taken into consideration, in 
this case 18 months approximately. Step 3 is for adjustment for policy objectives, mainly 
deterrence, and Step 4 makes adjustments for further aggravating or mitigating factors. The 
final, Step 5, being for adjustments to prevent maximum penalty being exceeded and to avoid 
double jeopardy. 
Although the OFT rejected all of John Bruce’s claims in defence, in setting the penalty rate for 
the company’s turnover, the OFT accepted as special circumstances; a) that John Bruce has 
introduced a new product into a market which was difficult to penetrate and increased 
competition, b) that John Bruce was a small new entrant to a market where one supplier 
(Haldex) had a large share, and c) that purchasers of John Bruce product benefited  by about 
25 per cent lower price than that of the leading product in the market. These were pro-
competitive effects arising from John Bruce’s actions which benefited the customers, despite 
the price-fixing nature of the infringement and therefore the OFT set the penalty at 5 per cent 
of relevant turnover for John Bruce (amount redacted). The OFT, however, acknowledged that 
in most other circumstances RPM was a serious breach of Chapter I prohibitions, and the 
penalty would have been set nearer 10 per cent. 
No adjustment for duration was made. CA 98 came into force on 1 March 2000. The price-
fixing agreement commenced about March 2000, although evidence showed the agreement 
commenced in November 1999 between John Bruce and Fleet Parts, (the period prior to the 
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coming into force of CA 98 cannot be taken in retrospect) and was terminated on 31 August 
2001, so the OFT decided not to increase the penalty for duration. Interestingly, OFT also did 
not make an adjustment at Step 3 for deterrence as it considered the earlier penalty was 
sufficient in this case.  OFT did not consider there were aggravating factors, but decided there 
were mitigating factors. As John Bruce fully cooperated with the investigation OFT reduced 
10 per cent of the penalty imposed, for not disputing the facts OFT reduced another 10 per 
cent of the penalty, and for immediately terminating the RPM on receipt of the OFT’s notice 
under section 26 CA 98, John Bruce received another 20 per cent reduction in the amount of 
penalty. Altogether 40 per cent reduction of penalty was therefore awarded to John Bruce 
making it a penalty of 3 per cent in all, of its relevant turnover. No adjustments were made 
under Step 5 as the penalty did not exceed the turnover stipulated in s 36(8), CA 98. 
Despite being the informant (albeit by way of a complaint) Fleet Parts, on the other hand gets 
a different treatment. The financial year for Fleet Parts was deemed to be from 1 May 2000 to 
30 April 2001, preceding the termination of the RPM. The OFT accepted that Fleet Parts 
helped introduction of the new product into the market, but as it benefited from the lack of price 
competition due to the price-fixing agreement, OFT set the starting penalty at 8 per cent for 
Fleet Parts. As with John Bruce there were no changes at Steps 2 and 3. At Step 4, OFT 
decided there were no aggravating factors for Fleet Parts. On mitigating factors, OFT reduced 
10 per cent of Fleet Parts penalty for fully cooperating with the investigation, and added 
another 10 per cent reduction for not disputing the facts. Again, as Fleet Parts introduced a 
competition law audit to ensure compliance and introduced a training programme to make all 
employees were aware of the CA 98 rules, on receipt of s 26 notice from the OFT, a further 
reduction of 10 per cent of the penalty was given to Fleet Parts, making it a total of 30 per cent 
reduction. There were no other adjustments at Step 5. The resulting total penalty for Fleet 
Parts was 5.6 per cent of its relevant turnover, higher than that of John Bruce. 
TTC’s financial year was determined as the period from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2000, 
and the starting point for relevant turnover was set at 8 per cent. The agreement with John 
Bruce and TTC lasted at least from September 2000 to 31 August 2001, and as before, no 
adjustment was made for the duration at Step 2. Under Step 3, the OFT increased the penalty 
for TTC by a factor of three by way of deterrence. Next at Step 4, as TTC fully cooperated with 
the investigation, a 10 per cent reduction of the penalty was made. However, as TTC had 
failed to inform their solicitor under an internal policy document, of the price-fixing agreement 
and thereby acted in breach of their (internal) compliance programme, OFT increased the 
penalty by 10 per cent. The total amount of penalty for TTC was set at 24 per cent of the 
relevant turnover, with no further adjustments at Step 5. 
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This investigation commenced about a year after the OFT’s first Chapter I prohibition case 
(Arriva), and approximately a year and a half into the CA 98 coming into force. Fleet Parts was 
a small distributor and this was the reason given by John Bruce for replacing Fleet Parts with 
the much bigger TTC. John Bruce was the key player in putting in place the RPM agreements 
with all the distributors, hence in effect the instigator of the infringement. Yet, John Bruce 
received a much better deal from the OFT decision (if the percentage rate represents the 
actual penalty amount). Moreover, the OFT having condemned John Bruce for the RPM, 
rewarded them for the same action because the result was considered pro-competitive. Since 
the OFT acknowledged that Fleet Parts also helped towards introducing the new product into 
the market, should they not have been rewarded as well? 
The managing directors of John Bruce and Fleet Parts were directly involved in the 
agreements, evidenced by correspondence, emails, and memoranda made available to the 
OFT investigation. 
None of the parties made leniency applications prior to the OFT investigation in the case. 
 
5.4 Hasbro I – Hasbro UK Ltd and Distributors (Price-fixing agreements) 
This investigation was started by the OFT on a tip-off from an informant, relating to price fixing 
agreements by Hasbro UK Ltd (Hasbro), one of the largest toys and games suppliers in the 
UK, with its distributors.368 The OFT carried out on-site investigations under section 27(3), CA 
98 in May 2001. The OFT had received a copy of a circular sent to customers earlier, and the 
OFT found further documents by way of agreements and letters. The OFT found that senior 
managers of Hasbro were involved, with one Sales Director also admitting that he was an 
‘instigator’ (paras 89 and 90).  
Hasbro was later found guilty of price-fixing agreements along with ten of its distributors, by 
the OFT, in November 2002.369 The decision was appealed to the CAT on 29 January 2003. 
On 3 March 2003, the appeal was withdrawn.  
Hasbro, one of the largest toys and games suppliers entered into agreements with ten 
distributors to fix prices which restricted the distributors’ ability to sell at prices other than 
                                                          
368 Hasbro Ltd is a subsidiary of Hasbro Inc, a US company.      
369 OFT Decision No. CA98/18/2002, Agreements between Hasbro UK Ltd and distributors fixing the price of 
Hasbro toys and games, (Case CP/0239-01), 28 November 2002.  
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Hasbro’s list price. The agreements were entered into at the beginning of 2001 and came to 
an end in July 2001 (when Hasbro wrote to the distributors ending them). No penalties were 
imposed on the distributors concerned as Hasbro had taken the initiative, and the distributors 
were substantially in a weaker position to disagree.  
Starting point of penalty for Hasbro was between 5 and 8 per cent of its relevant turnover 
(actual percentage rate redacted). The OFT rejected Hasbro’s assertion that the duration was 
from February 2001 to 10 July 2001, and noted that it was two months after the OFT’s on-site 
visit under s 27 CA 98 (15 May 2001), that Hasbro took action to write to the distributors to put 
an end to the agreements, but as the duration was less than a year no adjustment was made 
at Step 2.370  
Although the OFT believed Hasbro gained from the price-fixing agreements, no increase was 
made for deterrence at Step 3 either.371 There was involvement by senior officials despite 
compliance programmes being in place, and the fine was increased by 10 per cent at the next 
step. The OFT also considered the method by which Hasbro imposed restrictions on the 
distributors, who were substantially in a weaker economic position to refuse, and therefore, 
held it to be a serious aggravating factor and increased the penalty by another 20 per cent at 
Step 4. 
The OFT would consider the existence of a compliance programme to be a mitigating factor, 
but the OFT decided, the fact that senior officials ignored it, offset any adjustment for reduction 
of the penalty on that basis.372 However, as Hasbro put in a specific compliance programme 
for staff since the infringement, OFT awarded a reduction of 10 per cent on the penalty. No 
further reduction was made for cooperation as leniency has been granted on that basis. 
However, as Hasbro terminated the agreements after the OFT’s visit to their premises (albeit 
after two months, which should normally have been an aggravating factor) another 10 per cent 
reduction to the penalty was awarded. Hasbro’s actions were intentional and, therefore, there 
was no mitigating factor, the OFT observed. The total percentage added for aggravating 
factors was 30 percent and the total percentage deducted for mitigating factors was 20 per 
cent. The total penalty for Hasbro stood at £9 million. No further adjustments were available 
at Step 5 as the penalty did not exceed 10 percent of Hasbro’s relevant turnover.  
                                                          
370 Ibid, para 94. 
371 A contrasting view as opposed to that taken against Fleet Parts, in Case CP/0717/01 discussed at 4.3 above. 
372 A distinct departure from the Arriva decision where the parties ignored the compliance procedures in place, 
but a reduction was made. 
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Hasbro's penalty was the largest since CA 98 came into force in March 2000 up until this 
decision, at £9 million, but was then reduced by 45 per cent due to a leniency application made 
at an early stage and for cooperating fully with the investigation, the amount coming down to 
£4.95m. (Hasbro’s UK turnover in 2001 was £123.8 million and £197.8 million in 2000).373  
BBC news reported that the Consumer Association’s Campaigns and Communications 
Director Allen Asher declared, “Price fixing is theft” adding that the OFT has teeth to use when 
consumers and honest competitors are affected. The Association was unhappy that the fine 
was reduced, given that Hasbro did not show remorse.374 A spokeswoman for the OFT said 
“This is not a victimless crime” but defended the leniency programme.375  
Given that Hasbro was the instigator and in a position to put pressure on the distributors, and 
also Hasbro gained as a result of the price-fixing agreement, the penalty should have been 
set closer to the 10 per cent turnover. The reduction of the penalty for full cooperation should 
have been far less in the circumstances.  
Here again, the colluders did not come forward with leniency applications before the 
investigation was started, hence the conclusion is, there was no rush for Leniency by them.  
 
5.5 Hasbro II - Hasbro (UK) Ltd, Argos Ltd, and Littlewoods 376 – (Price-fixing)  
A Decision made by the OFT on 19 February 2003, was appealed to the CAT on 7 April 2003. 
The CAT remitted the case to the OFT on 30 July 2003 to permit the OFT to put witness 
evidence to the appellants. On 2 December 2003, the OFT issued its second decision in place 
of its earlier decision. The CAT upheld the OFT’s second decision on 14 December 2004, but 
reduced the fine for Argos and Littlewoods, to £15.0 million (from £17.28 million), and to £4.5 
million (from £5.37 million) respectively.377 Both Argos and Littlewoods went to the appellate 
Court but the appeals were dismissed.378  
                                                          
373 See n 369, (Hasbro I), paras 1 and 7. 
374 BBC News online, ‘Hasbro fined for toy price fixing’ 29 November 2002 < 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2527267.stm > last accessed 06.05.2016. 
 
375 Ibid. 
376 OFT Decision No. CA98/8/2003, Agreements between Hasbro U.K. Ltd, Argos Ltd and Littlewoods Ltd fixing 
the price of Hasbro toys and games, (Case CP/0480-01), 21 November 2003.  
377 Argos Ltd and Littlewoods Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2004] CAT 24 and [2005] CAT 13. 
378 Joined Cases, Argos Ltd and Littlewoods Ltd v Office of Fair Trading, JJB Sports Plc v Office of Fair Trading, 
[2006] EWCA Civ 1318.           
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The case concerned three parties Hasbro, Argos and Littlewoods, Hasbro being one of the 
largest toys and games suppliers in the UK. The three companies had entered into an overall 
agreement and/or concerted practice to fix the price of certain toys and games supplied by 
Hasbro. The OFT held that this agreement included two bilateral agreements, one between 
Hasbro and Argos, and the other between Hasbro and Littlewoods both being price-fixing or 
concerted practices which breached Chapter I of CA 98 prohibitions, and may have affected 
trade within the UK. These agreements had as their object and effect the prevention, restriction 
and distortion of competition in the UK of the supply of the said toys and games. 
This investigation started as part of the process of Hasbro I,379 which resulted in a Decision 
against Hasbro and ten of its distributors (para 11). The OFT sent s 26 Notices under CA 98 
to Hasbro and a number of retailers on 10 August 2001 for information. Hasbro applied for 
leniency on 14 September 2001 seeking full immunity or in the alternative a reduction in the 
level of penalty, in respect of its dealings with the retailers. Hasbro provided the OFT with 
evidence of the infringement, before the investigation commenced and cooperated with the 
investigation. Hasbro was granted full immunity, on the condition it cooperated fully with the 
investigation. As regards evidence, the OFT found internal e-mails, and other supporting 
documents relating to the infringements in the case. 
The OFT carried out an on-site investigation under s 27(3) CA 98 at the headquarters of Argos 
and Littlewoods and a large number of emails and other supporting documents were obtained 
as part of the investigation. Having heard the evidence, both oral and written, the OFT gave 
its decision on 19 February 2003, that all three parties had infringed a Chapter I prohibition. 
Penalties imposed for Argos, Littlewoods and Hasbro were £17.28 million, £5.37 million, and 
£15.59 million respectively. As Hasbro had applied for leniency, and complied with its 
conditions, it received 100 percent leniency and the penalty was reduced to nil. 
Both Argos and Littlewoods appealed the decision to the CAT on 17 April 2003. The CAT 
remitted the case to the OFT, mainly on the strength of new witness statements by three 
employees/ex-employees of Hasbro, ordering OFT to admit the new witness statements but 
subject to the Rule 14 procedure.  
Having served rule 14 notices for a proposed amended decision on Argos and Littlewoods, 
and having considered their written submissions in response, (both declined the offer of giving 
oral evidence or further representation) OFT made its second decision replacing its previous 
decision. 
                                                          
379 See sec 5.4, OFT Decision No. CA98/18/2002. 
95 
 
In determining the penalties, Hasbro’s product market was taken as 10 types of a selection of 
toys and games and the geographic market was the UK. The starting point was set between 
8 and 10 per cent for the relevant turnover (exact percentage redacted).  At Step 2, duration 
for only 2 categories of the products was taken and the penalty multiplied by 1.2, but not for 
other categories as duration for them was not clear. At step 3, no adjustment was made. Step 
4 aggravating factor was that the senior staff were involved, who had compliance procedures 
in place, and a 10 per cent increase was therefore made. In addition, the OFT found Hasbro 
to be the instigator, and a second increase of 10 per cent was made. As for mitigating factors, 
quick action by the parent company with specific compliance procedures put in place for staff 
and disciplinary action taken against employees involved, allowed the penalty to be decreased 
by 10 per cent. No further reduction for full cooperation was made as Hasbro has been granted 
leniency. The fact that Hasbro’s involvement was found to be intentional did not merit further 
reduction under mitigating factors either. The total penalty for Hasbro amounted to £15.59 
million. This penalty did not exceed the maximum penalty rate of 10 per cent at Step 5. 
However, as Hasbro has been given 100 per cent leniency, the penalty was reduced to nil. 
The OFT set the Argos’s starting point between 8 and 10 per cent, and at Step 2, duration for 
2 categories were multiplied by 1.2 and not for others. At Step 3, again there was no change 
and at Step 4, for full cooperation a reduction of 10 per cent was given. The total penalty stood 
at £17.28 million for Argos. For Step 5, no change was made as the amount was far below the 
maximum 10 per cent of the relevant turnover. 
Littlewoods’ starting penalty was also set between 8 and 10 per cent. At Step 2, the penalty 
was multiplied by 1.2 for two items, not for others. At Step 3, no change was made for 
deterrence. For mitigating factors under Step 4, cooperation with the investigation allowed for 
a reduction of 10 per cent. The total penalty for Littlewoods was thus £5.37 million. No change 
was made at Step 5 as the penalty did not exceed 10 per cent of the relevant turnover. 
Argos and Littlewoods were unaware of the total leniency awarded to Hasbro until the end, 
and both appealed to the CAT. They requested the OFT to submit (to CAT) the leniency 
documents, which request the OFT rejected, only submitting some documents from which 
sections were redacted. The appeals were dismissed, but the CAT reduced the fines for Argos 
and Littlewoods. This was despite the CAT finding the appellants fully liable for the breach, 
and acknowledging that both appellants had annual turnovers of over 2 billion each. 
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An appeal to the Court of Appeal was similarly dismissed. The Court of Appeal commented 
on the length of the CAT judgement (and OFT judgement) with a subtle admonition, and hoped 
that future decisions would be delivered succinctly.380 
This was the first appeal from a CAT decision to the Court of Appeal, under Chapter I of the 
CA 98. The Court of Appeal made the observation that OFT’s grant of leniency to Hasbro 
appeared complicated and unclear, and in its conclusion also stated that in the absence of the 
favoured party (Hasbro) the CAT could not have arrived at a different conclusion.381 Clearly, 
the lack of transparency in leniency agreements due to confidentiality clauses, means there 
cannot be a balanced analysis of the evidence among the participant defendants 
Although Hasbro was granted full immunity by the OFT, it was only after the OFT sent a Notice 
under s 26 that Hasbro responded positively. Here again the conclusion is there was no rush 
for Leniency. 
 
5.6 Aluminium Spacer Bars - (price fixing, non-compete agreement, and market 
sharing) 
The OFT found four suppliers of aluminium double glazing spacer bars had infringed Chapter 
I prohibition by engaging in price fixing, non-compete agreement, and customer 
allocation/market sharing.382 One party was granted full immunity while a second party was 
granted 40 per cent leniency. The OFT held that in respect of three of the parties, EWS, Ulmke 
and DSQ, that they were liable jointly and severally with their parent companies. 
A written complaint from a retail double glazing supplier in March 2002 alleging price fixing by 
manufacturers and distributors in the ‘aluminium spacer bar for double-glazing’ market 
triggered the OFT’s investigation.  This was a highly concentrated market in the UK, and the 
market was worth an estimated 268.5 million in 2002. 
The OFT carried out unannounced inspections of the premises of four parties in December 
2002, and incriminating documents were seized from three of the premises. Another 
inspection was made in March 2003 in respect of a fifth party and copies of documents were 
                                                          
380 Ibid, para 5. 
381 Ibid, para 290.  
382 OFT Decision CA98/04/2006, Agreement to fix prices and share the market for aluminium double glazing 




taken from the premises. The documentary evidence constituted emails, letters, internal sales 
reports, memoranda, diary entries, correspondence, attendee lists of meetings, and other 
documents showing that senior staff, including the Managing Director of DQS attended 
meetings to fix prices. 
The relevant product market was the supply of aluminium Spacer Bars. The relevant 
geographic market was the UK. The OFT concluded the duration to be from November 2002 
to December 2002 or January 2003. 
Total immunity was granted to Ulmke, and 40 per cent leniency was awarded to Thermoseal. 
The remaining two parties, EWS and DQS also received reductions for co-operation, and for 
taking compliance measures. Interestingly, starting points and adjustment rates at different 
Steps have all been redacted from the published case record, with only the final penalty 
amounts for each party published. 
Even with full immunity and full cooperation, it took four years for the OFT to conclude the 
case. One party, DQS together with its parent company appealed to the CAT on penalty, but 
the appeal was dismissed.383 
Again, there were no leniency applications prior to the OFT taking action in the case.  
 
5.7 UOP /UKae/Thermoseal Case384  -  RPM agreement 
This case involved a resale price maintenance cartel between the manufacturer of desiccants 
(absorbent products termed molecular sieves and aluminas) UOP Limited, with four of its 
distributors during the period of 1 March 2000 until at least 12 March 2003. The OFT found 
against all five parties, and penalties were imposed on them.  
Three of the parties, UKae, Thermoseal, and UOP were granted leniency under the OFT’s 
leniency policy, UKae with full immunity, Thermoseal 50 per cent and UOP with 20 per cent. 
A fourth party, DGS, a smaller company whose participation in the breach was rather 
lacklustre, did not receive leniency but their penalty was considerably lower than the other 
parties. Confidential information provided by the leniency applicants were redacted from the 
                                                          
383 Sepia Logistics Limited (formerly known as Double Quick Supplyline Limited) and Precision Concepts Limited 
v Office of Fair Trading, [2007] CAT 13. 
384 OFT decision No. CA98/08/2004, Agreement between UOP Limited, UKae Limited, Thermoseal Supplies Ltd, 
Double Quick Supplyline Ltd and Double Glazing Supplies Ltd to fix and/or maintain prices for dessicant, (Case 
CE/2464-03), 8 November 2004. 
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published version of the OFT’s decision as a consequence of the leniency being granted, as 
is normal under the leniency policy. However, the annual turnovers and the penalty 
calculations of the other parties have also been redacted. 
By visiting the premises of a number of the suspected undertakings in December 2002, the 
OFT seized documents which indicated the existence of a suspected infringement.  
Documents including correspondence, agendas, meeting notes, faxes, policy notes, memos 
and invoices were seized. Consequently, the OFT launched an investigation in February 2003. 
The OFT considered the relevant product market to be the supply of desiccant for use in IG 
units, specifically through distributors. The relevant geographic market was the UK. The OFT 
concluded that the parties were involved in an agreement and/or concerted practice composed 
of five sub-agreements and/or concerted practices that amounted to a single infringement. 
The overall agreement was entered into before CA 98 came into force, and continued at least 
until OFT’s intervention on 12 March 2003 or no later than 21 May 2003, except in the case 
of UKae, where the infringement ended on 12 December 2002. The OFT, however, was of the 
opinion that it was likely that the infringement continued to affect prices after 12 March 2003. 
For the purpose of calculating the duration, the infringement was taken as having lasted from 
1 March 2000 to 12 March 2003, the duration rounded up to 3.25 years. Ukae’s duration was 
rounded up to 3 years (UKae’s breach having lasted 2 years and 9 months). 
Total immunity was granted to UKae, and a reduction of 50 per cent of the penalty was granted 
to Thermoseal. A reduction of 20 per cent of the penalty was granted to UOP. The overall 
infringement consisted of a single agreement comprising five sub-agreements between UOP, 
and the distributors who were party to the case. UOP, UKae, Thermoseal and DQS discussed 
the policy at meetings. Apart from UOP, there were senior managers including Managing 
Directors, and a Chairman (DGS) involved from the other parties.  UOP gave financial support 
to distributors in the form of rebate to defend their existing business or win new business as 
against their competitors, and also as an incentive to source their desiccant solely from UOP. 
There were considerable number of incriminating documents relating to the agreements. 
Penalties were imposed in respect of the main agreement only, and not the separate sub 
agreements.  
UOP (subsidiary of a US firm), is a worldwide manufacturer, and supplier to many different 
industries and the largest in the UK. The effect of the breach on other manufacturers was 
significant. It was highly likely that the lack of competition would have fed through to the cost 




UOP submitted that a low penalty would be a sufficient deterrent. They pleaded that: there 
was no attempt on their part to conceal the agreements, and therefore it was not intentional;385 
they had compliance programmes and seminars; the employee who was responsible for the 
agreement was not a senior manager, and; they have taken note of the deficiencies and steps 
were taken to improve. Although there were senior managers at the highest level involved 
from the other parties, UOP pleaded that the manager involved from their firm was not a senior 
manager, which the OFT accepted but expressed surprise that the senior management was 
not aware of the infringements (para 337). 
One party, DQS appealed to the CAT on the amount of penalty, but the proceedings were 
brought to an end following the OFT consenting to reduce their fine, which it did (from 
£109,000 to £73,000).386  
The approach taken by the OFT in this case to finding the existence of overall concerted 
practices was from a pattern of conduct demonstrating the common objective of the parties. 
Although the OFT does not mention in this case what led them to suspect the existence of the 
cartel, it can be assumed that the anonymous written information sent to the OFT with regard 
to the Aluminium Spacer Bars case (see 5.6 above) led to this investigation as some of these 
parties were engaged in that cartel as well. 
 
No leniency applications were made prior to the OFT investigation in this case, meaning that 
there was no rush for Leniency by the colluders. 
 
 
5.8 Lladro Comercial SA and UK Retailers – (price fixing)  
 
On receipt of complaints by three UK based independent retailers, the OFT carried out an 
investigation into an alleged price fixing infringement which involved Lladró Comercial SA 
(Lladró), a Spanish company producing luxury porcelain and stoneware figurines, and its UK 
retailers. OFT found that Lladró had entered into bilateral price fixing agreements with its 
retailers which breached Chapter I prohibition imposed by s 2, CA 98.387 The majority of these 
agreements were entered into in 1999, before CA 98 came into force (on 1 March 2000), and 
Lladró had been cleared by the European Commission with the issue of a Comfort Letter 
                                                          
385 Ibid, para 292. 
386 Double Quick Supply Line v Office of Fair trading [2005] CAT 10.   
387 OFT Decision No. CA98/04/2003, Agreements between Lladró Comercial SA and UK retailers fixing price of 
porcelain and stoneware figurines, (Case CP/0809-01), 31 March 2003. 
100 
 
regarding a selective distribution agreement (SDA), drawn up by Lladró intending to implement 
it across Europe .388 
The SDA contained, inter alia, a clause (clause 6.3.2) that required retailers, before offering 
discounts on Lladró figurines, to inform Lladró and to offer the items back to Lladró for 
repurchase at wholesale price. The SDA also contained clauses (clauses 10.5 and 9.5) that 
prevented the advertising of discounts.389 Lladró notified the SDA to the Commission on 23 
January 1996 seeking negative clearance under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty, now Article 
101(1) TFEU, or in the alternative, exemption under Article 81(3), now Article 101(3). Lladró 
wrote to the Commission on 26 November 1999, stating that they intended to remove the 
offending clause as their German retailers had informed them that the clause would 
contravene German competition law. In the event, the Commission issued a ‘comfort letter’ 
but also referred to some other clauses in the agreement.390 However, Lladró never changed 
the said clause and it continued to remain in force. The comfort letter was issued by the 
Commission on 30 March 2000. 
A comfort letter is a letter stating that the European Commission intends to close its file and 
take no further action in relation to an agreement which has been notified to it. The OFT 
received confirmation from the European Commission’s Director-General of Competition (D-
G Comp) that a comfort letter was indeed issued to Lladró because it considered the 
agreement did not substantially affect trade between Member States, and therefore did not 
fall within the scope of Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty.391  
Lladró had submitted to the Commission in its notification that their market shares stood well 
below 10 per cent, about 4 percent, in 1999. That estimation, however, was based on all 
ornamental ware, including both luxury and non-luxury ornaments in the market. The OFT 
determined the relevant product market for Lladró to be luxury ornamental ware only and 
therefore did not accept that estimate. OFT sought to obtain information relevant to the period 
of all ornamental ware in the UK to arrive at a more up to date estimate. 
                                                          
388 1997 Notice on agreements of minor importance, OJ C 372, 9.12.1997, (“de minimis Notice”). Prior to 
decentralisation under Regulation 1/2003, companies had to give notice of their intended business agreements to 
the Commission, who before taking a final decision (due to the large number of such applications), would issue a 
comfort letter which in effect meant clearance, so that the company could enforce it.  A comfort letter is not a 
legally binding document. 
389 In Case 86/82, Hasselblad v Commission [1984] ECR 883, the European Court held that restrictions on 
advertising may amount to an indirect form of resale price maintenance. 
390 Specific references were made in respect of clauses in the SDA providing for quantitative selection of 
distributors and prohibited distributors from selling similar brands. 
391 See n 387, para 113. 
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The OFT held that in the case of a resale price fixing agreement, it is capable of having an 
appreciable effect even where the combined market share falls below the 25 per cent 
threshold.392 For the same reason the agreements fell outside the scope of the Exclusion 
Order under CA 98.393 Moreover, no exemptions applied to price fixing agreements either. 
S 41(2) of CA 98 prevents a penalty being imposed in respect of the period between 
notification of an agreement to the Commission for exemption under Article 81(3) EC Treaty, 
(now Article 101(3) TFEU), and before “the Commission has determined the matter”. While 
accepting that a penalty could not be imposed in respect of the SDA in the period before the 
issue of the comfort letter, the OFT took the view that the comfort letter was a “determination” 
of the matter, and therefore s 41 did not apply to the period after 30 March 2000. Nevertheless, 
in view of the existence of the comfort letter, OFT decided not to impose a financial penalty 
on any of the parties, but made a direction under s 32 CA 98, requiring all parties involved to 
end the infringement within 20 days of the Decision, and to remove the price-fixing clauses 
from each agreement as appropriate, within 20 working days from the date of the decision. 
Lladró as the instigator, was also directed to send the OFT a copy of the letter which it was 
required to send to its retailers detailing the OFT’s Direction, within 10 days.  
The three complainants alleged that Lladro had terminated their supply on learning that they 
had sold the products below the recommended retail price. One retailer had secretly recorded 
a conversation between him, and a representative of Lladró discussing the agreement. The 
OFT decided not to disclose the identity of the complainants, (and of those retailers who 
responded to the s 26 notices served on them by the OFT), in accordance with s 56(2) of CA 
98, on the grounds that to do so would be contrary to public interest, based on the belief that 
the disclosure would have the likely effect of discouraging future informants in similar 
circumstances.394   
Although there were no leniency applications in the case, Lladró escaped without any financial 
penalty. The OFT stated in its decision that it took the view that the comfort letter could have 
led Lladró to conclude that the Commission’s decision to issue the letter was based, at least 
in part, on a substantive competition assessment of the agreement. Therefore, it would not 
have been unreasonable for Llabró to have concluded that the agreement was not a type to 
give rise to an infringement on that basis. Indeed, it appears this was the stance taken by 
Lladró in its defence.395 
                                                          
392 OFT Guideline 401 ‘The Chapter I prohibition’ (March 1999), sec 2.18- 2.20. 
393 CA 98 (Land and vertical Agreements Exclusion) Order 2000, SI 2000/310. 
394 See n 387, paras 97- 99. 
395 Ibid, para 124. 
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Understandably, the comfort letter appears to have vexed the OFT somewhat in this 
investigation, as the Commission appears to have overlooked the price-fixing nature of the 
agreement. It brings to question how many similar agreements may have been approved by 
the Commission despite legislation that precludes price fixing agreements benefiting from 
exclusions and exemptions. It is possible the Commission may have been misled by the low 
market share presented in the notification, and the fact that Lladró stated in the notification 
that the particular clause in question would be removed from the agreement. Whatever the 
reason, it shows the relaxed way in which authorities are willing to accept a businessman’s 
version without further examination or analysis of the market involved. 
It is important to note that out of the many retailers only three complained, and the three 
complainant retailers only came forward after their supply was stopped by Lladro. The OFT 
determined Lladró to be the instigator, and the agreements being of a vertical nature no 
penalty was intended upon the retailers.  
Documentary evidence in the case consisted of the bilateral agreements with incriminating 
clauses together with the secretly recorded conversation. There were neither leniency 
applications nor any penalties imposed on the parties. 
 
5.9 Stock Check Pads Case – (price fixing and market sharing)   
The OFT fined three suppliers of stock check pads, for fixing prices and market sharing in the 
supply of stock check pads in the UK, in breach of Chapter I of CA 98.396 (Stock check pads 
are generic paper note pads with tear-off sheets used by staff in restaurants, cafés and similar 
establishments to record customers’ orders). 
The parties were involved in a single overall agreement and /or concerted practice which had 
the object of fixing the prices of and sharing the market for stock check pads. The parties’ 
agreement involved fixing the prices at which they would sell check pads to customers, and 
also not to try and win business from each other. Senior managers and a Managing Director 
were responsible for the infringement. 
Bemrose Group Limited (BGL) and its wholly owned subsidiary BemroseBooth were granted 
full immunity in recognition of providing evidence before the commencement of the 
                                                          





investigation, thereby reducing their near two million fine to nil. Their leniency application was 
received by the OFT in December 2003. In February 2004, OFT decided there were 
reasonable grounds to suspect one or more infringements were engaged in by the parties and, 
in April 2004, premises of two other companies were searched. Later, one of the other 
companies, Achilles Paper Group Limited applied for and was granted 50 per cent leniency.  
Bemrose and Achilles were active in the manufacture of stock check pads, and the subsequent 
supply to wholesalers who in turn sold them to other wholesalers or direct to end users. The 
third party involved was 4imprint Group PLC, which exited the market in June 2000. Senior 
managers were involved in the infringement. 
On 23 December 2003 (after the infringement had come to an end), an American company 
named Appleton Paper Inc acquired the entire share capital of BGL through its UK holding 
company (Rose Holding Limited), and it was following the buyer’s due diligence process for 
that acquisition that BGL and Bemrose approached the OFT for leniency. The infringement 
had occurred during the period from May 2000 until December 2003. There were entries in 
the day book, fax message and letter as evidence of the infringement that had taken place. 
The relevant product market was deemed to be the supply of stock check pads. The relevant 
geographic market was the UK. The OFT noted that the infringement led directly to higher 
prices in respect of a significant proportion of the relevant market.  
The penalty calculation rates are redacted from the records showing only the final penalties 
imposed on the parties.  
Again, this case shows a leniency application was only tendered when a buyer found out about 
the infringement which was then uncovered by the buyer’s lawyers. It is also important to note 
that the infringement had already ended by that time. 
However, the defendant approached the OFT prior to any investigation was begun by the OFT, 
in this case. 
5.10 Northern Ireland Livestock and Auctioneers’ case397 - (price fixing) 
In February 2001, the OFT began an investigation after receiving a complaint by the Ulster 
Farmers Union (UFU), that the Northern Ireland Livestock and Auctioneers’ Association 
(NILAA) has infringed CA 98 by recommending the introduction of a standard (or uniform) 
                                                          
397 OFT Decision CA98/1/2003, Decision of the Northern Ireland Livestock and Auctioneers’ Association of 
undertakings to recommend that its members introduce a buyer’s commission in Northern Ireland cattle marts, 
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commission for purchasers of livestock in Northern Ireland cattle marts. The NILAA did not 
apply to the OFT for an exemption of this decision to fix a £2.00 commission plus VAT on each 
animal purchased. At the time NILAA represented about 63 per cent of the marts in Northern 
Ireland. 
However, the recommendation by the NILAA was well publicised with a Press Release, issued 
by the Chairman of the NILAA, copies of which were sent to its members. The OFT also took 
into consideration the exceptional circumstances that had affected the cattle market, due to 
BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), and Foot and Mouth disease (FMD). The OFT, 
therefore, took the decision of not imposing a fine on NILAA, while finding that NILAA had 
indeed breached s 2(1) of Chapter I, CA 98. 
The OFT quoted a number of CJEU cases in support of the fact that a recommendation made 
by an association of undertakings can amount to a decision, and may amount to an 
infringement of the Chapter I prohibition of CA 98, where it affects the competitive conduct    of 
its members in the market. The Commission set out the position in Fenex, ‘While it is normal 
practice for a trade organisation to provide management assistance to its members, it must 
not exercise any direct or indirect influence on competition, notably in the form of tariffs 
applicable to all undertakings regardless of their own cost price structure.’398 
The fact that the recommendation was not binding, nor has been fully complied with by its 
members did not exclude it from the application of Chapter I, CA 98. 
In considering the duration, OFT took the start date as the date of the meeting by the NILAA 
on 19 December 2000 at which the decision was taken. The NILAA was put on s 27 notice of 
a possible infringement, by the OFT on 9 February 2001.399 In the absence of any 
representation by the NILAA, the OFT reviewed the evidence as set out in Rule 14 Notice and 
arrived at its finding, that the NILAA’s recommendation that its members introduce a 
commission on buyers for the purchase of livestock in Northern Ireland cattle marts infringed 
the Chapter I prohibition. 
The duration of the infringement was from 19 December to 1 March 2001, and there was total 
closure of the cattle marts from the end of February 2001 until August 2001 in Northern Ireland 
due to BSE and FMD diseases. The OFT took into consideration the overt nature of the 
                                                          
398 Fenex, OJ L 181 - 20/07/1996 P, 26-36, para 60. 
399 S 27 of the Act provides that the Director may enter premises in connection with an investigation under s 25 of 
the Act. The Director must, so far as is reasonably practicable give two days’ notice of the intention to exercise this 
power unless he has a reasonable suspicion that the premises are or have been occupied by a party of the 
agreement that he is investigating under s 25 of the Act. 
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NILAA’s recommendation combined with the exceptional burdens on the NILAA and its 
members at the time, and decided to exercise its discretion under s 36(1) CA 98 not to impose 
a financial penalty on the NILAA.  
When the marts reopened in August, some of the marts charged a buyer’s commission, but 
there was no evidence to show that the NILAA’s recommendation was later revived or 
renewed. The OFT was of the view that the undertakings were then all acting independently 
in the market. 
At Paragraph 56 of its decision, OFT quoted from the Court of First Instance decision in 
Cementhandelaren,400 ‘In fact the fixing of a price, even one which merely constitutes a target, 
affects competition because it enables all the participants to predict with a reasonable degree 
of certainty what the pricing policy pursued by their competitors will be’.  
While it could be deemed reasonable that NILLA was let off without a financial penalty due to 
the harsh conditions prevalent in the cattle market at the time, was there not a connection in 
the subsequent action taken by some auctioneers to charge the fee recommended by the 
NILLA in the infringement? Was the OFT’s take on the fact that some marts charged the 
recommended fee later, ‘was carried out independently’ correct?  In Aalborg401 the CJEU has 
held that an undertaking would be presumed to have participated in an anticompetitive 
agreement unless that undertaking informs the other parties that it withdraws from the 
communication immediately. The party not intending to take part should protect itself by 
recording evidence in writing to the other parties, by giving full account of the meeting to its 
Board who must keep a full record of minutes, and where necessary by reporting the matter 
to the Regulator (the OFT in this case). No such disclaimer was made by any of the participant 
auctioneers, while in effect the NILLA recommendation was clearly intended to replace the 
risks of competition, with co-operation in the market, the object of which would be restricting 
competition in the market. 
 
There were ample documents in this case, beginning with the press release, and minutes of 
meetings, agendas, lists of attendees, and other connected documents connected with this 
case. There were no penalties imposed by the OFT decision, and there were no leniency 
applications either.                                     
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5.11 Airline Passenger Fuel Charges case - (price fixing)           
By the OFT’s decision of 19 April 2012, two airlines, British Airways (BA) and Virgin Atlantic 
Airways (VAA) were found to have breached the Chapter I prohibition of CA 98 and/or Article 
101 of the TFEU between August 2004 and January 2006.402 The two airlines had coordinated 
their pricing by an agreement to their respective passenger fuel surcharges (PFS) for long-
haul flights to and from the UK, through the exchange of pricing and other commercially 
sensitive information. BA was fined £58.5 million while VAA was granted full immunity for 
having brought the matter to the attention of the OFT. BA also applied for leniency and was 
granted a reduction of 25 per cent. BA received a further reduction of 20 per cent on account 
of entering into an early resolution, resulting in the initial penalty imposed which was £121.5 
million, being reduced to £58.5 million.  
The parties had engaged in applying PFS to the sale of commercial tickets. The surcharges 
which rose from £5 to £60, were added to ticket prices in response to rising oil prices. Criminal 
charges against four BA executives under s188 of EA 02 were later dropped, resulting in the 
acquittal of the defendants.403  
OFT conducted an unannounced inspection of BA’s premises, and some documents were 
seized on the day and some others were made available to the OFT at a later date. Informal, 
voluntary interviews were carried out with VAA staff (by the OFT’s criminal investigation team), 
transcripts of which were transferred to the administrative investigation. Other documents 
were also submitted to the OFT by VAA, which included telephone records, results of 
computers, servers, mobile phones and PDAs. Senior managers from both parties were 
involved in the breach. 
The product market was the sale of commercial tickets, and the relevant geographic market 
was determined on the basis of the point of origin and the point of destination of the flights 
(O&D), as is normal in airline cases. For the purpose of the OFT’s decision the market 
definition was the O&D airport pairs on which both parties offered long-haul flights and in 
relation to which both parties charged the PFS. Only those relevant markets where the parties 
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19 April 2012. 
403 R v George, Crawley, Burns and Burnett [2010] EWCA Crim 1148; See Alice Englehart, ‘Collapse of OFT trial 
against BA’ Allen & Overy, 8 July 2010. 
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overlap (‘Affected Markets’) were deemed to be sufficient in the case to meet the OFT’s twin 
objectives of policy on financial penalties.  
The effect on trade between Member States would have potentially deflected demand 
between the parties and their competitors in other Member States, and their conduct by its 
nature at least had the potential to affect the pattern of trade between Member States.  Hence 
the conduct of the parties by its nature was capable of coming within the meaning of Article 
101, and in accordance with the Commission’s Effect on Trade Notice.404 Given BA’s and 
VAA’s respective market shares in the affected markets, the OFT considered that the effect 
on trade between Member States satisfied the requirement of appreciability. 
Following the entry into force of the Modernisation Regulation on 1 May 2004, the OFT is 
required to apply Art 101, to practices that may affect trade between Member States to an 
appreciable extent.  
The OFT case was conducted in parallel with a similar case brought by the US Department of 
Justice (DoJ). The two investigations were carried out separately but the two agencies have 
consulted each other closely throughout their investigations. BA (who was fined by the US 
Antitrust Division in a criminal investigation to the tune of $300 million) had a third of its penalty 
reduced at Step 3 of OFT’s penalty calculations, on account of it being already fined by the 
US authorities. Account was also taken of the fact that BA suffered losses in the two previous 
years, and that part of the infringement occurred outside the UK. 
The criminal case against the BA executives collapsed due to a number of errors by the OFT, 
one of which involved not taking possession of the electronic documents of VAA which were 
submitted during leniency cooperation. At the criminal trial however, it transpired that VAA had 
not disclosed all relevant e-mails to the OFT at OFT’s administrative investigation, expected 
of a full immunity applicant. 
The OFT subsequently had a self-investigatory assessment of what went wrong. In its Virgin 
Atlantic Airways immunity review - OFT 1398 (December 2011), paragraph 3.14 states:   
‘In this case, as noted above, VAA might reasonably have been expected to have    
done more to assist the OFT, pursuant to VAA’s duty to maintain continuous and 
complete co-operation. In the specific circumstances, it is ‘genuinely a close call’ as to 
whether the conduct in question amounted to non co-operation such as to warrant the 
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revocation of VAA’s immunity. Accordingly, the OFT has applied its policy of erring in 
favour of the immunity applicant.’ 
OFT also erred in its uncertainty (to assuage VAA) as to the scope of the OFT’s obligations to 
obtain, and its powers to require the disclosure of documents which might be legally privileged. 
It was the OFT’s first contested criminal prosecution, where the particular question arose, and 
in its internal review in which four issues were raised, decided to take measures to rectify 
them. Following the collapse of the criminal case, BA threatened to appeal the OFT decision 
in order to recoup the fine, and costs imposed on BA in the administrative investigation. 
This case raises again the reliability of leniency applicants. The immunity applicant was 
already aware of the US investigation, and the media was showing a great interest in the fuel 
surcharges, which probably led to the leniency application in the first place. Having applied for 
and obtaining a marker from the OFT in March 2006, VAA signed the immunity agreement 
only in December 2008. In the meantime, BA applied for leniency in July 2006, and entered 
into the leniency agreement in July 2007.405  
In August 2010, VAA notified OFT that it was in the process of complying with a subpoena for 
evidence issued by the US DoJ in the criminal investigation into PFS.406 OFT requested VAA 
for a detailed search to be carried out of that evidence, relevant to the OFT case, and provide 
the results of the search to the OFT. Statement of Objections was sent to the parties in 
November 2011. Neither party gave oral evidence.    
This case, more than any other (of the OFT cases) illustrates the perils of depending purely 
on leniency applicants’ evidence.  
In this case, however, VAA applied for leniency prior to the OFT starting an investigation in 
the UK, probably as it was involved in the parallel investigation in the US, and suspected UK 
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5.12 Attheraces case407  - application for exemption (non-leniency case)         
This case arose out of the proposed joint sale of new interactive betting rights to horse racing 
by 49 of the 59 UK race courses to a consortium, Attheraces (ATR), for the purpose of 
launching a new TV channel devoted to horse racing, to be financed by betting income 
generated by the viewers. ATR was made up of Channel 4, BskyB, and Arena Leisure. The 
parties jointly notified the OFT with a view to obtaining clearance for the agreement.  
An application under s 14 of CA 98, on Form N was submitted to the OFT on 15 November 
2001, by the parties for a decision as to whether the ‘notified arrangement’ infringed the 
Chapter I prohibition, and if it did, for an individual exemption. The notification was placed on 
the OFT Public Register and informal consultations with third parties were undertaken by the 
OFT until April 2002. On 8 April 2003, a Rule 14 Notice under Rule 14 of the OFT’s procedural 
rules408 was issued to the five applicants and to the race courses involved, stating that the 
OFT proposed to issue a decision, that one aspect of the notified arrangement infringed the 
Chapter I prohibition. Following judicial review proceedings, and admitting the British 
Horseracing Board (BHB) in June 2003 as an intervener on 29 January 2004, ATR gave notice 
that it would terminate the agreement with effect from 29 March 2004. 
During the OFT’s investigation two of the parties, ATR and Arena Leisure, agreed with the 
OFT’s view that the agreement was anticompetitive. OFT rejected the application on the 
ground that it was anticompetitive and in breach of Chapter I prohibition. The OFT held that 
the agreement had the effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition in the supply 
of those rights by increasing the price to ATR, and restricting the incentives for increasing 
course ‘output’, (arrangements for the sharing of returns between courses), and that ATR 
could have instead collected a portfolio of licences with individual courses or small groups of 
courses.  
The relevant product in the decision were five rights affected by the ‘notified arrangement’. 
The OFT devoted some 29 pages of the decision in analysing and arriving at the relevant 
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Broadcasting Group plc/Channel Four Television Corporation/The Racecourse Association Limited, (Case 
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product markets,409 using the ‘hypothetical monopolist test’. Only one of the rights was a 
relevant product market in which the notified arrangement could have had an appreciable 
effect on competition. The relevant geographic market was the UK. No penalties were 
imposed, as under s 14(4) of CA 98, no penalty is warranted in respect of any infringement of 
the Chapter I prohibition by an agreement which has been notified to the OFT.  
The 49 race courses, the Racecourse Association (RCA), and BHB appealed the decision to 
the CAT. The CAT held that there is no presumption that an agreement has an anticompetitive 
effect and, therefore, the burden was on the OFT to show with a reasonable degree of 
probability that this agreement had an effect on competition.410 The CAT quoted from Société 
Technique Miniére411 to illustrate the point.  
In order to prove the likely effect, the enforcement authority has to create an imaginary 
scenario, the ‘counterfactual’ as to what the effect would be, in the absence of the intended 
agreement. The principle in assessing the ‘effect’ is to ‘take as a reference the competition 
that would normally exist if there was no infringement’.412 It applies the ‘but for’ test and is 
applicable only where all objective conditions on the relevant market are taken into account, 
including the economic context and legislative background.413 The assessment need not be 
precise414  
The CAT accepted the appellants factual background that there was an urgent need for 
funding, with government support, to finding further finance through the selling of media rights. 
The CAT criticised the OFT for not taking these into account, and overturned the decision.415 
Both UK and EU competition authorities have generally taken the view that collective selling 
of sports rights as anticompetitive, and require justification for it to be permitted.416 The CAT 
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Girgenson, ‘The Counterfactual Method in EU Competition Law: The Cornerstone of the Effects-Based Approach’ 
(2011) TILEC Working Paper series <  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970917 > accessed 12.03.2014. 
411 Case 56/65, Société Technique Miniére v Machinenbau Ulm GmbH,[1996] ECR 235. (The party alleging the 
restrictive effect bears the burden of proof); See Draft Guidance Paper − Quantifying harm in actions for 
damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty, June 2011.   < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html > last accessed 12.03.2014; Commission 
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414 Case T-213/00 CMA CGM and others v Commission [2003] ECR II-913, [342]. 
415 See Joined cases, The Racecourse Association and others and The British Horseracing Board v Office Of Fair 
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did not find it necessary to decide on whether a sporting agreement would affect competition 
in the context of consumer interest in its search for funding. In effect, the CAT acknowledged 
a higher price for the rights would not pass onto consumers as a result of the competitiveness 
of the betting market, which was the appellants’ argument.  
In this decision by the OFT, there were no leniency applications warranted as the case arose 
out of an application for exemption.  
5.13 Schools Sector - Private School Tuition Fees case                     
Fifty fee paying independent schools were found by the OFT to have infringed the Chapter I 
prohibition by engaging in the exchange of specific information relating to annual pricing of 
future school fees, on a regular and systematic basis.417 The information exchange was 
organised by the bursar of Sevenoaks School (referred to as the ‘Sevenoaks Survey’), to 
whom the participant schools submitted details of their current fee levels, proposed fee 
increases, and the resulting intended fee levels. Through the Sevenoaks Survey, the 
participants exchanged on a regular and systematic basis highly confidential information 
regarding one another’s pricing intentions for the coming academic year that was not made 
available to parents of pupils of the participant schools or published otherwise. As evidence, 
the OFT found information circulated among participants in tabular form, the ‘Sevenoaks 
Survey’, details submitted by participants to the bursar, and regular exchanges of highly 
confidential information not available to parents or available generally. The practice continued 
from 1 March 2001 and terminated in June 2003, for the purposes of this investigation. 
Although the practice had been or may have been in existence over a long period of time, the 
period before the CA 98 came into force cannot be taken into account, and from that date a 
transitional period of 1 year is given under Schedule 13 of CA 98). 
The OFT was informed of the infringement by a journalist who was preparing a report relating 
to fees charged by independent schools, for the Sunday Times, in April 2003. The OFT began 
a formal investigation and in June 2003, visited three of the schools having prior notice given 
to them under s 27(2) of CA 98. On receiving the notices two of the schools, Eton College and 
Winchester College applied for leniency. Four other schools including Beneden School, and 
Sevenoaks School also applied for leniency. Two other schools who were not party to the 
Sevenoaks survey were also granted leniency. A number of other schools who were parties 
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also applied for leniency at a later stage of the investigation, but were refused as the 
investigation was at an advanced stage by then. 
A number of the participants approached the OFT to offer a binding commitment under s 31 
A of CA 98 as an alternative to the OFT proceeding with the case, and arriving at an 
infringement decision, but due to the seriousness of the case this request was declined. After 
the Statement of Objections was sent, the OFT was approached by the Independent Schools 
Council (ISC) seeking to negotiate a resolution to the case.418 The ISC argued, in particular 
with a view to reducing the legal and other costs, that the participants were charitable not-for-
profit organisations, but the OFT maintained that charitable organisations also come under 
CA 98. The OFT entered into discussions with an ISC steering group which included senior 
governors of the participant schools, and chaired by the General Secretary of the ISC and a 
proposed resolution was reached. 
In view of a number of exceptional features of the case, the OFT decided to deviate from the 
penalty Guidance and limit the penalties imposed on each of the participants. Each participant 
was ordered a fixed amount of £10,000, subject to leniency granted to some of the 
participants.419 No penalty was imposed in respect of the Royal Hospital School, which is part 
of a trust whose sole trustee is the Secretary of State for Defence, and therefore having Crown 
immunity, the OFT cannot require it to pay a penalty under CA 98.  
The penalties were thus limited to a nominal amount of £10,000 per participant school, subject 
to the reductions agreed with the leniency applicants, in view of the following exceptional 
features: 
• The voluntary admission by the participants, 
• The participants agreed to make an ex gratia payment to fund a £3 million     
educational trust fund for the benefit of pupils who attended their schools during the 
said breach, and 
• Participant schools were all non-profit making charitable bodies. 
                                                          
418 See John Clare, ‘50 public schools fined for fixing their fees’ The Telegraph, 25 February 2006. The report 
added, “The deal was thrashed out in a series of meetings between the OFT and a high-powered group of 
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Included among the 50 participants were Eton College, Harrow School, Malvern College, 
Marlborough College and Westminster School. On becoming aware that the Sevenoaks 
Survey was unlawful, the parties ended the infringement. This was in June 2003, when the 
OFT began its investigation.   
The OFT used a market definition to establish the closest substitute to the product that was 
the focus of the investigation, which would usually be the immediate competitive constraints 
on the behaviour of the undertaking controlling that product. Referred to as ‘the focal product’ 
the OFT considered two focal products provided by the participant schools, namely; the 
provision of educational services to boarding pupils and, the provision of educational services 
to day pupils. The geographic market for the former was the UK, but the OFT could not reach 
a definitive conclusion as to the relevant geographic market for the latter, owing to the fact that 
there were pupils from various countries other than the UK, in these schools. 
The OFT concluded that the infringement artificially facilitated the horizontal coordination of 
price increases capable of altering the pattern of trade within the UK. Effect on trade within 
the UK is purely a jurisdictional test, not read as importing a requirement that the effect on 
trade should be appreciable. 
The OFT reduced the penalty imposed in respect of the following participants; Eton College 
50 per cent, Winchester College 50 per cent, Sevenoaks School 45 per cent, Benenden 
School 30 per cent, Cheltenham Ladies’ College 30 per cent and Malvern College 20 per cent.  
The Telegraph reported, ‘Even a fine of five per cent of turnover, half the maximum available 
to the OFT, would leave them facing a penalty of £33 million between them’420 
The OFT included a caveat in the decision that, should the parties wished to appeal, OFT 
reserved the right to vary the penalties, and that the parties should pay costs to the OFT. 
Interestingly, the OFT also agreed to incorporate a clause in the terms of the resolution, 
expressly stating that no finding has been made as to whether the infringement had any effect 
on fee levels at each of the participating schools. While admitting the Chapter I infringement, 
no admission was made by any of the participants that the exchange of information by way of 
Sevenoaks survey had any effect on fee levels. The resolution also stated that the payments 
by the participants to the trust set up may be expressed as being paid without any admission 
as to liability, and need not be expressed as representing “compensation” for any loss421. 
                                                          
420 See Peter Allen and Julie Henry, ‘Revealed: how two boys blew whistle on the public school fees ‘cartel’ The 
Telegraph, 13 November 2005 < www.telegraph.co.uk > last accessed 10.05.2016.  
421 See n 417, Annex 1, para 4c at 452. 
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The parties claimed they were unaware that the exchange of fee levels by the Sevenoaks 
Survey infringed the Chapter I prohibition, which was irrelevant in establishing that the 
infringement was committed intentionally or negligently. Nevertheless, the OFT noted that   the 
entry into force of CA 98 in March 2000 was preceded by a considerable amount of publicity, 
including OFT’s publication of detailed guidelines on the major provisions of the CA 98, and 
the undertakings that it would be applicable to, including those that had previously been 
exempt from the provisions of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act. There were prior 
consultations, draft bills (by different governments) before CA 98 was finally enacted.  
It seems incomprehensible that senior officials running such prestigious schools were 
unaware of the much publicised legislation, considering they were in effect running commercial 
projects, albeit under the label of charitable organisations. The General Secretary of the ISC 
declared, ‘The law seems to have changed without Parliament realising – and without the 
independent sector being consulted …”422 
There were no leniency applications made in this case, although leniency was granted to some 
of the participants.  
 
5.14 Banking Sector - MasterCard UK Members Forum Limited  
In September 2005, the OFT made a Decision that MasterCard UK Members Forum Limited 
(MMF) consisting of 17 major banks, acted in breach of a Chapter I prohibition by a collective 
price agreement between the members of MMF in setting the fall-back multilateral interchange 
fee (MMF MIF).423 The agreement applied in respect of all transactions made in the UK using 
MasterCard branded consumer credit and charge cards between 1 March 2000 and 18 
November 2004. The agreement resulted in unjustified recovery of certain costs (‘extraneous 
costs’) due to the MMF MIF interchange fee. The OFT decided that because the agreement 
had ended prior to the Decision, no directions were needed to be given, and having regard to 
all the circumstances of the case it was not appropriate to impose a financial penalty on the 
parties. The Decision came after some five and a half years of investigation. Notwithstanding 
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that there was no financial penalty, the MMF appealed to the CAT. The CAT quashed the 
OFT’s Decision and ordered OFT to pay damages to the appellants, and also to the intervener. 
On the date of entry into force of CA 98 (1 March 2000), MasterCard notified to the OFT a set 
of agreements including the MMF MIF agreement. On 1 September 2000, the British Rail 
Consortium (BRC) made a complaint to the OFT against the MasterCard scheme, and other 
UK payment card schemes focusing on the setting of multilateral interchange fees, including 
MMF MIF in particular.424  
The OFT found that the MMF MIF led to an unduly high interchange fee being paid to card 
issuing banks on every transaction made using a MasterCard credit or charge card in the UK. 
The cost of this fee was ultimately passed onto all consumers, by causing merchants to charge 
higher retail prices. In effect, the fee acted as a tax on retail transactions paid by all consumers 
in outlets that accepted MasterCard cards in the relevant period. The result was higher retail 
prices for all UK consumers. Interchange fees are among the most frequently paid prices in 
the UK economy, and in 2004, MasterCard credit and charge card transactions in the UK were 
worth £42.7 billion.425 Between 1 March 2000 and 18 November 2004, bilateral arrangements 
on interchange fees were virtually non-existent in the MasterCard scheme, and the 
interchange fee which applied to MasterCard transactions was, almost without exception, the 
MMF MIF. The OFT concluded that the MMF MIF agreement created an appreciable 
restriction of competition in two ways; a) it deterred parties from entering into bilateral 
agreements i.e. there was little or no competition between them on the level of interchange 
fees while the MMFMIF agreement was in place and, b) it resulted in parties recovering 
‘extraneous costs’ i.e. cost of services provided which are not integral to the MasterCard 
scheme, for example, interest free periods. This resulted in paying higher MMF MIF charges 
which passed along the chain until it was passed on to the consumer by way of increased 
retail prices. The OFT also found that the agreement distorted competition within the 
MasterCard scheme in two ways; first, MasterCard issuers having to recover from cardholders 
the full cost of extending credit to them, rather than recovering some of those costs through 
MMF MIF, and secondly, the extra revenue from a higher MMF MIF meant that cardholders 
were spending more on MasterCard cards irrespective of whether they used them for 
borrowing or not. 
                                                          
424 The BRC is the trade association of the retail industry and represents more than 90 per cent of the total retail 
trade in the UK, para 57. 
425 See n 423, paras 52 and 510. 
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Nevertheless, the scheme was not all bad, and the OFT found there were a number of 
benefits426 to the cardholder as it was universally accepted, but it also meant merchants could 
not select which issuers’ card they would accept. Notwithstanding all the resulting 
contraventions, OFT decided not to impose a financial penalty on the MMF. 
The OFT’s 5 ½ years of investigation produced a 264-page document, 52 of which bearing 
Annexes (some of which were redacted) in support of the Decision. The OFT Decision itself 
consisted of 747 paragraphs. It is possible the fact that powerful banks were the defendants 
in the investigation (the case was prior to the financial crisis), made it necessary for the OFT 
to wade through a maze of actions, transactions and complicated schemes before making its 
pronouncements. But to what purpose? The MMF MIF scheme had lapsed,427 but the OFT 
was aware a new interchange fallback fee was likely to be instituted by the MMF, and warned 
that the OFT ruling would apply to any such future scheme.428 
The MMF being a collection of some 17 leading banks, appealed to the CAT despite not having 
to pay any financial penalty. What then transpired was the most unusual of occurrences 
concerning public regulatory actions. MMF UK were joined by MasterCard International 
Incorporated (MCI) and MasterCard Europe SPRL (MCE), together with the Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group (RSBG) as appellants.  New contenders, Visa (Europe) Limited and Visa (UK) 
Limited came in as Interveners in support of the appeal against the OFT Decision. The British 
Retail Consortium supported the OFT as Intervener. 
MCI is a Delaware corporation which owns the MasterCard trademarks, and licences them to 
financial institutions worldwide having the responsibility for rules, standards and procedures 
of administration, MCI being the main operating subsidiary of the MasterCard group of 
companies. MCE is a subsidiary of MCI processing UK transactions. RSBG is a member of 
the MMF and one of the principal issuers of MasterCard credit cards in the UK. 
Intervention by Visa (Europe) Ltd and Visa (UK) Ltd was pursuant to an Order by the CAT 
dated 9 December 2005. The Commission had previously taken a decision granting exemption 
under Article 81(3), as it then was (now Art 101(3)), for the multilateral interchange fee in 
respect of international (as opposed to domestic) transactions under the Visa system.429  The 
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117 
 
CAT wrote to the Commission by letter dated 24 January 2006, seeking its observations 
pursuant to Article 15 of EC Regulation 1/2003 on the matter. However, the Commission in its 
reply dated 9 February 2006, informed CAT that it did not wish to submit observations at that 
stage. Subsequently, the CAT invited all parties involved to agree to a list of issues for 
consideration at a case management conference which proved impossible. The OFT 
submitted a separate list of issues and, the appellants and Visa provided their separate lists. 
At the case management conference, the appellants and Visa submitted (to the CAT) that 
there were material divergences between OFT’s defence, and its Decision. They alleged that 
the OFT had effectually introduced a new decision abandoning the Decision taken at the 
conclusion of the investigation. The OFT had taken advice from two experts employed by an 
international consultancy firm, and offered recommendations from their report to modify the 
MMF MIF in order for it to be able to operate without infringing the Chapter I prohibition. The 
OFT accepted that the Defence had been reached by a different route to that taken by the 
Decision, and that the route taken in the Defence was only a substitution. The OFT’s 
explanatory letters in reply to the appellants’ requests were rejected by the appellants. The 
CAT could either have remitted the matter back to the OFT, as Visa wished, or as MMF and 
RSBG wished proceeded with the appeal on a ‘judicial review’ basis,430 but the CAT did 
neither. 
On 31 January 2006, the appellants filed objections to an application by the BRC for the 
disclosure of some 39 confidential documents belonging to the appellants in order for BRC to 
prepare its Statement of Intervention. The appellants stated that some of the documents were 
their ‘Crown Jewels’ and highly confidential, and also alleged it would be time consuming, 
extending the proceedings unnecessarily!431  
After lengthy legal arguments, with the appellants demanding more clarification of every 
divergent paragraph of the Decision, the CAT ordered the OFT to file within 14 days, a 
paragraph by paragraph schedule stating in summary form the parts of the Decision that it no 
longer relied on, withdrawn or no case was made of or were qualified, giving brief particulars 
and cross-references to the Defence. The CAT made the Order on 9 May 2006, pursuant to 
Rule 19(1) and Rule (2) (b) of the CAT’s Rules (SI 2003/1372).432  
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5 and 9. 
432 See n 423, para 33. 
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OFT’s response was to withdraw the Decision. (Notwithstanding the unprecedented 
withdrawal of its Decision, the OFT maintained that its original legal and economic reasoning 
were sound but did not intend to waste time on past infringements. It wanted to focus on 
investigating the current credit card interchange fees as a whole).433  
On withdrawal of the Decision by the OFT, the CAT quashed the Decision,434 and made its 
order, of awarding costs not only to the appellants, but to the intervener as well. The total costs 
claimed by the appellants were reported to be just under £5 million which was more than 40 
per cent of the OFT’s enforcement budget.435 However, the CAT stipulated the award of costs 
to be from the date that OFT filed its Defence, i.e. 31 March 2006 rather than the date of the 
Decision, i.e. 6 September 2005.  
Leniency did not apply in this case as it was initially an application to the OFT for exemption. 
Since the dismissal of the MasterCard Decision, an interesting development has been the 
decision by the Commission, prohibiting MasterCard’s multilateral interchange fees (MIF) for 
cross-border payment card transactions with MasterCard.436 It held such transactions in the 
European Economic Area (EEA) violate the EC Treaty rules on restrictive business practices 
thereby infringing Article 81. MasterCard was given six months to withdraw the fees in 
compliance with the Commission’s order.                                                            
Although MIFs are not illegal in themselves, they are only compatible with EU competition 
rules if such transactions contribute to technical and economic progress, and are of benefit to 
the consumers. In the EU, over 23 billion payments exceeding a value of 1,350 billion euros 
are made every year with payment cards. Commissioner Neelie Kroes has said that the MIF 
agreements inflate the cost of card acceptance by retailers, and the consumers risk paying 
twice; once through annual fees to the bank, and again through inflated retail prices which are 
then paid not only by the card users but by those who pay by cash as well. This sounds very 
much like the OFT decision.   
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The CMA has announced that it has decided to close its investigations into MasterCard and 
Visa multilateral interchange fee infringements after the EU passed an Interchange Fee 
Regulation (IFR), capping interchange fees.437  
The CAT has, in the meantime awarded damages to the tune of £68.6 million to Sainsburys 
supermarket against MasterCard in respect of the multilateral interchange fees.438 The case 
was transferred from the High Court to the CAT pursuant to the powers granted to the CAT 
under CRA 15. 
Since then, a collective action over fees charged by MasterCard was filed before the CAT, 
by former chief Financial Services Ombudsman as the proposed representative of the class 
of UK consumers that have suffered loss, claiming £14 billion in damages on behalf of all UK 
consumers.439  The case was dismissed by the CAT.440 
 
5.15 Professional Loan Products case     
The OFT started an investigation in April 2008, in relation to the pricing of loan products to 
large professional services firms, by the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), and Barclays bank. 
OFT decision of 20 January 2011 concluded that, the two parties infringed the Chapter I 
prohibition and/or Article 101 by participating in an agreement to supply loan products to large 
professional services firms.441 The decision concluded that the agreement was entered into in 
October 2007, and was terminated at least in February or March 2008. The infringement was 
the provision of confidential commercially sensitive pricing information by RBS to Barclays, 
which comprised of both generic and customer specific information, with the object of 
facilitating the coordination of the parties’ respective pricing on the loans supplied.  The OFT 
found evidence that the information was taken into account by Barclays in determining its own 
pricing. The focus of the infringement related to Barclays’ former Head of Team,442 meaning 
the discovery was made after he left. There were senior officers involved from RBS, and the 
OFT found that RBS was the instigator. 
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Nevertheless, the matter was brought to the OFT’s notice by Barclays under the OFT’s 
leniency programme.443 Barclays was granted total immunity, while RBS entered into an early 
resolution and agreed to pay a total of £28.59 million as penalty to the OFT. 
There was an international dimension to the infringement by the parties, in the banking sector. 
There was evidence in the information submitted by the parties that debt finance had been 
sought from them by UK-based large professional services firms for use outside the UK. Also 
several of the parties’ customers had international aspects to their businesses. 
The investigation started due to Barclays approaching the OFT with a leniency application in 
March 2008. The OFT made an unannounced visit to the premises of RBS on a warrant 
obtained under s 27 of the CA 98. The OFT seized telephone records, IT server and took 
images of hard drives. The OFT visited Barclays premises on notice and took images of laptop 
documents of key personnel, and telephone records pertaining to the infringement. Barclays’ 
employees relevant to the infringement were also interviewed. In March 2010, RBS agreed an 
early resolution to the investigation by admitting it had infringed Chapter I prohibition and/or 
Article 101. In the agreement, RBS offered to pay a penalty of £28.59 million, which included 
a 15 per cent reduction made by the OFT in recognition of the early resolution.  
 
Following the entry into force of the Modernisation Regulation from 1 May 2004, the OFT is 
required to apply Article 101, when applying national competition law where the infringement 
may affect trade between Member States to an appreciable extent. Both parties carried out 
their businesses at international level, and there was the potential for trade to be affected as 
opposed to there being an actual effect on trade. In Raiffeisen Zentralbank, the General Court 
held that a banking cartel in Austria had an effect on trade between Member States.444 That 
decision was upheld by the CJEU.445 The OFT considered that Barclays/RSB infringement 
may also have had an effect on trade between Member States.446 
 
However, the OFT concluded that in this case, the relevant geographic market was the UK 
national market.447 Barclays disputed the OFT’s definition of the product market. Having gone 
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through a lengthy assessment,448 the OFT concluded the relevant product market to be the 
provision of core lending and deposit products to Large Professional Services449  
 
In calculating the penalty for RBS, starting point was set at 6 per cent in Step 1. No adjustment 
was made at Step 2 for duration, which lasted five to six months (and only ended after OFT’s 
intervention).450 At Step 3, an increase by way of a multiplier of two was made as a deterrent. 
For being the instigator, an uplift of 10 per cent was added at Step 4 which was balanced out 
by a 10 per cent reduction for cooperation.                                                                
A leniency application in this case was made by Barclays prior to any investigation by the OFT.  
 
5.16 Replica Football Kit case451 - Price-fixing in the Sports sector 
The OFT received a letter of complaint on 3 August 2000 from Sports Soccer Ltd, a retailer, 
stating that price fixing agreements were rife in the Sports industry despite an investigation 
carried out by the OFT in the previous year (1999). On that occasion the industry had given 
assurances to the OFT that they will take measures to prevent infringements in the future. 
Those assurances were given by, among others, the Football Association Ltd (‘the FA’) and 
the FA Premier League (‘English PL’) clubs. The price fixing agreements were in relation to 
the sale of replica football kits made by Umbro Holdings Ltd.  
Due to the OFT investigation in 1999, the FA and English PL clubs agreed to include a clause 
in their new licensing agreements not to prevent dealers from offering discounts, and as a 
result the OFT issued a press release in August 1999, stating that the Football price-fixing has 
ended.452 
After receiving the current complaint of 3 August 2000, OFT interviewed the complainants on 
30 March 2001 and began a formal investigation. OFT made unannounced visits to the 
premises of a number of the participants (on warrants under s 28, CA 98), and seized 
documents in August and September 2001. Section 26 Notices were sent to various parties 
involved and in May 2002, a notice under rule 14(1) of the OFT’s rules (‘Rule 14 Notice’) was 
sent to FA, Umbro, Sport Soccer, and a number of other dealers and retailers numbering 
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eleven in all. One party, Debenhams, was later dropped after evaluation of its representations. 
The evidence seized included formal written agreements, monthly reports, file notes, 
handwritten comments, faxes, diary entries, memos, letters and emails. Management at the 
highest level were involved in the infringements, including the Chairman of JJB and the 
Chairman who was also a Director of Allsports. Chief Executives, Directors and Managing 
Directors of the parties were involved which the OFT considered to be an aggravating factor. 
There were four price-fixing agreements involving seven parties including JJB, JD, MU, Sports 
Soccer, and Umbro. These related to certain Umbro licenced Replica Shirts during key selling 
periods for home games and international tournaments. Although the OFT regarded the 
agreements as distinct infringements, there was a good deal of overlap between them and as 
such, the OFT decided to count them together. When assessing whether any party has 
engaged in repeated infringements, such action was to be treated as an aggravating factor. 
The OFT, therefore, decided not to impose separate penalties for each distinct infringement, 
but to impose a single penalty duly increased to take into account the multiple infringements. 
The relevant product market was deemed to be each club’s or national team’s Replica Kit, and 
the geographic market was UK wide. The OFT determined there was a second relevant 
product market, i.e. the granting of club or team trademark Intellectual Property (IP) licences 
for the manufacture or sale of Replica Kit for each club or team. This second market was 
defined for the purpose of calculating a financial penalty for Manchester United (MU) and the 
FA, as their businesses were active in it. The relevant geographic market was also as wide as 
the UK. 
The product market IP is an essential input for the manufacture and supply of Replica Kit. 
Demand for IP licences is derived from the demand for each Replica Kit. IP licence is not the 
same as the Kit itself. 
 
The effect of the infringement on third parties was significant, but the OFT concluded that the 
consumer damage was not measurable or useful. The infringement affected 50 per cent of the 
total sales. Umbro was found to be an instigator, and they used retaliatory measures against 
those who deviated from the agreement. Umbro also had its senior managers involved, and 
were found to have engaged in 3 breaches. Umbro had also previously given assurances to 
the OFT (in 1999) to stay away from anticompetitive behaviour. However, Umbro’s actions 
were deemed reactive due to pressure from JJB and MU. They were given a reduction on that 
account as well as for putting in compliance training, and also for cooperation. Their market 
share was 100 percent for both manufacture and sales. The OFT fined Umbro £6.641 million. 
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Allsports was nationally a small company but the second largest by the number of stores after 
JJB. Allsports never accepted involvement but admitted organising a meeting, for which 
cooperation a reduction in the penalty was given.453 Senior most managers (along with the 
chairman who was also a director, and the CEO of JJB) were involved in the breach, and the 
OFT imposed a fine of £1.350 million on Allsports.    
Blacks were the third largest retailer, and they attempted to blame their subsidiary and vice 
versa but the OFT rejected that claim and imposed a fine of £0.197 million on them. Sports 
Connection was the smallest high street retailer, and they had pressure from Umbro. They 
had been given immunity in respect of other breaches, and leniency plus for this decision, and 
as a consequence their fine was £0.020 million. JJB was the biggest sports retailer, and was 
an instigator, and contributed to the establishment of two of the agreements. JJB pressurised 
Umbro, and consequently they were fined £8.373 million. JD did not accept liability and were 
fined £0.073 million. MU was also an instigator, and put pressure on Umbro. MU as licensor 
had 100 per cent team trademark IP licences. Although they had compliance training in place, 
acted in breach of compliance. They also had given assurances in 1999, and yet senior 
managers, were involved in the infringement. MU offered limited admission which was taken 
as a mitigating factor, and they were given a penalty of £1.652 million. 
Sportsetail was a web retailer and a new entrant who was involved at the behest of other 
parties. Their action was considered of low impact, and the OFT fined them £0.004 million, 
but they were granted total immunity and their penalty was therefore zero. Sports Soccer was 
the whistleblower, but continued with the infringement and they also did not disclose an earlier 
breach.  Their cooperation was slow, and they informed others when they were asked not to. 
Sports Soccer was fined £0.123 million. FA had 100 per cent IP market, and barriers to entry 
was high. FA was given 20 per cent leniency even though FA did not stop the infringement 
until nearly 3 months after the investigation began. FA was an essential participant in England 
Direct Agreements and exercised clear influence over retail prices of Sportsetail. FA still 
received 20 percent leniency for cooperation, and their fine was reduced to £0.158 million.  
FA is the governing body for football in England (founded in 1863) and its rules govern the 
conduct of football in England, covering not only the playing of football but also the conduct of 
clubs and their players. The FA has devolved some of its powers to other bodies such as the 
FA Premier League Ltd. The FA is also affiliated to FIFA (international football association) 
and UEFA, the European football governing body.  The FA also licenses other companies to 
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manufacture and supply other England team merchandise but not replica football kit.454 The 
FA’s activities involve licensing the commercial rights of the England teams, concluding 
sponsorships and licensing agreements, selling broadcasting rights and selling tickets for 
games involving England teams. Hence, FA is an undertaking engaged in economic 
activities.455 Under those powers the FA licenses Umbro to manufacture, supply and distribute 
the England team replica football kit and certain other England merchandise.  
JJB and Allsports appealed to the CAT on grounds of both liability and penalty, while Umbro 
and MU appealed on the amount of penalty only.456 The CAT upheld the OFT’s decision but 
reduced the penalties of 3 of the parties, but increased that of Allsports because they were 
found to have misled OFT on the fact that they were fully cooperating with the investigation, 
but in fact did not disclose all the evidence that was later made available to the CAT. The 
increase was the same percentage by which the OFT had given a reduction in Allsports’ 
penalty for cooperation.457 The trial took 14 days, with witnesses being cross examined before 
the CAT. Umbro tried to block confidential information being provided to the other parties, and 
the CAT took exception to that,458 with the request being rejected. The CAT is not bound by 
the restrictions on the OFT, relating to the rules regarding disclosure nor by the guidance on 
penalties. 
JJB appealed the CAT’s decision to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed JJB 
Sports’ appeal against CAT’s judgement on both liability and penalties, and upheld CAT’s 
findings.459 Following the Court of Appeal decision, the appellant applied for leave to appeal 
which was refused by the Court of Appeal. Subsequently, the House of Lords’ Appeals 
Committee refused to grant JJB Sports leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal judgement, 
in Feb 2007.460  
In March 2007, the Consumers’ Association, brought a claim against JJB, the first and only 
consumer damages action brought under s 47B.461 The case was later settled, announced on 
9 January 2008 by both parties. The CAT made the order for withdrawal of the action, and for 
reasonable costs.462 The Consumers Association (now known as “Which?”), made it known 
                                                          
454 Ibid, para 51. 
455 Ibid, para 305. 
456 See JJB Sports plc and Allsports Limited v Office of Fair Trading, [2004] CAT 17 (liability); [2004] All ER (D) 
23 (Oct), paras 7 and 8 respectively. 
457 Umbro Holdings Ltd and others v Office of Fair Trading, [2005] CAT 22, paras 231, 232 and 234. 
458 Umbro Holdings Limited v Office of Fair Trading, [2003] CAT 26, paras 42 and 43 in particular. 
459 See Joined Cases Argos, Littlewoods and JJB Sports plc v Office of Fair Trading, [2006] EWCA Civ 1318. 
460 OFT Press release 17/07, House of Lords rejects appeal in price fixing of toys and games and replica football 
kit cases, February 2007. 
461 S 47B of CA 98.                                                                         
462 The Consumers’ Association v JJB Sports Plc, Case 1078/7/9/07. 
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that initially JJB offered a free shirt and a mug to those people who had a relevant replica shirt 
as compensation! What they got in the end, under the settlement was £20 each for litigants, 
and £10.00 for anyone with proof of purchase or the shirt with the label intact!  
Which? has said that, had the collective redress system been based on ‘Opt-out’ and ‘Cy-
près’463 the case would have made a greater financial impact, ensuring that the affected 
consumers were properly compensated. The ‘opt-in’ system, the collective action had to 
operate under, meant the number of consumers opting in were very low, and it was time 
consuming and expensive considering the amount of resources and external legal costs 
needed to be spent.464 The Government has since introduced a limited Opt-out collective 
actions regime, and alternative dispute resolution under the Consumer Rights Act 2015, the 
outcome of which will only be seen in the future.465 
It was a year after the Replica Football Kit case, that s 19 of EA 02 introduced a new clause, 
47B into CA 98. This allowed certain ‘specific bodies’ to bring damages claims before the CAT 
on behalf of two or more named individuals for proven breaches, i.e. ‘follow on’ actions. The 
body had to be independent, impartial, has integrity, is reputable, and act in the best interests 
of the victims and has the capacity to bring an action. It was as a result of this new clause that 
‘Which?’ was able to act soon after the JJB appeal.  
Also from 20 June 2003, those individuals involved in infringements of a similar kind are liable 
to disqualification as a director or criminal prosecution under EA 02. Considering that the 
Replica Football Kit case had directors involved in the infringements, a reasonable expectation 
would have been to see EA 02 provisions applied vigorously as a matter of course. It is 
therefore, puzzling when a senior officer of the OFT declares that they have not had 
experience of any directors being involved in the cases they have investigated.466  
No leniency applications were made by the parties in the case. 
 
 
                                                          
463 For a definition of ‘cy-près’ see Rachael P Mulheron, The Modern Cy-près Doctrine: Applications and 
Implications (Routledge Cavendish, 2006). As Mulheron notes the cy- près doctrine in a wider sense extends 
both to the calculation and distribution of damages; For ‘Opt-out’ system see OFT916resp, Private actions in 
competition law: effective redress for consumers and business, November 2007. 
464 ‘Collective Redress – JJB Sports: a case study in collective action’ July 2011. 
<www.which.co.uk/documents/pdf/collective-redress-case-study-which> last accessed 17.10.2014.                   
465 A case filed under the new regulations has been rejected by the CAT in July 2017. See Walter Merricks  v 
Mastercard  [2017] CAT 16. (an appeal has been lodged). 
466 Ali Nickpay, ‘UK cartel enforcement – past, present, future’ Speech to the Law Society Anti-Trust Section, 11 






5.17 Retail Pricing of Tobacco case467  -  (RPM) 
In its decision dated 15 April 2010, the OFT found that two tobacco manufacturers and ten of 
their retailers had infringed a Chapter I prohibition by engaging in unlawful practices in relation 
to retail prices for tobacco products in the UK. The fines imposed amounted to £225 million. 
The OFT concluded that each manufacturer had a series of individual arrangements with each 
retailer whereby the retail price of a tobacco brand was linked to that of a competing 
manufacturer’s brand. Those arrangements restricted the ability of the retailers concerned to 
determine their selling prices independently, which was in breach of CA 98.  
The infringements had taken place at different periods for different parties between 2001 and 
2003, and related variously to the markets for UK duty paid cigarette products. The relevant 
product market was the UK duty paid cigarettes and similar tobacco products. The OFT had 
earlier started an investigation in 2003, over a Chapter II infringement, into the behaviour of 
one of the manufacturers, Imperial Tobacco Limited, allegedly abusing a dominant position in 
the UK market for cigarette papers (which case file was closed due to insufficient evidence). 
During that investigation which was prompted by a complaint, the UK supermarket 
Sainsbury’s, and other retailers connected to the investigation submitted leniency applications. 
The current case originated owing to these leniency applications regarding the vertical 
agreements between tobacco manufacturers and retailers admitting they were in breach of 
competition law.  
From the information provided in the leniency applications, the OFT believed there were 
reasonable grounds to suspect that a Chapter I infringement has occurred. As a result, the 
OFT sent over 30 section 26 notices to retailers of tobacco requiring them to produce relevant 
documents and information, during the course of the investigation.468 Among the documents 
found were written trading agreements, letters, faxes, emails, minutes of meetings, internal 
policy documents, pricing information, linking of retail price of competing brands. Other 
evidence of bonuses, monitoring, and routine communications indicating retailer did not set 
                                                          
467 OFT Decision No. CA98/01/2010, Tobacco, (Case CE/2596-03), 15 April 2010.  
 
468 Ibid, paras 2.95-2.98. 
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price were also found. Sales managers and Area Managers were involved together with the 
buyers. 
Due to the large number of parties and the volume of documents, the OFT later decided to 
limit the number of parties to a manageable group of 2 tobacco manufacturers and 10 of their 
retailers, bearing in mind its limited resources. In selecting the parties, the OFT focused its 
resources on those parties whose activities would most likely to have caused the greatest 
consumer detriment. The OFT, therefore, excluded those retailers with a share of less than 
one per cent by value of UK tobacco sales, based on the figures relating to the final year of 
the period under investigation. Further, two parties were excluded due to the weak nature of 
the evidence available. The decision to reduce the number of parties under investigation was 
taken around three years into the investigation.469 
Documents obtained in the investigation revealed a significant amount of information about 
the relationship between the manufacturers and their retailers, which led the OFT to 
investigate further. The OFT relied on written trading agreements between the manufacturers 
and retailers which formalised the basis for certain aspects of the ongoing commercial dealing 
between them, from which Infringement Agreements were identified. After a five-year 
investigation, the OFT issued a Statement of Objections (SO) in April 2008. Following the SO, 
the second manufacturer, Gallaher (comprising Gallaher Group Ltd and Gallaher Ltd), and 
five retailers admitted the infringement, and reached early-resolution agreements with the 
OFT, in respect of which, the six parties received a 20 per cent reduction in their fines.  
The OFT decided that the relevant product market, on balance, may be UK duty paid tobacco 
products. The relevant geographic market was the UK. Total value of sales of cigarettes and 
tobacco in 2003 in the UK was estimated to be around £15.27 billion.470 The share by volume 
of the total UK duty paid cigarette sales during the infringement period for the two 
manufacturers in this case was estimated at 90 per cent. 
The infringements were taken as having been committed between 1 March 2001 and 15 
August 2003 in respect of 9 parties, and different dates for 3 others. Total immunity was 
granted to Sainsbury’s on making an early leniency application. Three retailers received 
leniency ranging from 10 per cent to 40 per cent. Early Resolution reductions of 20 per cent 
were granted to 6 others. Another 10 per cent reduction was given to all parties due to the 
long length of time taken for the investigation, although some of the parties themselves 
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contributed to the delay. Initial investigation having started in 10 March 2003, it took 5 years 
before the Statement of Objections was issued.471  
ITL (comprising both Imperial Tobacco Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Group plc), and the 
remaining retailers declined early resolution, and the investigation continued. The OFT made 
its decision in April 2010, and imposed a combined fine of £225 million on the parties, making 
it the largest fine imposed by it under CA 98. Imperial Tobacco Group plc and Imperial Tobacco 
Limited were found jointly and severally liable, as parent company and subsidiary respectively.    
ITL and five retailers appealed to the CAT, and after 26 days of hearing, in December 2011, 
the CAT allowed the appeal against the OFT decision, after the OFT’s Refined Case failed.472 
The CAT’s judgement did not deal with the substantive issues raised in the appeals, and 
therefore, did not address the issue of whether there was a breach of Chapter I prohibition.  
The CAT judgement resulted in the OFT also having to pay a non appealing party, TM Retail, 
a sum amounting to £2,668,991 and a contribution to certain other costs due to an assurance 
the OFT had given them if the appeals by others were to be successful.473 On learning of this 
repayment, two other non-appealing parties who had not been given such an assurance, 
requested OFT to repay their penalties also. The defendants took their case to the Court of 
Appeal and their appeal was upheld.474 
The OFT investigation was a very complex one, concluding only in 2010, after over seven 
years of toil, leading the OFT to make 10 per cent reductions in the penalties for the length of 
time taken, although some of the parties were responsible for the delay themselves. And yet, 
after all that time and trouble the outcome came to nothing. This case illustrates the difficulty 
in proving parallel behaviour between undertakings before a court. 
There were no Leniency applications before the investigation started, but total immunity was 
granted to one party who applied subsequently, with some others receiving reduced fines. 
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473 OFT News release, Tobacco, ‘Update – TM Retail’. (archived 2/4/14) < 
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5.18 Dairy Products case475  - (RPM agreement)  
Four supermarkets and five dairy processors were fined £49.51 million by the OFT, for an 
infringement of Chapter I, CA 98, by those nine parties. The OFT held that the parties 
breached the law by coordinating increases in the prices consumers paid for certain dairy 
products in 2002 and/or 2003. The coordination was achieved by the supermarkets indirectly 
exchanging retail pricing intentions with one another via the dairy processors. Three 
infringements were found to have been committed, but not all the parties were involved in all 
three infringements. 
One of the supermarkets, Tesco wrote to the OFT in April 2000, forwarding two letters sent to 
them by Farmers for Action (FFA) group. The letters expressed support for an increase in 
retail prices for cheddar and British territorial cheeses, in order to pass back monies up the 
supply chain to farmers, provided the retailers would also increase their retail prices. The 
intended increase would thus increase the price of raw milk. Initially the letters were sent to 
the FFA by Safeway and the representatives of a retailer, following an approach by FFA. The 
letters were being circulated between retailers, with a copy received by Safeway. Tesco 
sought advice from the OFT on whether the letter was in breach of the CA 98. The OFT wrote 
to both Tesco and Safeway and a retailer in April 2000, advising that the concerted action 
expressed in the letter could constitute a breach of the Chapter I prohibition. 
Later, the OFT was alerted to the suspected existence of the breaches, by a retired farmer 
forwarding an article published in the Farmers Weekly of 4 July 2003, reporting that ‘leading 
retailers’ had increased the price of milk by 2 pence per litre. The OFT commenced a formal 
investigation in January 2004. 
One of the dairy processors, Arla, applied for leniency, and was granted full immunity. One of 
the supermarkets, Asda, was granted partial leniency owing to total immunity given to it in 
respect of a completely separate infringement it was involved in other separate markets. 
Seven of the other parties applied for and agreed early resolution, thereby receiving reduced 
penalties. Each of these parties admitted liability and agreed to a streamlined procedure 
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enabling parts of the case to be resolved quickly, reducing the costs of the investigation. One 
of the supermarkets, Tesco, contested the decision in the Statement of Objections vigorously 
at first, but when OFT dropped some of the charges against it, and issued a second Statement 
of Objections, Tesco came back to face the remaining (three) charges. 
The four supermarkets involved (Sainsbury’s, Asda, Tesco and Safeway) engaged in the 
infringement indirectly by exchanging retail pricing intentions with each other via the dairy 
processors, the mode of communication called the A-B-C information exchange. The 
information exchange, also called ‘hub and spoke’, happens when retailers exchange 
information via a supplier or suppliers learn each other’s strategies via a retailer. This area of 
anticompetitive activity has been a particular concern for European competition authorities 
over a period of time.476 
The three separate infringements in the case concerned cheese and fresh liquid milk. The 
OFT narrowed the relevant product market to the supply of fresh liquid milk, and British 
cheese, to national multiple retailers and consumers. The geographic market was deemed to 
be Great Britain.  
The case was complex, involving several geographic and product markets together with 
multiple statements of objections (to all the parties), leniency applications, and early resolution. 
Consequently, the case dragged on for some eight years ending with the OFT decision on 10 
August 2011 (with the early resolution enabling to reduce the time line somewhat!). Evidentiary 
documents included statements issued by FFA, communications, letters, meeting notes, 
reports, future pricing information, slide presentations, emails, ‘briefing documents’, time 
tables for price increases, and memos. 
In making its economic assessment of the case, the OFT relied on a number of sources 
including a report by the Competition Commission (CC) on the proposed merger between Arla 
and Express Dairies, in October 2003 (‘the Arla/Express Report’). This report assessed the 
impact of the merger in the context of three customer groups. One of these customer groups 
was defined as ‘national multiples’, consisting of Asda, Marks and Spencer, Morrisons, 
Safeway, Sainsbury’s, Somerfield, Tesco and Waitrose.477 This group includes all of the 
retailers in the OFT investigation, i.e. Asda, Safeway, Sainsbury’s and Tesco and, therefore, 
OFT noted many of the CC’s findings in respect of this group were relevant to the case. The 
                                                          
476 See Peter Whelan, ‘Trading Negotiations between Retailers and Suppliers: A Fertile Ground for Anti-
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four supermarkets were the largest grocery retailers in the UK, with a market share of 
approximately 60 per cent in 2002 and 2003. There were senior managers involved in the 
infringements. 
In 2010, the OFT dropped certain allegations in the case stating that subsequent detailed 
representations, and in light of new evidence, the OFT concluded that the evidence it then had 
on its files was insufficient to support those allegations relating to liquid milk in 2002, and value 
butter in 2003. This was despite some of the parties had entered into early settlement 
agreements. As a result, penalties paid on early resolution (by some parties) were reduced, 
and the allegation against one party, Morrisons, was dropped as the only allegation against 
that party related to liquid milk in 2002. 
Morrisons acquired Safeway in March 2004, after Safeway was involved in the infringement 
(at the time of the infringement Morrisons was not implicated). As a result of its acquisition, 
Morrisons became the parent company of Safeway, which led to the OFT writing to Morrisons 
in April 2007, stating that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting it of infringing Chapter 
I prohibition. However, in the end OFT dropped the charge against Morrisons, for not having 
sufficient evidence to support their participation in the infringement. 
Tesco was the only party to appeal the OFT’s decision (both on liability and penalty).478 The 
CAT made its decision on 20 December 2012, partially allowing the appeal. According to the 
CAT, the OFT’s evidence was sufficient to establish a concerted practice through A-B-C 
information exchange on three occasions, but that there was insufficient evidence to support 
OFT’s findings in respect of five other infringements covering the 2002 period. The CAT also 
held that there was insufficient evidence to support the OFT’s conclusions regarding Tesco’s 
participation in a concerted practice in 2003. The CAT, therefore, set aside these aspects of 
the OFT’s decision. The CAT reduced Tesco’s penalty from £10.4 million to £6.5 million. The 
CAT was due to receive submissions on whether Tesco’s infringements constituted a single 
overall act (as identified by the OFT), and on the amount of penalty imposed by the OFT, but 
the appeal was withdrawn by Tesco.  
At the outset, the OFT applied for disclosure of documents relating to the appeal, but the 
application was rejected by the CAT, and the OFT was ordered to pay costs to Tesco.479    
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The OFT also paid Morrisons £100,000, in settlement of a defamation action brought by 
Morrisons.480 In addition, the OFT paid Morrisons costs in relation to both a judicial review, 
and the defamation action launched by Morrisons following a press release by the OFT on 20 
September 2007, implicating Morrisons in the infringement.481 The Guardian reported that a 
legal source had said the costs that OFT would have to pay Morrisons was likely to top 
£500,000.482 However, this has not been verified by any other source. 
No Leniency applications were made by the parties prior to the investigation in the case, only 
applying after the OFT started its investigation. 
 
5.19 Flat Roof and Car Park Surfacing Contracts483 – (bid rigging) 
This case related to the infringement of bid rigging, a formal investigation into which was 
started in 2003 by the OFT. The parties numbering 13, were roofing contractors who had 
colluded in bidding for tenders in the flat roof and car park surfacing contracts (using mastic 
asphalt), and flat roofing contracts (using felt and single ply) in England and Scotland. The 
OFT found they had infringed s 2(1), CA 98 in fixing prices by way of collusive tendering, such 
agreements and/or concerted practices being among the most serious infringements under 
CA 98.  
When a purchaser wished to obtain these services, the parties typically invited a number of 
presumably qualified contractors to submit tender bids detailing the price at which they could 
undertake the work specified so as to invite competition between contractors, and obtain a 
competitive price for the individual contract. The cooperation and coordination of the parties 
with one another in relation to the setting of tender prices had the object of preventing, 
restricting or distorting competition.  
                                                          
480 OFT Press release, 54/08, 23 April 2008, `Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc: an apology < www.oft.gov.uk > 
last accessed 29.03.2014. (This Press Release was in turn delivered via London Stock Exchange’s Regulatory 
News Service, RNS No: 8870S).   
 
481 See Richard Fletcher, ‘OFT to pay Morrisons £100,000 over milk price-fixing allegations’ The Telegraph, 23 
April 2008; OFT Press release, 134/07, ‘OFT issues provisional decision against supermarkets and dairies over 
price fixing’ 20 September 2007– (This press release was subsequently removed by the OFT from its website. 
482 Graeme Wearden and Julia Finch, ‘Apologetic OFT pays Morrisons £100,000’ The Guardian, Thursday 24 April 
2008. <www.theguardian.com> last accessed 29.03.2014; Michael Peel and Tom Braithwaite ‘OFT rethinks cartel 
probe after Morrison pay-out’, Financial Times, 24 April 2008, (‘OFT declined to say why it made the pay-out, which 
some legal observers described as surprisingly high …’ 5th para).                   
 
483 OFT Decision No. CA98/01/2006, Collusive tendering for flat roof and car park surfacing contracts in England 




Different parties were involved in different number of contracts, and the OFT considered the 
collusion in relation to the tenders for each individual contract as discrete infringements. The 
OFT imposed financial penalties on all the parties involved subject to the Leniency Programme 
where leniency applications were made. Where leniency was granted, in addition to immunity 
or reduction in fines for the applicants, confidential information has been redacted from the 
published version of the Decision. Fines were calculated in accordance with the revised 
penalty Guidance, and the relevant turnover was determined by the amended Penalties Order 
2004.484  As the infringements had ended prior to 1 May 2004, penalties were adjusted so as 
not to exceed the maximum penalty applicable prior to1 May 2004.   
OFT acted on information received from a source or sources (in July and again in October 
2003) which identity has not been disclosed. The OFT entered, and searched the premises of 
12 of the 13 parties unannounced on warrants obtained under s 28, CA 98. These were carried 
out over a period of time extending to September 2004. Tender documents, faxes, letters and 
minutes of board meetings were seized. Statement of Objections were sent on 6 April 2005 to 
all parties. 
The OFT concluded there were two product markets in the case, defined as the supply of 
installation, repair, maintenance and improvement services for mastic asphalt coverings for 
flat roofs and other surfaces (‘the Mastic Asphalt Market’), and for single ply/felt coverings for 
flat roofs (‘the Single Ply/Felt Market’). Geographic markets were the Mastic Asphalt Market 
in England, the Mastic Asphalt in Scotland and the Single Ply/Felt Market in the South East of 
England. 
The customers in the case were public authorities, and one foreseeable effect was a higher 
cost for building projects than if there had been competitive bidding. Ultimately, the obvious 
consequence would be higher council taxes.485 It was not possible for the OFT to quantify the 
loss to customers. In a previous investigation, the OFT discovered that ‘cover pricing is 
endemic in the construction industry in general, including the roofing industry’.486                                  
Duration of the tender bids did not extend over a year in most of the agreements but the OFT 
recognised that their effect was irreversible, yet decided not to increase the penalty on that 
account. Directors and senior managers were involved in the infringements. 
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The OFT considered the fact that bid rigging was widespread in the UK, and the practice by 
some tenderers to require bidders to complete bona fide tender certificates did not prevent bid 
rigging from occurring in these cases. As a deterrent OFT considered raising the penalty in 
the case of larger companies, and no reductions by way of adjustment for financially smaller 
ones. 
Most of the parties had entered into multiple infringements, and their penalties were increased 
by a multiple of 10, incrementally for each additional breach. The OFT held that the 
infringements were capable of altering the structure of competition in the UK by removing 
competition from the competitive tendering process in each of the markets 
Despite the OFT stressing on the seriousness of the infringement, seven of the parties were 
granted leniency in differing degrees. Briggs, the party that received full immunity due to a 
leniency application, had three previous convictions for similar breaches, and found to have 
engaged in five infringements in the current investigation, but had their penalty reduced to nil.  
Three other parties, Pirie, Walker, and Rio, who had previous convictions also received 
leniency in the range of 55 per cent, 45 per cent and 25 per cent respectively. Another party, 
Rock, was involved in 17 infringements in the current case, but was granted 40 per cent 
leniency, and another party, Cambridge which had five infringements was granted 25 per cent 
leniency, whereas Makers and Coverite who had only one infringement each did not receive 
any leniency.  One of the parties, Durable, asked to treat with caution the statement of another 
party, Rock, because they were recipients of leniency.487 
The OFT noted that the customers in the case were all local authorities which meant public 
money was spent on all of the contracts. Ultimately, the cost would be borne by the consumers 
by way of (Council) tax and the damage to consumers was not quantifiable.  
One additional point worthy of note in the OFT Decision (which went on to 227 pages and 916 
paragraphs) is the seemingly dominant part played by the recipient of total immunity, Briggs, 
who argued that the product market should be redefined, which proposition takes up 14 
paragraphs for the OFT to deal with,488 before setting out the product market according to its 
own reasoning. None of the other parties disputed the product market. Also, Briggs made no 
representations in respect of two additional breaches in their Statement of Objections, giving 
rise to doubts about awarding full leniency to them, but later made written and oral 
representations that they were covered by the leniency application, which the OFT accepted 
as satisfactory.    
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Some of the parties appealed, the CAT upheld the OFT Decision. No Leniency applications 
were made prior to the OFT investigation in the case, although total immunity was granted to 
one party, with reduced fines given to some others. 
                               
5.20 Flat-roofing Services in the West Midlands489  - (cover pricing)  
The OFT found that a number of roofing contractors in the West Midlands area had colluded 
in relation to making tender bids for flat roofing contracts, and therefore, infringed the Chapter 
I prohibition. The OFT started the investigation on receiving information regarding the alleged 
infringement (source not disclosed). One of the ten parties involved, Ruberoid, applied for 
leniency on behalf of its subsidiary Briggs, before the start of the formal investigation, and as 
a result obtained 100 per cent leniency. Another party, Howard Evans, making a late leniency 
application was granted 50 per cent leniency. 
Having decided in June 2002 that there were reasonable grounds that a collusive tendering 
cartel was operating, the OFT made unannounced visits to the premises of the parties in 
September 2002. Various documents including tender documents, fax messages, hand 
written lists, and letters recovered were relied on as evidence by the OFT. Some of the parties 
provided voluntary statements at different stages of the investigation. The parties were found 
to have been engaged in the infringements during the period between 2000 and 2002, and 
this case appears to be the beginning of the series of OFT construction industry investigations.  
The parties were in the business of providing flat roofing contracting services, which means 
the supply of repair, maintenance and improvement (RMI) services in relation to flat roofs.  
The market was fragmented, and personnel to work in the roofing industry were scarce, so it 
was hard for new players to enter the market. The OFT found the infringements to be 
individual, discrete and not the most serious examples of collusive tendering. None of the 
parties had a leading market share. The duration of the infringements was less than a year. 
The OFT found that the practice of cover pricing was endemic in the industry.490  
The contracts in question involved schools, a community library, shopping centre and a car 
park. Local authorities were significant purchasers of these services. Local authorities make it 
clear in their invitations to tender that any form of collusive tendering is unacceptable. Further, 
                                                          
489 OFT Decision No. CA98/1/2004, Collusive tendering in relation to contracts for flat-roofing services in the 
West Midlands, (Case CP/0001-02), 16 March 2004. 
490 Ibid, para 394. 
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local authority tendering is subject to EU and UK public procurement rules. The OFT 
considered collusive tendering to be a most serious breach, the OFT chairman stating that 
collusive tendering deprives customers of the benefits of competition.  
Tendering procedures are designed to provide competition in areas where it is otherwise 
absent. An essential feature of the system is that prospective suppliers prepare, and submit 
tenders or bids independently. Tenders submitted as joint activities are likely to have an 
appreciable effect on competition.491 
The relevant product market was the supply of RMI services for flat roofs and the relevant 
geographic market was the West Midlands area.  
The immunity recipient Briggs was involved in a total of 13 infringements, and senior 
management and directors were involved in at least some of the breaches. Howard Evans 
had engaged in 10 infringements, and a director was also involved. Most of the other parties 
had senior management and, some directors involved in the infringements. All parties had 
fines imposed on them with Briggs’ fine reduced to zero due to full immunity being granted. 
The OFT decision was appealed to the CAT by two of the parties. CAT upheld the OFT 
decision in its entirety in one case,492 but refused costs to the OFT.493 The CAT also upheld 
the decision in the other case, but reduced the fine by half due to the appellant not having had 
an annual turnover in the relevant year.494   
A Leniency application was submitted by the total immunity recipient only after the preliminary 
investigation was started by the OFT, but before the formal investigation. 
5.21 Felt and Single Ply North East case495 - (cover pricing) 
The OFT in its Decision of 16 March 2005 found seven roofing contractors colluded in relation 
to tender bids in felt and single ply flat roofing contracts in the North East of England, thereby 
infringing the Chapter I prohibition.  
Felt products dominate in the flat roofing industry, and accounted for approximately 80 per 
cent of the flat roofing industry from 1999 until 2003 (para 27). Industrial and commercial 
                                                          
491 OFT Guideline 401 ‘The Chapter I prohibition’ March 1999, para 3.14. 
492 See Apex Asphalt and Paving Co. Ltd v Office of Fair Trading, [2005] CAT 4. 
493 See Apex Asphalt and Paving Co Ltd v Office of Fair Trading, [2005] CAT 11; [2005] ALL ER (D) 270 (Apr). 
494 See Richard W. Price (Roofing Contractors) Ltd v Office of Fair Trading, [2005] CAT 5. 
495 OFT Decision No. CA98/02/2005, Collusive tendering for felt and single ply flat-roofing contracts in the North 
East of England, (Case CE/1777-02) 16 March 2005. 
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construction of the roofing industry accounted for 74 percent of the total roofing industry in the 
UK in 1999 and in 2003 it accounted for 79 per cent of the total roofing industry.496  This growth 
was believed to be due to increased construction of supermarkets, out of town retail parks and 
warehouses. The value of the industry was £1625.6 million between 1999 and 2003.497 
However, the roofing contracting industry was highly fragmented, with approximately 74 per 
cent of companies having a turnover of less than £250,000 in 2003. Only 8 per cent of the 
industry had turnovers of over £1 million in 2002 and 2003 (para 30) although 50 companies 
had turnovers of more than £5 million in 2002 and 60 companies had more than £5 million in 
2003498 
The case was initiated due to the information provided by the company Briggs who disclosed 
this information in a previous case,499 concerning collusion among roofing contractors in the 
West Midlands that the same practice was happening in the North East. Briggs consequently 
was granted full leniency. This case was another of a series of construction industry cases 
that the OFT had been investigating over a number of years. The first of the leniency 
applicants, Briggs continued to enjoy full immunity through all the subsequent cases.      
The OFT searched the premises of seven companies on warrant to seize documents, in 
January 2003. Documents consisted of faxes, tender bids, analysis sheets, diary entries, hand 
written notes, letters, and invoices in relation to the contracts in question. 
Tendering procedures are designed to provide competition in areas where it might otherwise 
be absent. An essential feature of the system is that prospective candidates submit tenders 
or bids independently. Any tenders submitted as the result of collusive activities which reduce 
the uncertainty of the outcome, would have an appreciable effect on competition.500 
The relevant product market in this case was the supply of installation, repair, maintenance 
and improvement (IRMI) services for a variety of flat roof weatherproofing coverings (OFT 
redefined an earlier market definition made in the Midlands Roofing case, due to having 
received more information since then). The relevant geographic market was the North East of 
England.  
                                                          
496 Ibid, paras 28-29. 
497 Market Business Development Limited report, ‘Roofing Materials and Contracting (Industrial Report) – UK’, 
April 2004.        
498 Market Business Development Limited report, ‘Roofing Materials and Contracting (Industrial Report)’, October 
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The effect of bidding markets goes beyond the short period in which the tendering process is 
carried out. Once the tender is awarded, the contract work then carried on cannot be rectified.  
There were a number of contracts the parties were involved in, the value of which ranged from 
approximately £20,000 to over £700,000. Local authorities were significant purchasers of 
IRMIs, and some of the contracts were in respect of schools and churches. Cover pricing was 
a widely encountered phenomenon in the roofing industry according to evidence of some of 
the parties. 
The recipient of total immunity, Briggs was involved in 3 infringements. Roofclad, the recipient 
of 50 per cent leniency was one of the only two parties in the case who were involved in only 
one infringement. All the other parties were involved in infringements ranging from 2 to 4. 
Hylton, who had taken part in 3 infringements was granted 35 per cent leniency. The penalty 
imposed on one party, Single Ply, who had no turnover and had gone into administration, was 
not recoverable and therefore reduced to nil. Senior managers and directors were involved in 
the breaches. 
No Leniency applications were made before the investigation in this case too.                                        
                                                                      
5.22 Mastic Asphalt Flat-roofing Contracts in Scotland501  
Four contractors were involved in price-fixing agreements in relation to the supply of 
installation, repair, maintenance and improvement (IRMI) services for mastic asphalt 
coverings for flat roofs (and other flat surfaces) in Scotland. The parties were engaged in 
various collusive tendering agreements, in relation to the tender prices submitted to local 
authorities and private undertakings for the supply of IRMIs. The OFT searched premises of 
three of the parties on warrants obtained from the Court of Session in Scotland in November 
2002. Documents seized included tender bids, faxes, letters, and other related evidence. 
The information about the collusion was received by the OFT, owing to one of the parties, 
Briggs, disclosing the information in another investigation relating to roofing contractors in the 
West Midlands.502 When a purchaser wished to purchase services for a flat roof, it typically 
invited a number of suitably qualified contractors to submit tender bids detailing the price at 
which they could undertake the work specified in order to have competition between 
                                                          
501 OFT Decision No. CA98/01/2005, Collusive tendering for mastic asphalt flat-roofing contracts in Scotland, 
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502 OFT Decision No. CA98/1/2004, ‘Collusive tendering in relation to contracts for flat-roofing services in the 
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contractors, and obtain a competitive price. Hence any co-operation and co-ordination 
between the contractors in order to set the tender prices had the object of preventing, 
restricting or distorting the intended competition. Public authority tendering is subject to EU 
and UK public procurement rules. In paragraph 41 of its Decision the OFT sets out four types 
of anticompetitive arrangements which can result in collusive tendering. 
The relevant product market was the supply of installation, repair, maintenance and 
improvement services for a variety of flat roof weatherproofing coverings. The relevant 
geographic market was Scotland. The duration of the agreement, according to the evidence 
before the OFT, was not greater than one year. In this case, the duration was calculated to be 
less than one year. However, the OFT considered that the concept of duration was of less 
significance in bidding markets compared to fixed-price markets, because its effect, once a 
contract has been awarded, was irreversible in relation to that tender.  
Local authorities were significant purchasers whose budgets invariably constituted funds 
collected from the tax payers, even considering government subsidies. The result being any 
extra cost would have to be passed onto the local taxpayers. It was not possible (for the OFT) 
to quantify the amount of loss caused to the customers. 
All parties in the case had engaged in multiple infringements, and the OFT increased the 
penalties by a multiple of 10 for each additional infringement. Briggs, who had 5 breaches, 
received 100 per cent immunity, so the penalty was reduced to nil. Another party, Pirie who 
had 11 infringements was granted 55 per cent leniency as the first to apply for leniency, and 
voluntarily providing information relating to a separate product market under the ‘leniency plus’ 
scheme. Walker, who had 10 infringements, was given 45 per cent leniency, and the fourth 
and final party, Lenaghen who only had 3 breaches obtained 35 per cent leniency.  
No Leniency applications were made before the investigation in the case.                     
5.23 Felt and Single Ply Roofing Western-Central Scotland503 
Six roofing contractors were found to have breached Chapter I prohibition by agreeing to fix 
prices through collusive tendering in Western-Central Scotland and were fined a total of 
£258,576 reduced to £138,515 by leniency. The range of customers affected was diverse and 
included a hospital, and a school. 
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Information received from Briggs (a party involved in most of the construction cases), in a 
previous related case in 2001 (‘West Midlands case’) led to the Scottish roofing investigation 
(March 2005), which in turn provided information relating to the current investigation and 
further separate investigations.  
As the first applicant for leniency, and for providing information in a previous investigation, one 
of the parties, Pirie who was involved in seven infringements, was granted full immunity. A 
second party, Walker who was involved in 5 infringements was granted 45 per cent leniency. 
There were two directors of Walker involved in the breaches which was taken as an 
aggravating factor resulting in an increase in the penalty for Walker. But a reduction was also 
made for Walker for taking remedial action. The other parties did not apply for leniency but 
received undisclosed reductions in fines for cooperating with the investigation.  
In November 2002, OFT entered and searched the premises of two of the parties, Pirie and 
Walker, on warrants obtained from Court of Session in Scotland. Unannounced visits were 
made to the premises of several other parties in October 2003. As a result of these searches 
documents relating to the contracts including tender documents, faxes, letters and minutes of 
board meeting were seized. Statement of Objections were sent in January 2005 to all the 
parties.    
The different parties in the case were involved in different numbers of contracts, and the OFT 
considered the collusion in relation to tenders for each individual contract as discrete 
infringements. The services of contractors who specialise in flat roofing are usually procured 
through competitive tendering process whereby local authorities, and private managing agents 
along with architects and surveyors invite a number of contractors to submit sealed 
competitive bids. An essential feature of the tendering system is that prospective suppliers 
prepare and submit tenders or bids independently. Tendering procedures are designed to 
provide competition in areas where it might otherwise be absent. 
The OFT maintained that the relevant product market for the purpose of its decision, to be the 
supply of installation, repair, maintenance and improvement services for felt and single ply 
coverings for flat roofs. Walker disputed at length the OFT’s definition of the product market 
in the case (leading to the addition of paragraphs from 57 to 71). The relevant geographic 
market was Western-Central Scotland. Duration for each of the infringements was taken as 
less than one year.                                                                                                    
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While it was difficult to estimate the actual gain achieved by the parties, the potential gains 
may be derived not only from the contracts through higher margins, but also from alterations 
to the ongoing relationships with customers.  
Local authorities were significant customers. Scarce resources are diverted from elsewhere 
in the public sector, lowering welfare, and in the roofing market itself there would be less 
incentives to compete by lowering costs and innovation. Even if customers do not end up 
directly facing higher prices in the short term, the foreseeable effect of the restriction or in 
some cases complete removal of competition from tender process will lead to consumer 
detriment through inefficiencies.504       
No Leniency applications before the investigation were submitted.                                                
 
5.24 Construction Industry cases505 - bid rigging 
After nearly a seven-year investigation into 103 construction companies, the OFT fined the 
parties £129.2 million for contract bidding between 1 March 2000 and 31 December 2006. 
This was by far the largest investigation undertaken by the OFT. Some of the companies 
included were the biggest names in the UK construction industry. The OFT found that the 
parties were involved in one or more infringements in bid rigging activities comprising cover 
pricing, and/or agreements to pay compensation to a competing bidder, thereby contravening 
the Chapter I prohibition.  
The OFT dealt with 199 specific infringements in which the parties had engaged in, imposing 
financial penalties on each of the parties in respect of a maximum of three infringements. The 
OFT offered the companies an extended period of three years in which to pay their penalty, 
subject to payment of interest on the outstanding balance. Thirty-seven of the parties involved 
were granted leniency while discounts were given to non-leniency parties who accepted the 
OFT’s Fast Track Offer (FTO).     
Having first received information from an auditor in Nottingham,506 the OFT started this 
investigation into the industry. The OFT made visits to 57 of the premises in 2005 and 2006, 
and obtained a considerable quantity of electronic material using its ‘seize and sift’ powers 
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under the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (CJPA).507 Specific evidence of tender forms 
which were stand-alone evidence, and tender logs were found.  
The OFT chose to proceed with up to a maximum of three infringements per company as it 
considered three proven instances of bid rigging by a company was sufficient to establish a 
pattern of behaviour, and also in order to balance the OFT’s objectives of completing its 
investigation whilst sending a clear deterrence message. The OFT was mindful of the 
additional resources and time that would be required, and the quality of evidence available. 
Consequently, even where parties had admitted to more than three infringements on being 
granted leniency (there were potentially a total of 425 suspect tenders), three infringements 
with quality evidence were deemed sufficient for each party. 
The investigation led to the revelation that cover pricing was endemic in the construction 
industry, to the extent that it had become normal practice in the industry.508 One party (Thomas 
Vale) even produced an economic report commissioned by them, stating that it would be 
perverse to impose penalties on the parties as that would restrict competition in the same 
market that the alleged conduct was deemed to restrict competition. Some parties suggested 
the OFT should have educated the industry rather than conducting an investigation. 
The OFT rejected these assertions by some of the parties, but recognised that there were 
several features of the case that would militate against imposing penalties at the highest 
possible level. The OFT, therefore, placed the starting point at a lower level at Step 1 for all 
parties. 
In its 1,834 paged decision, the OFT concluded the product market to be the provision of 
construction works in an identifiable sector of work, and named 15 sectors relating to the 
relevant product market. The geographic market was determined as the Government Office 
Regions, naming the 8 regional areas concerned in the case. 
Six of the infringements involved what is called ‘compensation’ payments, four of which were 
payments made by companies providing cover price to the company receiving it in the event 
the former won the tender. In the other two, the companies agreed that the winner would pay 
the loser a specific sum for the cost of tendering even where no cover pricing may have been 
provided, and each company submitted competitive bids. The OFT considered the 
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infringements involving compensation payments to be more serious than those involving 
‘simple’ cover pricing. 
Twenty-five of the companies appealed to the CAT on the amount of penalty, and every one 
of those appellants had the amount of their fines greatly reduced (89 per cent) by the CAT or, 
in some cases dismissed altogether. The first in receipt of the largest fine, Kier Group had 
their fine reduced by 90 per cent on appeal.509 A FTSE 250 construction group’s fine was 
reduced from £17.9 million to £1.7 million. Two other appellants had their fines wiped out, as 
the CAT concluded that the OFT had not proven liability. Some fines appear to have been 
reduced without any reasoned basis of a method of calculation.510 The CAT ordered the OFT 
to pay huge costs to the successful appellants.511  
However, 78 of the companies whose fines totalled up to 50 million did not appeal, having 
accepted leniency or a ‘fast-track offer’ from the OFT to reduce their fines if they accepted 
liability and did not appeal the decision. 
The CAT was critical of the OFT’s new Penalties Order allowing the relevant financial year to 
be taken as the year before the decision was taken, rather than the year before the 
infringement ended. The OFT had made that change following the new Guidance of 2004, 
although there appears no specific reference to adopting such a change. The CAT found in 
favour of most of the appellants’ arguments, even as it agreed with the OFT that the appellants 
had infringed the Chapter I prohibition. The CAT went so far as to observe that the OFT should 
have recognised that the practice of cover pricing was long-standing in the industry and widely 
regarded as legitimate. The CAT proceeded to adjust the penalties, albeit with a warning for 
such future activities by companies.512   
Leniency applicants in the case did not come forward prior to the investigation.   
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5.25 Construction Recruitment Forum case513    
The OFT concluded that seven recruitment agencies had engaged in anticompetitive conduct 
by:  a) Collective boycott by way of an agreement to withdraw, and or refrain from entering 
into contracts with an intermediary company, Parc UK, for the supply of candidates to 
construction companies in the UK and, b) Price-fixing, by way of an agreement and or 
concerted practice to fix target fee rates for the supply of candidates to intermediaries and 
certain construction companies in the UK, during the period from 21 October 2004 to 26 
January 2006. 
The OFT found that the conduct formed one single overall infringement of Chapter I of the CA 
98, having as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the relevant 
product market, which was the market for the supply by recruitment agencies of candidates 
with professional, managerial, trade, and labour skills required by the construction industry in 
the UK. The OFT considered in this case that the infringement consisted of both price fixing 
and collective refusal to supply candidates. 
Parc UK entered the market in 2003 with a new and innovative business model to act as an 
intermediary between construction companies, and different recruitment agencies for the 
supply of candidates, which put pressure on the margins of recruitment agencies. This new 
approach did not go down well with the recruitment agencies, and instead of competing with 
Parc UK, and with one another on price and quality, the parties formed a cartel, referred to as 
the ‘Construction Recruitment Forum’ which met five times between 2004 and 2006. The 
forum agreed to boycott Parc UK, and also cooperated to fix the fee rates they would charge 
to intermediaries such as Parc UK and also certain construction companies. 
The OFT granted full immunity from fines to one of the parties, HMG, as the first of the group 
to approach OFT for leniency, and provide evidence of the cartel to the OFT (Their fine was 
the biggest in this decision, before being reduced to nil owing to full immunity). HMG was also 
found to be the instigator of the infringement. All other parties of the group also applied for 
leniency, and were granted leniency ranging from 35 per cent to 20 per cent reduction in their 
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penalties (apart from one party that went into liquidation), depending on the overall value 
added by the respective party to the OFT’s investigation.  
OFT’s investigation revealed that in 2004, construction activity accounted for 6.2 per cent of 
the total UK Gross Value Added Product. In 2005 the value of construction output in the UK 
was £107 billion, and by 2006 this value had risen to £114 billion, a rise of 13 per cent as from 
2001.514 Companies active in the construction industry require candidates with a range of craft 
and trade skills, and there had been a serious skills shortage over a period of time, in particular 
during the infringement. The wages and vacancies had increased due to the shortage, and 
the situation put recruitment agencies in a strong position. Construction companies enter into 
contractual relationships with recruitment agencies, paying a fee, usually contingent upon the 
successful appointment of a candidate. 
The investigation began on 20 December 2005. OFT visited the premises of each of the 
parties involved, in June 2006, and documents were taken from all the sites visited. The OFT 
found copies of documents, signed agreement, minutes, internal communications, emails, and 
a telling internal presentation by one of the parties.515 One specific minute action pointed to 
‘instigate cartel meeting to counter ...’516 In October 2008, the OFT issued Statements of 
Objections to the parties concerned. 
All parties had directors or senior managers involved in the infringement, gaining uplifts in the 
penalty. However, by taking compliance measures they also gained reductions in the 
penalties. The OFT gave its decision in September 2009.  
Three parties appealed on the amount of penalty, CAT reduced their penalties significantly. 
One party, Hays had their penalty reduced from £30.36 million to £5.88 million.517 The CAT 
again criticised the OFT’s penalty guidance on a number of fronts including the use of MDT, 
stating that it was an inappropriately mechanistic and narrow approach. This was despite the 
CAT accepting the use of MDT in at least two previous cases. The CAT also did not explain 
itself how the reductions in the penalties were calculated. 
MDT was applied in the OFT decision in Collusive tendering for flat roof and car park surfacing 
contracts in England and Scotland,518 and on appeal by one of the parties, the CAT accepted 
that MDT was a reasonable approach519 and therefore MDT was not in question in that case 
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and the appeal was dismissed, Michael Blair QC dissenting who quoted ‘There is no bright 
line between arithmetical mistakes and mistakes of methodology.’  
The OFT states in paragraph 2.64 of the Decision that it informed one of the defendant 
companies of the action about to be taken against them and a leniency application was made 
by that company. In paragraph 2.164, the OFT states that the investigation was started due to 
an application, made in November 2005, by another company which then merged to form this 
new company that submitted the current leniency application. From a reading of the 
constituent parties of the company that received total immunity,520 it is apparent that the first 
leniency applicant was well aware of the impending merger,521 and the senior officers were 
the same who moved from one to the other.522 A merger may be  subject to review under EA 
02 (as amended by ERRA), and consequently must be in accordance with OFT/CMA 
Guidance523 procedure which means any anticompetitive behaviour is bound to be revealed 
during the process which, in this instance taking two and a half years.524 It can safely be said 




The cases summarised in this chapter are Chapter I, CA 98 decisions investigated and 
published by the OFT between 2001 and April 2012, numbering 24. Of the 24 cases, 2 were 
clearance applications which did not warrant leniency applications.525 Of the remaining 22 
cases, only four cases made leniency applications prior to the OFT investigation started. And 
of these four cases, two parties had already been found out or targeted by other legal 
entities,526 hence it can safely be assumed that they only came forward because the danger 
of an investigation was looming. The third application was submitted just prior to a merger 
which would eventually have discovered the breach due to legal scrutiny.527 This leaves only 
one application, Barclays,528 that was soundly voluntary, by coming forward before the OFT 
was aware of the existence of a cartel.  There again the application was made after the Head 
of Team who was responsible had left. The applications in the remaining 18 cases were made 
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after the OFT started an investigation. Clearly, therefore, leniency by itself does not bring 
cases to court. 
Most of the cases dealt with in this chapter involve price fixing, and in the constructions sector 
cases the offences concern mostly bid rigging or cover pricing, involving a large number of 
construction companies. It is noteworthy that the construction cases, and some of the other 
cases came to light only after the infringements had ended. Had the OFT been actively 
engaged in ex officio investigations, it is possible that some of the infringements could have 
been detected earlier, and perhaps reduced the damage caused.  
Notwithstanding the grant of leniency, most of the cases dragged on for years, some over 5 
to 8 years, which means the scarce resources of the OFT were taken away from ex officio 
investigations. This was further aggravated by some of the parties granted leniency appealing 
the OFT decision, thereby extending even more time and, the ensuing greater expenditure 
(resources).  
A surprise finding from these cases is that the long held belief that evidence on cartel 
behaviour is hard to find, is proved to be no longer true, possibly due to the use of electronic 
messaging by the cartelists. Significantly, most of the evidence was gathered by the OFT 
using its powers of seize and sift.  
Importantly, even after total immunity has been granted, some defendants were found to have 
lied or concealed evidence at the investigation stage, bringing into question the reliability of 
the evidence provided by leniency applicants.529  
Except for the one case, Lladro, where the OFT does not specify the positions held by those 
involved in the breach, in all other cases there were senior management involved, including 
directors, senior executives, Chief Executives and even four Chairmen.530  
In all the cases where leniency was granted, and even in some cases where no leniency was 
granted, the parties were allowed confidentiality regarding their business secrets and 
accounts, with such information redacted from the case records. Leniency also comes with 
the proviso of nondisclosure of the leniency documents other than with the consent of the 
party/parties providing them, which prevents victims accessing them in private actions. It is 
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also noteworthy that those companies granted full immunity are protected from criminal 
prosecution. Thus the infringing companies can keep the profits of their illegal activities on full 
leniency being granted, and in addition they do not have to pay any costs towards the 
investigation proceedings, with complete immunity granted from fines or prosecution.  
 
Another important feature revealed in the cases is the procedural difficulties faced in arriving 
at assessing the penalties which meant the CAT reducing or quashing the penalties imposed 
by the OFT in a number of cases. The law relating to proving anticompetitive behaviour also 
seems very complex, and the CAT decisions do not shine any clear light on those very 
difficulties faced by the OFT. The case records themselves are heavily redacted to afford 
confidentiality to the offending parties which makes it difficult to ascertain the true procedural 
framework applied in the OFT decisions. As has been pointed out by the Court of Appeal in 
the Replica Football Kit531 case, a balanced judgement cannot be arrived at without the full 
picture being presented to Court, where the full leniency applicant is absent. 
 
The evaluation of the OFT cases studied in Chapter 5 are taken up in Chapter 6 that follows, 
which will deduce that leniency although granted generously, has not been the prime detection 















                                                          







Assessment and Evaluation of the OFT cases 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will assess and evaluate the Chapter I, CA 98 cases discussed in chapter 5 which 
forms the core chapter of this thesis. Most of these Chapter I, CA 98 cases are price fixing 
cartels, with some involved in more than one offence such as market sharing, restricting 
market entry or bid rigging and compensation payments. The biggest case was from the 
construction industry where 103 companies were found to have breached the law. 
Interestingly, anticompetitive behaviour does not appear to be restricted to the usual industry 
sectors but has even extended to the private schools sector.  
The important conclusion that is deduced from the pattern of leniency applications by the 
cases studied in Chapter 5, is that undertakings do not rush out with leniency applications in 
order to confess and seek immunity. 
Apart from the one applicant Barclays,532 in the banking sector, none of the others came 
forward willingly prior to the instigation of an investigation by the OFT. Two of the applicants 
came forward because, one had already been found out by another legal entity,533 and the 
other was aware that they would come under investigation in another jurisdiction.534 Another 
party tendered a leniency application just before notifying a merger with an associate 
company.535 The surprising outcome of the analysis of these cases is that, there were 
considerable amount of documentary evidence in all the cases which belies the claim that  it 
is difficult to obtain hard evidence in cartel cases. This outcome in effect destroys the very 
basis of the introduction of the Leniency Programme. The other claim, that leniency saves the 
limited resources of the enforcement authorities has also shown up to be untrue, judging by 
the length of time taken by these decisions. The longer a case continues more and more 
resources need to be utilised. Even with full immunity granted, some of the investigations took 
                                                          
532 See section 5.15, Loan products.   
533 See sec. 5.9, Stock check pad. 
534 See sec 5.11, Airline fuel surcharge. 
535 See sec. 5.25, Construction Recruitment Forum. 
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an inordinate length of time to conclude,536 which means more resources had to be used by 
way of staff, funds and time, thereby taking resources away from other interventionary cases.  
This chapter will also discuss findings by academics, and organisations that could further 
assist the study on leniency and possible solutions for enhancing enforcement.  
6.2 Questions Arising from the OFT Practices 
Perusal of the various OFT case records show inordinately long details of the evidence, both 
oral and documentary. Every word, every nuance or any little deviation or transgression has 
been given much detailed explanation irrespective of whether they are relevant to the case in 
hand or not. The result, in part, is the obvious length of time it has taken for the case to be 
concluded, some up to eight or more years, in one case even leading the OFT to make 
reductions in the penalty imposed, to compensate for the excessive time taken to conclude 
the investigation.537 The excessive time spent in reasoning and explaining is not the only 
problem, as has been evident in the appeal cases. This has left room for the counsel for the 
appellants to pick on the slightest discrepancy, even attempting to interpret words in a different 
context because the same word was not used consistently when referring to a certain item or 
a statement, leading again to lengthy discourse.538  
In the only Court of Appeal (CA) decision relating to the cases discussed in Chapter 5, Argos 
and Replica Football kit,539 it was, therefore, a relief to note that the CA observed, and mildly 
admonished both the OFT and the CAT for the protracted nature of their decisions. 
The CA quoted Griffith L J in Eagil Trust Co Ltd,540 endorsed by the Court of Appeal as being 
of general application in English v Emery Reimbold,541 as applicable to such a judgement of 
the Tribunal as to any other.542  
Griffiths LJ said: 
‘[A] judge should give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the Court of Appeal the 
principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision. 
They need not be elaborate. I cannot stress too strongly that there is no duty on a 
judge, in giving his reasons, to deal with every argument presented by counsel in 
                                                          
536 See sec 5.6, Aluminium spacer bars; See also sec 5.17 Tobacco.  
537 Tobacco case, sec 5.17. 
538 MasterCard case, sec 5.14. 
539 Joined Cases,Argos Ltd and Littlewoods Ltd v Office of Fair Trading, JJB Sports Plc v Office of Fair 
Trading,(Replica Football kit) [2006] EWCA Civ 1318, paras [4]-[6].             
540 Eagil Trust Co Ltd v Pigott-Brown [1985] 3 All ER 119, [122]. 
541 English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605, [2002] 1 W.L.R. 2409. 
542 See n 540, para 5.  
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support of his case. It is sufficient if what he says shows the parties, and if need be, 
the Court of Appeal the basis on which he has acted… (see Sachs LJ in Knight v Clifton 
[1971] Ch 700 at 721).’ 
The CA went on to say that the same applied to findings of fact, and that the Tribunal may 
need not make a finding on every disputed factual issue.543 Nor is it always necessary for the 
CAT to set out each party’s submissions in detail before explaining its reasons for deciding 
the case. The CA hoped, in future, decisions would be more succinct, having regard to Griffith 
LJ’s quote. However, neither the OFT nor the CAT appeared to have paid attention to the CA’s 
observations, and continued in the same vein in the cases that followed.  
In relation to the grant of immunity, the CA’s decision stated that the position between the 
parties was unlikely to be ever clear since the OFT does not reveal the reasons for granting 
immunity to one party in the same cartel.544 This is an important observation, because 
immunity leaves not only other participants in the dark but more importantly, the victims have 
no way of knowing how the breach may have affected them. 
It should be added that evaluation of the OFT cases is made even harder due to redaction of 
evidence provided by not only the leniency recipients but other parties as well, where their 
sensitive business interests are concerned. Comparison of penalties is also impossible due to 
redaction of turnover of the relevant financial year as well as the percentages increased or 
decreased at the calculation stage. 
The OFT, nevertheless must be given credit for attempting to play the difficult role of 
investigator, prosecutor and adjudicator all at the same time. This probably explains why the 
OFT finds it necessary to record all events, explaining every single detail in each of the 
investigations concerned.    
As for the much praised leniency programme which is supposed to encourage infringers to 
come forward on their own accord, only four such applicants came forward prior to the OFT 
starting an investigation. Of these, there is only one example of a purely voluntary application 
made in the Loan Products case.545 Even in that case, a leniency application was submitted 
only after the senior manager responsible for the breach had left Barclays. Of the others, Stock 
check pad case,546 had no option but to come forward, as a legal team had already found 
them out. The next nearest to a voluntary application is that of VAA, who, suspecting what 
                                                          
543 Ibid, para 6. 
544 Ibid, para 290. 
545 See sec 5.15, Loan products (OFT Decision No. CA98/01/2011). 
546 See sec 5.9, Stock Check Pads, (OFT Decision No. CA98/03/2006). 
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was coming due to the US investigation into BA’s surcharge case, tendered an application, 
seemingly to undercut BA in a parallel UK investigation. Even then, having obtained full 
immunity, VAA suppressed or withheld some of its evidence, giving rise to the failure of the 
OFT initiated first ever criminal case. In Construction Recruitment Forum,547 the application 
came just prior to the company giving notice of a merger, which meant that it would be subject 
to legal scrutiny.  None of the other OFT cases provide an example of anyone voluntarily 
approaching the OFT with an application before an inquiry has started.  
 
If leniency programme was meant to gather hard evidence without the enforcement authority 
having to search for it, the question also arises why most of the OFT investigations had 
dragged on for years when parties had been granted full immunity or part immunity for 
providing the necessary information. Longer the investigation, costlier it is for all parties 
concerned. Recognising this fact, the BIS submits one of its policy objects for new reforms as, 
‘Improve Speed and Predictability’.548 BIS continues, ‘The government is concerned that 
antitrust cases take too long, and result in too few decisions, thus having less deterrent effect 
on anti-competitive activity than they should.’549 
Having obtained part leniency and cooperating fully, some of the parties then went on to 
appeal the OFT decision.550 When challenged on the amount of penalty, in almost all the 
cases, the CAT has granted huge reductions or in some cases has quashed the penalty 
decision altogether, ordering the OFT to pay huge costs wherever the appellant was 
successful. The appeals take almost the form of a new trial, sometimes allowing new 
witnesses with cross examinations so that appeals themselves elongate the whole antitrust 
decisional procedure, thereby incurring further costs. 
In the Construction551 cases, the same party was given full immunity in successive multiple 
infringement cases, because that party provided information relating to the first case on 
granting immunity. This prompted some participants to complain that they were treated 
unfairly.552 
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549 Ibid, para 5 at 45. 
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6.2.1 Reliability of Leniency Witnesses 
An intriguing example of relying on the evidence of leniency applicants can be seen in the 
Airline fuel surcharges553 case, when the OFT tried to bring criminal charges on four airline 
executives. At the trial at Southwark Crown Court, it emerged that a large amount of email 
correspondence in the possession of Virgin Atlantic Airlines (VAA), the whistleblower in the 
OFT’s investigation, had not been disclosed to the OFT in its civil investigation. VAA had been 
granted full immunity in the case. The result was that the OFT could not produce any evidence 
as against these new revelations, and the case collapsed.554 The OFT came under much 
criticism by the defence, in addition to the humiliation of the failure of its first ever attempt at 
initiating a criminal prosecution.555 Had the material been disclosed to the OFT by VAA at the 
outset, the criminal trial could have been continued to its conclusion. 
The OFT subsequently reviewed its decision to grant immunity to VAA, with the purpose of 
revoking it. This was because VVA was required to disclose all evidence under the total 
immunity granted to it, but the OFT could not pursue the matter as it had relied too heavily on 
the applicant’s lawyers instead of insisting on taking over all the documents for inspection. 
OFT concluded it was a ‘close call’ (‘a genuine close call’) which did not turn an instance of 
non co-operation into a situation in which there had been co-operation. ‘Rather, it remained 
an instance of non-cooperation, but which was not such as to warrant the revocation of 
immunity.’556  It may well be that the OFT was being wary having taken note of the US 
judgement where the US Court of Appeal dismissed an indictment against Stolt-Nielsen557 
which had received leniency from the Antitrust Divsion. The OFT accepted it had made 
mistakes (blaming itself for the collapse of the case), and appointed a Board Review named 
‘Project Condor Board Review’, in which a number of recommendations were made to reform 
the future handling of cases, including the grant of leniency to applicants, and the response of 
                                                          
553 See sec 5.11, OFT Decision No. CA98/01/2012. 
554 OFT press release, 47/10, ‘OFT withdraws criminal proceeding against current and former BA executives’ 10 
May 2010; Alistair Osborne, ‘Collapsed BA price-fixing trial places OFT and Virgin in the dock’ The Telegraph, 11 
May 2010, (‘As Julian Joshua, a cartel lawyer at Brussels-based Howrey put it: “You are relying largely on 
witnesses who have an agenda. They have to admit they are dishonest and then the prosecution has to bring 
them as witnesses of the truth.")  < www.telegraph.co.uk > last accessed 18.05.2016.                               
555 The earlier Marine Hose case (R v Whittle), the only successful prosecution by the OFT was an off shoot of 
the US Marine Hose case.   
556 OFT’, ‘Virgin Atlantic Airways immunity review – 1398’, December 2011, para 2.10. 
557 Stolt-Nielsen SA et al v United States, No. 05-1480 (US 3rd Cir 2006).  
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the executive management of the OFT.558 In the meantime, it was reported that BA was 
refusing to pay the fine imposed on it by the OFT in its civil investigation, due to the collapse 
of the criminal case against VAA executives.559 
In the Replica Football kit560 appeal cases, it came to the CAT’s attention that some of the 
documents produced at the appeal stage by Allsports had not been disclosed to the OFT, 
whereas the OFT was made to believe Allsports cooperated fully by disclosing all the evidence 
in their possession. The OFT was completely unaware of that fact, and had even reduced their 
penalty by 5 per cent for fully cooperating, and praising them for one single admission (of 
organising a meeting with anti-competitive intent), while they denied having ever infringed CA 
98.561 There had been nondisclosure by Allsports of all the information available to them, with 
only limited admission. The CAT observed that Allsports’ behaviour was ‘open to severe 
criticism’ and revoked the 5 percent reduction awarded to it by the OFT, thereby increasing its 
penalty by the same amount.562 Allsports had not disclosed evidence even to their own lawyers 
at the OFT investigation stage.563 This was the first and the only such action the CAT has 
taken against an appellant in uplifting a penalty so far, albeit indirectly, by revoking the 5 per 
cent discount given by the OFT for cooperation.  
With regard to the JJB Sports appeal in the same case, it came to light that JJB provided 
inaccurate evidence to the OFT, resulting in JJB Sports receiving a lower penalty, prompting 
the CAT to remark that OFT should have imposed a higher penalty on JJB at step 4, for 
pressurising Umbro.564  
The CAT also found that Umbro was not candid and suppressed evidence. Umbro’s evidence 
was incomplete and unreliable in important respects. They were incomplete and incorrect and 
were not offering ‘complete and continuous cooperation’ as required by paragraph 3.8(b) of 
the penalty Guidance.565 Umbro had been awarded 40 percent leniency, but their evidence 
left much to be desired. Further, the CAT found Umbro had given a misleading answer to a 
letter sent to them in the investigation. The CAT found that Umbro resisted disclosure 
whenever it could generally, and the information it supplied to the Tribunal itself was 
                                                          
558 OFT, ‘Project Condor Board Review’, December 2010. 
559 Alistair Osborne, ‘British Airways on collision course with OFT over £121m fuel price-fixing fine’ Telegraph, 31 
July 2011. 
560 See sec 5.16, Football Kit. 
561 Umbro Holdings Limited and others v The Office of Fair Trading, [2005] CAT 22.                                                     
562 Ibid, paras 210, 231 and 234.                                                                                                                
563 Ibid, para 232.  
 
564 Ibid, paras 193 and 203.    
565 Ibid, para 327.                                          
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unsatisfactory.566 In the event, the CAT said no further reduction of the penalty was possible. 
And yet, the CAT reduced Umbro’s penalty by a further 20 percent, because the CAT had 
reduced JJB’s penalty by the same percentage! This was despite the fact that CAT also 
concluded there was insufficient evidence to prove that Umbro was acting under pressure, 
which they claimed. 
According to s 3.2 of the OFT’s penalty guidance, consumer welfare outweighs penalty. The 
CAT in this case appears to take the contrary view. While observing that Allsports’ penalty 
should have been higher for nondisclosure, and remarking that Umbro also was trying to 
suppress evidence before the CAT itself, as it did before the OFT, the CAT nevertheless 
believed these matters should be dealt with by other legal procedures.567  
As for MU (Manchester United), simultaneously with introducing compliance, senior 
executives carried on with the infringement. MU had also given assurances to the OFT 
previously, in 1999, that it would not act in breach of compliance rules. The executives involved 
in the breach did not inform their Chairman, the Company secretary or their lawyers of their 
arrangements.  
The sports sector has clearly disregarded their previous pledges to the OFT that they would 
not act in breach of competition law.  The most rational criteria by which competition law cases 
might be selected would be futile if violation is neither deterred nor remedied. 
The theme of reliance on leniency applicants had come up in the roofing industry cases as 
well, where some parties warned against OFT taking the leniency recipients’ version of 
evidence for granted (Hylton questioned Briggs’ evidence).568 Again, in the West Midlands 
roofing case, Apex questioned Briggs’ evidence,569 Briggs being the biggest winner having 
received total immunity throughout. But the OFT rejected both assertions. 
In the construction sector cases, the parties who were granted full immunity or partial immunity 
continued to receive further immunity in the subsequent related cases. Most of the parties 
were granted leniency for repeat offences. The CAT decisions went even further in the 
construction appeal cases. The CAT admonished the OFT for not taking into account that 
cover pricing in tender bidding was so widespread that it should not have been taken as an 
                                                          
566 Ibid, para 337.  
567 Ibid, para 230. 
568 OFT Decision No. CA98/02/2005, Collusive tendering for felt and single ply flat-roofing contracts in the North 
East of England, para 196.         
569 OFT Decision No. CA98/1/2004, Collusive tendering in relation to contracts for flat-roofing services in the 
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infringement worthy of penalising. This was in spite of the fact that the OFT did lower the 
starting point of the penalty in recognition of the widespread nature of the practice.  
 
6.2.2 OFT’s Biggest Investigation – the Construction Industry cases 
The Construction Industry570 investigation by the OFT started after the receipt of a specific 
complaint in the East Midlands in 2004. Over the next five years it was to spread throughout 
England and Scotland to become one of its largest ever CA 98 investigations, involving 250 
of its staff.571 It was by far the largest investigation undertaken by the OFT, lasting some five 
and a half years. The investigation covered a wide range of projects where customers included 
local councils, schools, universities and hospitals. It involved more than 3,000 suspect 
contracts, in total valued at around £3 billion. More than 1,000 firms were involved but as the 
OFT did not have the resources to pursue them all, the OFT took the decision to focus on only 
103 firms for which it had the most robust evidence. In the circumstances, the OFT decided to 
restrict the number of alleged infringements to only three ‘But for’ infringements per party. In 
March 2007, OFT closed the door on new leniency applicants and issued a ‘fast track offer’ to 
85 firms who had not applied for leniency, in return for admission of liability for specific 
infringements and cooperation with the OFT in other ways, guaranteeing 25 percent reduction 
in penalty. Of these non-leniency parties, 45 accepted the fast track offer. The Guardian 
reported that the total fines imposed by the OFT on the parties only amounted to an average 
of 1.14 per cent of their total global annual turnover.572 
On appeal, the CAT agreed with the OFT that cover pricing is in breach of competition law, 
but felt the practice was less serious and very different from that of ‘bid rigging’. The CAT felt 
that the fines imposed were ‘excessive and disproportionate’ and also did not accept the OFT’s 
method of calculation. The CAT heavily criticised the OFT for applying MDT to groups as 
opposed to one party, so contradicting its own decisions in Apex and Makers, where MDT was 
accepted.573 The exercise of striking a fair balance between deterrence and seriousness is a 
difficult one. But the CAT’s judgement does not throw light on how OFT should have done so. 
                                                          
570 See sec 5.24, OFT Decision No. CA98/02/2009. 
571 See Contract Audit Line, ‘OFT’s Constructions Case’ Contract Audit Line Ltd < www.cal.org > last accessed 
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In particular, the CAT’s own calculations of the appellants’ penalties contain no reasoning at 
all, and do not refer to each company’s turnovers, profits or any indicative cash figures. The 
CAT recommended that the OFT ‘step back’ and ensure that the penalty was proportionate. 
Was CAT’s reduction of Kier Group’s574 penalty by 90 per cent really warranted? Kier Group 
was a company having a much higher turnover than most of the others in the case. Fines for 
the rest of the appellant firms were reduced by 89 percent. Interestingly, the majority, i.e. 78 
of the 103 firms originally named by the OFT, and fined a total of £50 million did not appeal. 
They possibly did not have the resources to appeal, and some had earlier accepted a ‘fast 
track offer’ which reduced their fines.  
Apart from the full immunity party, all other parties came up with any defence they could muster 
in order to obtain a reduced penalty, with one party, Stainforth, claiming that ‘OFT is culpable 
for failing to educate the construction industry that simple cover pricing gave rise to an 
infringement.’575  Some parties claimed that their penalties should be reduced because of the 
charity work and community work they do. Some argued that no material level of construction 
activity had taken place to have any significant effect.576 One party even made an application 
for a judicial review, to reopen the OFT’s fast-track offer, which was rejected by the court.577  
The OFT noted that there was no evidence that the construction industry had reduced 
involvement in cover pricing overall even after its previous roofing decisions.578 But it 
recognised that compliance efforts by the industry such as the Building Magazine’s ‘Rebuilding 
Trust’ campaign, and the UK Construction Group and National Federation of Builders code of 
conduct on competition compliance, were signed up to by a number of the parties. 
Later, the OFT noted that the full immunity recipient had breached its duty under leniency by 
engaging in further cartel activity, but decided not to take action on that occasion.579  
The industry publications gave the impression cover pricing was normal and an acceptable 
practice, hence significantly, more mitigation was allowed by the OFT to the parties. Apart 
from the full immunity recipient, between 65 and 35 percent leniency reductions in penalties 
were given to some while almost all the non leniency parties received reductions for 
cooperation and/or for putting in compliance procedures or other mitigating factors.  Moreover, 
the OFT allowed a 3-year period for the parties to pay the penalties imposed, in consideration 
                                                          
574 Kier Group and others v Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 3. 
575 Ibid, para VI.225. 
576 Ibid, VI.274. 
577 Crest Nicholson Plc v Office of Fair Trading [2009] EWHC 1875 (Admin), para 31. 
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of the financial climate of the time. Having obtained all these concessions and reductions, did 
not stop some parties from appealing to the CAT. 
The CAT took exception to the OFT calculating the starting point of the penalties by taking the 
business year prior to the OFT’s decision rather than the business year prior to the 
infringement ending. The OFT’s reasons for choosing this particular year is not clear, although 
it states that the 10 percent worldwide turnover for the year before the decision was calculated 
in accordance with s 36(8) of CA 98, and the 2000 Order,580 as amended by the 2004 Order.581 
In the next paragraph of its decision, the OFT states that the penalty should not exceed the 
maximum penalty applicable prior to 1 May 2004, i.e. 10 percent in the financial year preceding 
the date when the infringement ended.582 The second category was in respect of the 
infringements occurring prior to the amendment of the Penalty Order. The OFT decisions since 
the amendment had all been decided with the starting point taken as the year before the OFT 
decision, and not as the year prior to the infringement took place.583      
The CAT went to great lengths in order to soothe the appellants’ grievances in the case. In its 
reasoning for reducing Kier Group’s fine by nearly 90 percent, it almost contradicted itself in 
regard to the relevant financial year, and yet pointed an accusing finger at the OFT.584   
At the appeal stage, the OFT relied on interview transcripts while the appellants brought in 
witnesses who were open to cross examination. It is questionable why these witnesses were 
not available at the OFT investigation. 
The CAT gave all appellants the benefit of the submissions as to the relevant year for step 1, 
although only some advanced the argument. Again, some panels (different appeal panels 
were involved) did not hear arguments for the starting point percentage for simple cover 
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6.2.3 Cost Effectiveness of Leniency 
It is interesting to note that even where total immunity was granted, the OFT investigations 
could not be concluded within a short period of time. The shortest case, John Bruce585 which 
took 10 months from the date of issuing the s 26 notice under CA 98, to its conclusion, had no 
leniency applicants, although reductions were given owing to mitigating factors according to 
the penalty Guidance. The longest case, Tobacco586 took 85 months for the OFT investigation 
to conclude although total immunity was granted to one party, and six others entered into early 
settlement agreements. In the end, however, the OFT decision was quashed by the CAT, on 
appeal by some of the other parties in the case.  
On average, Chapter I cases have taken 38.2 months (including appeals).587 Invariably, the 
more time spent involves using more resources, which takes away staff and funds from 
investigating new cases. BIS reports that the costs incurred by the OFT on competition 
enforcement action amounted to around £56.4 million in the year 2009/10 alone.588 The 
amounts may vary according to the case load taken in each year, yet considering the very low 
number of antitrust cases concluded in a given year, expenditure appears excessive. 
However, OFT’s Annual Report and Accounts state that the benefits of the OFT’s overall 
performance to be higher than the estimated costs over time.589  But the BIS admits that, ‘… 
the system for the enforcement of the antitrust prohibitions is not working as well as it should. 
This is illustrated not only by the consultation responses but also by the protracted nature of 
cases and the strong challenge that is often mounted to decisions on appeal.’590 It goes on to 
say that ‘The Government remains concerned that too few cases are taken forward.’591 The 
concern is that the lengthy process and only a few cases will lead to less deterrence and 
diluted economic impact than if there were more cases. This tallies with some of the economic 
arguments, that when there is less ex officio enforcement, businesses are less likely to self-
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report even where immunity is available under leniency.592 Nevertheless, the BIS has decided 
to keep the current arrangements stating, ‘The Government is satisfied that the CMA should 
prosecute in most cases, because of the need to secure consistency in the application of the 
leniency and no action policy which is the bed-rock of many civil and criminal cartel cases.’593 
One of the major reasons for merging the OFT with the former CC to form the current CMA is 
a cost cutting exercise by the government, with BIS expecting a potential cost saving of £4.3 
million.594 The BIS states, ‘ … the length adds cost to the public purse and to those parties 
subject to the investigations.’595 According to BIS, ‘There are difficulties in successfully 
prosecuting antitrust cases at reasonable cost and in reasonable time, … which means that 
the decisional case law is too thin and precedents too few, and the deterrent effect of the 
prohibition is reduced.’596 
 
The second reason in favour of Leniency policy has been that it saves the scarce resources 
of the enforcement authorities. This can only occur if Leniency can help dispose of the 
investigations speedily. It is well known both to litigants and practitioners that longer the 
litigation, costlier it is for all parties concerned. The BIS has therefore stated in 2011, that it 
intends to improve speed and predictability for business as one of its policy objectives for new 
reforms.597                   
6.2.4 Evidence in Cartel Cases 
The main concern that cartels operate in secret and, therefore, hard evidence is scarce has 
been at the root of introducing a leniency programme in the first place. It is amply clear from 
the OFT cases that this is no longer true. In an era of instant electronic messaging it is easy 
to exchange messages and the risk factor appears to play a minimal role. In almost all of the 
OFT cases discussed in Chapter 5, there has been a considerable amount of documentary 
evidence that the OFT was able to access, not only electronic evidence but also print or hand-
written material. The OFT/CMA has strong empowerment procedures for ‘dawn raids’ or 
entering premises and accessing such evidence,598 and that is a far more effective method 
than relying on colluders to come forward and confess of their own free will. In the Football 
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Kit599 case, evidently the senior managers, and even directors appear to have been arrogantly 
disregarding their previous commitment given to the OFT not to break the law, and carrying 
on leaving behind a trail of evidence too. British Airways and Virgin Airways (VVA) exchanged 
a large number of emails, some of which were not disclosed to the OFT by VVA although it 
was granted full immunity as the whistleblower.600 
6.2.5 No Senior Officers?  
In light of the findings of the OFT decisions, the participants of the cartels involved have been 
mostly senior officers. Senior managers, chief executives, directors and even Chairmen of 
some of the companies have been directly involved.601  It is therefore questionable why there 
have been no prosecutions against any of them. There is not even a single application made 
for Disqualification Order against any of them on being found guilty. It is therefore highly 
questionable the statement made by a Senior Director of the OFT in a speech, where he 
stated: 
‘Our experience in civil cases to date is either that the conduct in question is not carried 
out at a sufficiently senior level, or that it has not been possible - on the available 
evidence - to establish that a director knew or ought to have known about the 
conduct.’602  
A reading of the OFT cases show otherwise. Except for the one case, Lladro,603 where the 
OFT does not identify the individual positions held by those involved, all the others had senior 
officers involved, most of them at the highest level. Not only there have been strong evidence 
against these senior managers, but also some of them have admitted their involvement,604 
although those who are granted immunity get exemption from prosecution. Opportunity to put 
EA 02 to good use has been therefore missed on a number of occasions. 
Berzins and Sofo have found that management were involved in 80 per cent of 69 publicly 
available cases from Australia, Canada, Denmark, the EC, Ireland, Japan, Korea, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK and the USA between 2000 and 2006.605 They also found 
                                                          
599 See sec 5.16. 
600 See sec 5.11. 
601 See n 530. 
602 Ali Nickpay, ‘UK cartel enforcement – past, present, future’ Speech to the Law Society Anti-Trust Section, 11 
December 2012, p.32.    
603 See sec 5.8. 
604 See sec 5.2 and sec 5.3. 
605 Michelle Berzins and Francesco Sofo, ‘The inability of compliance strategies to prevent collusive conduct’ 
(2008), Vol 8, Issue 5, Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 669- 680; See 
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that 71 per cent of matters examined, cartel participants were aware of illegality of their 
behaviour. 
6.2.6 Compliance Attracts Discounts on Penalties 
The OFT has been generous in awarding reductions in fines to participants of the cartels who 
put in place compliance procedures and/or training staff on such procedures in the workplace 
concerned.606 However, in Arriva, when senior managers who had trained in compliance 
procedures were caught engaged in the cartel under investigation, no uplift of the penalty 
occurred.607 In the EU however, compliance is not a factor taken into account when setting 
fines.608 Nevertheless, in an earlier case violation of compliance was taken as an aggravating 
factor together with recidivism.609 The Chairman of OECD has said that the EU has a very 
strong standard; that it will not reward compliance.610 He was also of the view that competition 
authorities are uneasy with compliance programmes, mostly because they realise they could 
be fake and not sure how to detect this, but that some countries have a more open attitude. 
6.2.7 Dying Cases? 
What is clear is that most of these cases, in particular the Construction industry611 cases, were 
dying cases (or dead well before the investigation started), and quite a number of the parties 
had discarded or destroyed the relevant documents, and some of them did not have turnover 
accounts or had nil turnovers for the relevant year. Some companies had changed character; 
managers had left or simply there was a lack of historic documents, resulting in protracted 
investigations. It may be argued that investigating dying cartels can be a warning to likely 
future colluders. However, the OFT’s resources could be better spent in proactively detecting 
and deterring existing cartels so as to prevent further damage to the economy. 
                                                          
also John K Ashton and Andrew D Pressey, ‘Who Manages Cartels? The Role of Sales and Marketing Managers 
within International Cartels: Evidence from the European Union 1999-2009’ (2012) CCP Working Paper 12-11. 
606 See Chapter 5. 
607 See sec 5.2, Arriva and FirstGroup. 
608 Case T-138/07 Schindler v Commission, (2011), [88]; Cases T-101/05 and T-111/05 BASF and UCB v 
Commission [2007] ECR II-4959, [52]; See Wouter Wils, ‘Antitrust Compliance Programmes and Optimal Antitrust 
Enforcement’ (2013) 1(1) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 52-81. Between 1982 and 1992, the Commission 
granted reduction in fines in seven decisions for setting up compliance after start of the investigations, but never 
since. 
609 British Sugar [1999] OJ L 76/1. 
610 David Vascott, ‘An interview with Frédéric Jenny’ Global Competition Review, 4 March 2014. 
611 See sec 5.24. 
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The OFT’s response regarding the Constructions investigation has been to point out that a 
report prepared for it by Europe Economics612 in 2010, suggests a significant improvement in 
the behaviour of construction companies since the case, and an awareness of competition 
law. It has also pointed to the UK Construction Industry Competition Law Code of Conduct 
that was produced in response to the case by the UK Contractors Group and the National 
Federation of Builders in 2009. 
Nevertheless, what is apparent is that none of these parties came forward with leniency 
applications before the OFT started investigations. It was an auditor who alerted the OFT, in 
the constructions cases. It can be argued that investigating dying cartels also help alerting 
current and future cartelists from desisting, which is worthwhile, however, considering the 
scarcity of resources available to the investigating authority, deterrence by way of catching 
the culprits much earlier would be more desirable to minimise the harm caused.  
6.3 Leniency, Recidivism and Multiple Infringements 
Although leniency is claimed to put a stop to anticompetitive behaviour, the evidence is not 
compelling. Repeat infringements occur both in the US and the EU (as it may happen in other 
parts of the world). There is criticism that repeat offenders are not dealt with severely 
enough.613 As Connor points out, deeply rooted profit-making business behaviour must result 
in high level of recidivism. Roots lie in the structures of the markets.614 This is particularly 
played out in international cartel cases. The US DoJ has, however, strongly denied Connor’s 
claims, and has stated that the US has eliminated cartel recidivism.615 However, the DoJ has 
refrained from making any references to the financial cartels by the banking sector. In the EU, 
Wils points out that out of the 74 cases in which the Commission applied the 1998 Guidelines 
up to the end of 2006, 17 cases involved a finding of repeated infringement by at least one 
undertaking, making a total of 28 findings of repeat offending.616 These findings led to an 
increase in the amount of the basic fines by fifty per cent.617 
                                                          
612 ‘Evaluation of the Impact of the OFT’s Investigation into Bid Rigging in the Construction Industry’ Europe 
Economics, 2010. 
613 Wouter P J Wils, ‘Recidivism in EU Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis’ (2011) < SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1957088  > last accessed 20.01.2016. pp 3-5 
614 See John M Connor, Studies in Industrial Organization: Global Price Fixing (2nd edn, Springer 2008). pp 17-
52.                                                                                                                             
615 Gregory J Werden, Scott D Hammond and Belinda A Barnett, ‘Recidivism Eliminated: Cartel Enforcement in 
the United States since 1999’ Speech before the Georgetown Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, 
Washington, D. C, 2011.  
616 Wouter P J Wils, ‘The European Commission’s 2006 Guidelines on Antitrust Fines: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis’ (2007) < SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=962654 > last accessed 20.01.2016, p 22. 
617 Ibid. However in the Belgian Beer case the increase was only 40 per cent while British Sugar had 75 per cent 
increase due to a number of other factors as well. See Case T-38/02 Groupe Danone v Commission (Belgian 
beer) [2005] ECR II-4407, [312]-[313], and British Sugar, OJ L76/1, [206]-[210]. 
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Applying a quantitative trade model, Clarke and Evernett show that low-income countries that 
lack effective anti-cartel enforcement paid prices more than double what the other importers 
for vitamins paid.618 Many corporate Vitamins conspirators were fined previously for price-
fixing violations under US or EU competition law.619 Hoffmann-La Roche, one of the two 
companies identified as the ringleaders of the Vitamins cartel, engaged in overlapping price-
fixing agreements with respect to 12 vitamin products.620 Just two years before it was fined for 
its role in the Vitamins cartel, Roche was fined $14 million by the US in 1997 for its leading 
role in the citric acid cartel of 1991-1995. Roche executives were required to provide full 
cooperation to the DoJ in antitrust matters due to Roche’s guilty plea in the citric acid case, 
yet the executives continued to conspire on vitamin prices for two more years. Moreover, there 
was trial testimony given in the 1998 case of U. S. v Andreas, to the effect that Hoffman-La 
Roche had been a member of an earlier clandestine international cartel in the citric acid market 
in the late 1980s.621 This earlier citric acid cartel was never punished by antitrust authorities.                                      
Roche was not the only convicted member of the vitamins case to be fined in another price-
fixing case. French chemical manufacturer Rhóne-Poulenc, which in 1999 merged with the 
leading German chemical firm Hoechst to form Aventis, was awarded immunity in 1999, by 
the Commission, for involvement in the Vitamins A and E cartels.622 Hoechst itself which 
conspired in respect of vitamin B12, was convicted and fined $36 million by the US in 1998 for 
its role in the global Sorbates cartel. In 2003 the EU imposed a fine of $116 million on Hóechst 
(by then Aventis) for the Sorbates violation. Thus, 3 of the leading co-conspirators in the 
vitamins cartel are known to have engaged in previous or concurrent cartels that operated in 
the 1990s. Doubtless there are others in the huge vitamins cartel who have not been 
discovered. As for the DoJ’s assertion that recidivism by these corporations have been 
eliminated, there is no criteria to make sure that they are not engaged in other undetected 
cartels, possibly using even more covert methods. 
                                                          
618 Julian L Clarke and Simon J Evenett, ‘The Deterrent Effects of National Anticartel Laws: Evidence from the 
International Vitamins Cartel’ (2003) 48 Antitrust Bulletin 289.  
 
619 Ibid. 
620 Hoffman-La Roche Ltd v Empagran S.A.,124 S.Ct. 2359, 159 L.Ed.2d 226 (2004); Harry First, ‘The Vitamins 
Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International Competition Law’ (2001) 68 Antitrust Law Journal 711; 
See also Commission Press Release, ‘Commission imposes fines on vitamin cartels’ IP/01/1625, Brussels, 21 
November 2001. 
                               
621 United States v Andreas 1999 WL 116218 (N.D. III 1999); See also Brief Amicus Curiae of Darren Bush, John 
M Connor and others in Hoffman-LaRoche v Empagran S A No 03-724, SC (US), 2004, pp 22-28. 
622 Aventis was the first company to cooperate with the investigation into some of the markets but was fined in 
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These 3 examples are not isolated or anecdotal. The phenomenon of repeat cases in US and 
EU antitrust is a subject of statistical study of modern private international cartels.623    
Participants in international cartels involving 283 products, were uncovered by one or more of 
the world’s antitrust authorities between January 1990 and July 2003. Out of the hundreds of 
companies identified, 173 companies participated in contemporary cartels in two or more of 
these products. Some were convicted of domestic or international cartel behaviour prior to 
1990 as well. Eleven had participated in price fixing of ten or more products (serial price fixing).   
In the OFT’s Football Kit investigation it transpired that a number of the parties involved had 
previously been dealt with by the OFT, with the defendants undertaking not to infringe the law 
in future, but engaged in further breaches regardless. 
The field of legal economics that studies crime and punishment is founded on the idea that 
persons choose crime because the anticipated ‘benefits exceeded the expected losses’.624 
When the benefits (monopoly profits) exceed the losses (antitrust fines and penalties), 
deterrence will not be achieved. Optimal monetary penalty that can equate the anticipated 
profits can achieve the objective of deterrence. The OFT cases show that the fines for 
colluders barely get close to the 10 per cent maximum that can be imposed as penalty. 
On revising its leniency policy in 2006, the EU threatened to increase the fine for recidivists 
by 100 percent for each previous offence.625 
6.3.1 Cartel Detection and Deterrence 
Connor submits that despite the higher fines imposed by the Commission and the NCAs, 
because of the near absence of private rights of action, the EU has not been as successful as 
North America in imposing monetary penalties that might deter international cartels operating 
in Western Europe.626 According to Connor, settling for a hard and fast rule as in Empagran, 
                                                          
623 See John M Connor J M and C Gustav Helmers, ‘Statistics on Modern Private International Cartels, 1990-
2005’ (2006) AAI Working Paper No. 06-11 < http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/28650/1/wp060011a.pdf > 
last accessed 26.04.2016. 
624 Thomas S Ulen, ‘Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics’ 0710, (1999) < 
http://reference.findlaw.com/lawandeconomics/0710-rational-choice-theory-in-law-and-economics.pdf > last 
accessed 25.02.2016, p 790. 
 
625 See Neelie Kroes, ‘Delivering on the crackdown: recent developments in the European Commission’s 
campaign against cartels’ Speech at The 10th Annual Competition Conference at the European Institute, October 
2006, SPEECH/06/595.  
 
626 See John M. Connor, ‘The High Economic Costs of Cartels:  Can Private Enforcement Help?’ (2010) AAI < 
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that sacrificed the purposes underlying the antitrust laws, the ability of those laws to deter 
unlawful conduct, created an environment ripe for recidivism by international cartels.627 He  
asserts that if antitrust laws are denied on the ground that cases are difficult, then that means 
courts should not have jurisdiction over many types of cases that are brought before it. 
 
Commission sanctions are well below the profits accruing from even a brief, typically harmful 
cartel. As in the US, generous reductions in fines are routinely granted for minimal cooperation 
with the Commission.628 As Sokol finds, ‘… a too-generous leniency program may create 
opportunities for firms to behave strategically.’629 The EU fines are still below their optimal 
level and come too slowly, according to Mariniello,630 and he argues that EU fines account for 
a tiny proportion of the turnover of affected markets in the convicted EU cartel decisions 
between 2001 and 2o12. The estimated affected sales in the European Economic Area (EEA) 
by these cartels while they were active, could amount to around 209 billion euros while the 
fines totalled to only 18.4 billion euros.631 When penalties are not severe enough, and the 
amount of resources saved by investigating leniency cases is not large enough, a Leniency 
programme would be counterproductive. 
According to Connor and Helmers, between 1990 and 2005 alone, the aggregate cartel sales 
were $1.2 trillion and overcharges were $500 billion.632 They found, that out of a set of data 
on 283 private international cartels, global cartels comprised more than half affected sales, 
and were larger and longer lasting, and more injurious than other types. 
Levenstein and others show two findings from their analyses; first, cartels are neither relics of 
the past nor do they fall under the weight of their own incentive problems.633 Even where 
cheating eventually undermines a cartel, consumers may have been burdened by years of 
increased prices, and enduring barriers to entry have often been created by strategic cartel 
                                                          
627 See John M Connor and Darren Bush, ‘How to Block Cartel Formation and Price Fixing: Using Extraterritorial 
Application of the Antitrust Laws as a Deterrence Mechanism’ (2008) 112 Penn State Law Review 813; See 
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633 See Simon J Evenett, Margaret C Levenstein and Valerie Y Suslow, ‘International Cartel Enforcement: 
Lessons from the 1990s’ (2001) 24 (9) The World Economy 1221-1245. 
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behaviour. Second, aggressive prosecution of cartels can deter collusion, but only where 
sufficient international cooperation exists to gather evidence and prosecute. In another sample 
of cartels prosecuted in the US, twenty cartels of which sales data were available, the annual 
worldwide turnover in the affected products exceeded US $30 billion.634 In the Lysine cartel 
alone, John Connor estimates that the cartel overcharged U.S. customers between $65 million 
and $134 million.635 Levenstein and Suslow find that there is enormous variance in cartel 
success in raising prices and profit maximising which reflects the innumerable possibilities for 
organising a successful cartel, due to the interdependence of those factors that determine 
cartel success.636 Although difficult at times to uncover, cartels are far from rare. Nussbaum 
estimates that international cartels controlled approximately 40 per cent of world trade 
between 1929 and 1937.637 Hence, efficient investigatory policies may be more effective in 
the detection of cartels even in the absence of leniency. Targeting specific industries in 
sequence may prevent firms from colluding for some time, which in turn reduces the 
attractiveness of collusion, and contribute to making it more fragile.  
 
In the OFT decisions, most of the immunity recipients were also the parties with the higher, if 
not the highest, annual turnovers among the participants in the cartels that they were involved 
in. The CAT has been very liberal in reducing the fines in most of the appeals against fines. A 
drawback in CAT decisions appear to be that legal arguments take precedence over a proper 
economic analysis of the cases before it. As Peter Freeman, the current CAT Chairman has 
stated, ‘striking the right balance between rules and individual case analysis’ is an important 
issue in arriving at antitrust decisions.’638 Courts have a real degree of latitude in dealing with 
complex antitrust cases. In Esso Petroleum, Lord Reid said that where a set of conditions had 
been incorporated into an agreement without negotiation, a party acceding to the main 
agreement may be at a disadvantage regarding other terms.639 Therefore, taking the case as 
a whole package, and assessing the economic damage by analysis would be a more 
appropriate way of dealing with antitrust cases.  
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6.3.2 Fines as a Deterrent 
Industry representatives have increasingly voiced concern that the European Commission 
imposes excessive fines, particularly since the introduction of new guidelines in 2006. Fines 
are too high, disproportionate, and liable to introduce distortions into the market leading to 
higher prices for consumers, they complain. They argue also that in crisis times, a more lenient 
approach should be taken. 
‘Optimal fine’ is defined as the minimum payment that would ensure complete deterrence, and 
which should be enough to offset the expected additional profit accruing to cartel members as 
a result of their illegal action, if they are caught by antitrust authorities. Key parameters for 
calculating the optimal fine are therefore the price increase (cartel overcharge) and the 
probability of detection. The empirical evidence on cartel overcharges reveals a significant 
diversity of price increases.640  
 
It is widely believed that the probability of detecting clandestine cartels is less than one-third.641 
No reliable estimate exists of the probability of detection by antitrust authorities. By definition, 
such an estimate would require information on cartels that have not been uncovered. Estimate 
could be the probability that a cartel will be detected during the course of a year, conditional 
on the cartel being eventually detected. Since not all cartels are detected, economic theory 
suggests that the fine should be inversely correlated to the probability of detection. A 15 per 
cent detection rate would suggest fines 6.7 times higher than the expected gains of the 
cartel.642 A report by the OECD in 2000 said, ‘It is estimated that average illegal gain from 
price fixing is 10 per cent of the selling price, but in such cases the harm to society may amount 
to 20 per cent of the volume of commerce affected by the cartel.’643 
Bos and Schinkel state in their paper that Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003 constrains the 
EC’s objective of deterring competition law infringements by introducing the 2006 fining 
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guidelines.644 They find that the legal maximum leaves the Commission little scope to apply 
its new fining method effectively. 
The think tank Bruegel published a paper on collusion and fines in the EU.645 The analysis is 
based on final decisions on cartels, adopted by the EU between 2001 and 2012, for a total of 
73 cartels and 479 convicted companies. Since January 2001, the Commission has imposed 
fines totalling 18.4 billion euros on companies convicted of cartels within the EEA. Compared 
to the harm caused by the infringing companies, this is very low. Fines account for a tiny 
proportion of the affected markets. Estimates suggest the total harm to commerce could be 
about 209 billion euros.  
6.3.3 Introduction of the 2006 Commission Guidelines on Penalties 
The aim of the 2006 Commission guidelines was to make a link to the profits established, and 
the penalties to be imposed. This was particularly evident in 2007 and 2008 when the value 
of affected markets, was especially high. Therefore, rather than EU being tougher, fines reflect 
the greater economic effect of cartels since 2007. These factors were not captured by the 
Commission prior to 2006. Fines since 2006 could have been higher had it not been for the 
economic crisis. There was an increase in requests for reductions due to ‘inability to pay’ which 
the Commission started to accept in 2008. In 2010 alone, 45 per cent asked for reductions. A 
little less than a third were successful. Fines are in effect very far from their optimal level, 
below the level for deterrence. If at the time of forming the cartel the companies could perfectly 
foresee future profits and costs, they would still find it profitable to commit to it, even knowing 
they would be caught. The analysis indicates current deterrents are insufficient, and suggests 
fines should be increased.646 But this could cost consumer more by way of hidden costs, and 
difficult to implement. Hence a practical solution for short term would be to reduce the time 
needed to complete cartel investigations.  
The current timeline for investigations is 4-6 years, therefore taking into account the average 
cartel duration, this means an infringer should expect to be sanctioned 10 to 20 years after 
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formation of a cartel. In the meantime, managers would have moved on or retired, having 
reaped the benefits without fearing any cost. If investigation time is halved, a corresponding 
10 per cent increase in fine could be made in terms of net present value of the starting time of 
cartel, since discounts given would be for a shorter time.647 Wils argues that the theory on 
optimal fines remains useful as a general guidance despite the fact that in practice, it does not 
appear feasible to measure econometrically a theoretical optimal fine for a given antitrust 
infringement648                    
6.3.4 Determination of Fines: Optimal Sanctions, Cartel Dissuasion - the 
Theoretical Framework 
The starting point of the optimal sanctions is rationality. A rational agent, i.e. one who 
undertakes a cost-benefit analysis based on expected profits and losses and who is risk 
neutral, does not break the law if the illegal gain derived from the crime is less than its expected 
cost, the latter being equal to the average sanction times the probability of conviction. 
Therefore, deterrence through the use of fines will work if, and only if, the expected fine 
exceeds the expected gain.649 If this theory is applied to price fixing, cartel formation will be 
deterred if the expected sanction (average fine times the probability of detection) is at least 
equal to the illicit profit obtained by cartel members. Wils argues that cooperation by colluders 
with the competition authority's investigation is advantageous for antitrust enforcement in that 
it reduces the administrative cost as well as the duration of the investigation, and may bring 
the violation to an earlier end. This may hold true if the colluders come forward voluntarily at 
an early stage of the violation. Judging by the OFT investigations, colluders rarely self-report 
unless there is an imminent risk of being discovered. 
As to the range of industries, and sectors affected most by cartels is not easy to ascertain, 
mainly due to information on affected markets is not always available. In the OFT cases, parts 
of the decisions remain redacted with details of market information remaining confidential. 
Therefore, it is not possible to examine the theoretical framework within which enforcement 
authorities determine optimal fines for anticompetitive behaviour. The fines imposed account 
for a small percentage of the annual turnover of the convicted companies as seen in the OFT 
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cases in Chapter 5. Moreover, these are only the detected cartels, while there is no data 
available of the undiscovered cartels or their frequency. As Mariniello observes until this data 
obstacle of not knowing the frequency of cartels in the economy, the ultimate impact of 
leniency programs on cartel formation and the lifetime of cartels will remain an open 
question.650 
6.3.5 The Predictability of the US DOJ Cartel Fines v UK’s EA 02 
The DoJ’s predictive power of the optimal-deterrence model is quite good. Conner and Miller 
found that corporate cartel fines are strongly directly related to economic injuries from 
collusion.651 But US fines do not conform to the theory’s predictions about the probability of 
detection and conviction of cartels. Also fines complement other penalties, such as the number 
of months that a corporate’s defendant managers are sentenced to prison and private 
damages paid. For criminal violations of the Sherman Act, DoJ has great latitude in 
recommending corporate cartel fines to the federal courts.  Hence, compared with the robust 
implementation of sanctions including jail terms for defendants it can be said that the US 
system is well ahead in their determination to deal with anticompetitive behaviour than the EU 
and the UK systems. The main features of US success point to its: a) Per se rule, b) Criminal 
sanctions, and c) A robust private actions role.  
 
In the UK, EA 02 has been notably dysfunctional in prosecuting infringers.652  The OFT’s first 
and only criminal conviction resulted from a US plea bargain in 2008.653 Bryan Allison, David 
Brammer and Peter Whittle were jailed between 30 months and 3 years for their role in 
organising a worldwide cartel in the supply of flexible marine hoses, but the sentences were 
reduced on appeal.654 They were arrested by US antitrust authorities in Houston in 2007, after 
attending a cartel meeting. They admitted guilt and agreed jail sentences under a plea bargain. 
The US DoJ allowed them to return to the UK on condition that they plead guilty to the UK 
cartel offence, and that they would return to the US if their UK sentences were shorter than 
those agreed under the plea agreement. The only other UK antitrust criminal prosecution 
                                                          
650 See Mario Mariniello, ‘Do European fines deter price fixng?’ (2013) VOX CEPR’s Policy Portal < 
http://voxeu.org/article/do-european-fines-deter-price-fixing > last accessed 26.12.2015. 
651 See John M Conner and Douglas J Miller, ‘Determinants of US Antitrust Fines of Corporate Participants of 
Global Cartels’ (2013), 7th International Industrial Organization Conference, Boston, 11th annual meeting of the 
AAI, April 3-5, 2009 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2229300 > last accessed 26.11.2015. 
652 See Andreas Stephen, ‘The UK Cartel Offence: Lame Duck or Black Mamba? (2008) ESRC Centre for 
Competition Policy (CCP) Working Paper 08-19; See also Peter Whelan, The Criminalization of European Cartel 
Enforcement: Theoretical, Legal, and Practical Challenges (Oxford University Press 2014).   
653 See R v Whittle and Others; OFT Press Release, ‘Three imprisoned in first OFT criminal prosecution for bid-
rigging’, 11 June 2008; OFT Press Release, ‘OFT brings criminal charges in international bid rigging, price fixing 
and market allocation cartel’, 19 Dec 2007. 
654 See R v Whittle [2008] EWCA Crim 2560; [2008] All ER (D) 133 (Nov). 
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under the OFT, concerning four BA executives collapsed when the OFT failed to provide 
evidence, while in the US, another BA executive, Keith Packer, was imprisoned in Oct 2008 
for a parallel offence relating to air cargo fuel surcharges.655                                                    
 
Save for the collapsed BA executives’ case no other prosecution by the OFT or the SFO has 
taken place as regards the cases set out in Chapter 5, despite the involvement of senior 
managers in a number of the OFT cases.656 A report by Deloitte has found that executives 
fear most the threat of imprisonment and a criminal record, as the biggest deterrent to 
engaging in cartel activity.657 Hence, streamlining the criminal offence relating to cartels is 
needed for effective prosecution. The challenge is to reduce complexity and delay, which in 
turn will help towards the important step of cost saving. There is also the undertone of historical 
tolerance of monopolies (and cartels) in the British Isles as highlighted in Mogul Steamship658 
and the recent House of Lords ruling in Inntrepreneur,659 to contend with.                                   
6.3.6 Competition, Business Interests or the Single Market? 
It appears that business interests are at the forefront of government agenda, from Lord 
Simon’s emphasis that ‘… the critical importance in minimising burdens on business. The 
problems for business in having two similar but, in their detail different prohibitions interpreted 
according to two different bodies of case law could be burdensome.’660 Further, he stated that 
the purpose of s 60 (CA 1998) was “to ensure that as far as possible the UK prohibitions are 
interpreted and develop consistently with EC prohibitions. That is of crucial importance in 
minimising burdens on business.”661  
It is also questionable whether the much repeated ‘consumer welfare’ was at the heart of 
competition law, given that it is not generally found in successive CJEU judgements handed 
down over the years.662 In GlaxoSmithKline, the Court of Justice stated that Article 101 ‘aims 
to protect not only the interests of competitors or of consumers but also the structure of the 
                                                          
655 DoJ Press Release, 30 Sept 2008, ‘Former BA Exec Agrees to Plead Guilty to Participating in Price-Fixing 
Conspiracy in Air Cargo Shipments’.                                                
656 See n 530. 
657 OFT, OFT962, ‘The deterrence effect of competition enforcement by the OFT’ A report prepared for the OFT 
by Deloitte, 2007, pp 110-135. 
658 Mogul Steamship v McGregor Gow [1892] AC 1; See also Norris v United States [2008] UKHL 16, [25-26]. 
659 See Inntrepreneur Pub Company (CPC) and others v Crehan [2006] UKHL 38. 
660 Lord Simon, HL Deb, October 30th 1997, Col 1145. 
661 Lord Simon, HL Deb, November 25th 1997, Col 960. 
662 See Joined Cases C-501/06P, C-513/06P, C-515/06P and C-519/06P GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited 
formerly GlaxoWellcome plc v Commission [2009] ECR I-9291, [63]; See Alexander Italianer, ‘Competition Policy 
in support of the EU 2020 policy objectives’ Speech at the Vienna Competition Conference 2010 - ‘Industry vs. 
Competition?’, 9 June 2010, p.3; See also Pinar Akman, ‘Consumer Welfare and Article 82 EC: Practice and 
Rhetoric, (2009) 32 (1) World Competition 71. 
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market and, in so doing, competition as such.’ More telling is the hierarchy of objectives set 
out by the European Commission Annual Report on Competition Policy 2000, where the first 
objective is the ‘maintenance of competitive markets’ and the second, the ‘single market 
objective.’ However, the Commission’s 2004 Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) 
sees a change of heart, reining in consumer welfare as one of the objectives.663 Indeed, the 
single market was the core goal of the Treaty of Rome, with building a single market taking 
shape from 1958, and key decisions taken by government ministers with little reference to 
public opinion.664  
6.3.7 US Senate Debate for More Stringent Regulations on Cartels 
The US senate heard arguments for toughening of antitrust laws further, in November 2013, 
by the members of its Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust, 
Competition Policy and Consumer Rights.665 The Chair of the committee, senator Klobuchar 
stated ‘Cartels have no other purpose than to rob consumers.’ Despite DoJ’s Attorney General 
Baer claiming that the Leniency Program has increased the rate of self-disclosure, others 
testifying before the Subcommittee pressed the Senate to adopt stricter punishments in light 
of the ‘steady stream of cartels’ that they viewed as a persistent problem. There were 
questions about the effectiveness of fines as a deterrent, and that the fear of receiving jail 
terms was only if the infringers actually believed they were likely to be caught. Some testified 
that steep fines and punishments may in truth discourage self-reporting. As a better deterrence 
it was suggested that individuals and corporations convicted of cartel violations should be 
banned so as to prevent them from conducting business in certain markets, serving on boards 
or in other corporate functions.  
 
The only published qualitative research involving case studies and interviews with 
practitioners on the effectiveness of the immunity policy outside of the UK, that this thesis 
encountered, is the survey by Sokol, who has found, ‘The practitioner surveys suggest that 
                                                          
663 Para 13 of the 2004 Guidelines provide that ‘The objective of Art 101 is to protect competition on the market 
as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. Competition and 
market investigation serve these ends since the creation and preservation of an open single market promotes an 
efficient allocation of resources throughout the Community for the benefit of consumers.’   
664 John McCormick, European Union Politics (Palgrave, 2011) p.77 – ‘European Economic Community (EEC) 
was created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, at heart, it was in its early years an elitist project that had little impact 
on European public opinion, with key decisions taken by government ministers’; See also P A Buigues, Oliver 
Guersent and J F Pons, ‘Alternative Models for Future Regulation’ < 
ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2001_020_en.pdf > paras I-2 and I-3. Accessed 23.06.2015.  
 
665 Gregory E Heltzer, Jennifer L Westbrook and others, ‘U.S. Senators Debate Toughening Cartel Penalties’ 
(2013) The National Law Review, November 19, 2013 < http//www.natlawreview.com/article/us-senators-debate-
toughening-cartel-penalties > accessed 15.02.2015. 
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while, overall, the leniency policy works, it is not as effective as DOJ rhetoric suggests. 
Strategic leniency seems to drive many leniency applications.’666 According to Sokol’s survey, 
‘Practitioners also suggested that the DOJ has institutional reasons to laud the success of the 
cartel program and to downplay any criticisms of it.’667 
As Wouter Wils states: 
‘[S]uccessful cartels tend to be sophisticated organisations, capable of learning. It is 
thus safe to assume that cartel participants will try to adapt their organisation to 
leniency policies, not only so as to minimise the destabilising effect, but also, where 
possible, to exploit leniency policies to facilitate the creation and maintenance of 
cartels. This raises the question whether there could be features of leniency 
programmes that risk being exploited to perverse effect.’668  
However, Wils is of the opinion that repeat offenders should not be deprived of being 
considered for leniency.669  
A report by the UK’s National Audit Office has noted that, the OFT and the CMA found only 
three breaches in financial services between 2001 and 2015, despite serious and long-running 
problems. Nevertheless, following applications for leniency, in 2013, the European 
Commission fined financial institutions €1.71 billion for participating in cartels in interest rate 
derivatives, particularly in London markets.670 
 
6.4 Applicants Racing to Obtain Immunity  
The financial mis-selling involving banks, such as Libor, IPP, and more recently Forex671 and 
all other anticompetitive dealings including money laundering activities still uncovering, and 
the high fines imposed on them, show that notwithstanding the EU and the US DoJ extolling 
the virtues of the leniency policy, anticompetitive behaviour appears to be rife among firms 
worldwide. Because the number of cartels remains unknown, it is difficult to determine if 
                                                          
666 D Daniel Sokol, ‘Cartels, Corporate Compliance and What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement’ 
(2012) 78 Antitrust Law Journal 201–240, p 236. 
667 Ibid, p 213. 
668 Wouter P J Wils, Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust Enforcement (Hart publishing 2008), p 137. 
669 See Wouter P J Wils, ‘Recidivism in EU Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis’ (2012) 35 (1) 
World Competition 5-26. 
670 NAO Report, ‘UK Competition Authorities: The UK Competition Regime’ HC 737, (2016), para 2.5 at 30. 
671 Sebastian Chrispin, ‘Forex scandal: How to rig the market’ BBC News, 20 May 2015 < 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26526905 > last accessed 28.12.2015;  Karen Freifeld, David Henry and 
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enforcers have achieved optimal deterrence. As Stucke finds, ‘Given the difficulty in detecting 
cartel behavior, it is impossible to give any accurate accounting of the number of hard-core 
cartels.’672 The US Senate debate in 2013 is testimony that tougher penalties have not been 
successful in deterring cartels.673       
The issues surrounding the structure and efficacy of leniency programmes were explored at a 
Competition Law Scholars Forum held in London, at City Law School in September 2010.674 
At this conference, Peter Willis presented his research on EU leniency applications for which 
data were available regarding the timing of leniency applications. The data showed a 
surprising gap in time between the first leniency applicant in a given cartel, and the second 
applicant from the same cartel. The data suggested that the conventional story told by antitrust 
enforcers that there is a race to the enforcement authorities, sometimes by a matter of 
minutes, hours or days, may not explain the confession dynamics in many cartels. The data, 
though interesting, cannot tell the whole story because the EU does not publish this 
information for all leniency applicants.675  
As competition law regimes vary significantly across jurisdictions it may mean that the optimal 
leniency programme in one jurisdiction may be suboptimal in another. Some jurisdictions offer 
both corporate and individual programmes while some others only offer corporate leniency 
programmes. Therefore, it requires more comparative work to be done to ascertain which 
overall antitrust regime creates a more effective leniency policy. While leniency programmes 
may be an incentive for firms to come forward and confess, it may also lead infringers to 
broaden their strategies. For example, they can abuse generous leniency packages to their 
advantage by first obtaining immunity through leniency, thereby avoiding financial and criminal 
punishment, and then engaging in a different kind of complicated cartel that can escape the 
antitrust authorities’ net.  
As Christopher Leslie states, coordination or harmonisation between leniency programmes in 
different jurisdictions is important. He points out: ‘Depending on the scope of a cartel, a 
participating firm could seek leniency in one jurisdiction and conceivably open itself up to 
antitrust liability in dozens of other jurisdictions. This possibility could dissuade a price-fixing 
firm from confessing in any jurisdiction, which would result in a harmful cartel continuing 
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unabated.’676 He reiterates the requirement of greater transparency and more transborder 
cooperation.677 
 
6.4.1 Effectiveness and Co-ordination of Law Enforcement as Distinct from   
Harmonisation Across Europe  
Corporate management may in part constitute all corporate governance arrangements dealing 
with: management misbehaviour; institutional structure of the organisation; incentive targeting 
schemes; interests between agent and principal, and; various contracts that cannot be easily 
seen. At the lower level, there may be dysfunctional corporate governance. Such lack of 
transparency leads to corporate crimes that have been uncovered in cases such as Enron,678 
WorldCom,679 and Parmalat,680 indicating accounting manipulations and a link between 
performance targets and compensation. Two large networks of auditors (Grant Thornton 
International, and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu) failed to detect the frauds in Parmalat, while 
auditors in Enron and accountants in WorldCom colluded with the management in producing 
misstatements to show false excessive profits. 
Failures of these massive companies and subsequent court proceedings have revealed some 
common features that led to their catastrophic financial failures such as massive growth, 
accounting failures, poor underlying performance, political connections, complex corporate 
structures, and a dominating shareholder controlling the management.681 Profits motivate 
shareholders, and rather than monitoring the corporate governance or the managers of the 
company they have invested in, they exploit the company by their short term interests in 
gaining as much profit as they possibly can. 
In these cases, the capital markets discounted the perceived risk and relied heavily on the 
Gatekeepers, i.e. the auditors. Enron scandal led to the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
the US in 2002. The main provisions of the Act included the establishment of the Public 
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678 See Skilling v United States, No. 08-1594, 561 US (2010). 
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Company Accounting Oversight Board, to: develop standards for the preparation of audit 
reports; the restriction of public accounting companies from providing any non-auditing 
services when auditing; provisions for the independence of audit committee members; 
executives being required to sign off on financial reports, and; relinquishment of certain 
executive bonuses in cases of financial restatements.  
It is now well over a decade ago, since the Sarbane-Oxley Act has been in force, and although 
well intended, it did fail to prevent the subsequent scandal of the Lehman Brothers,682 which 
in effect brought about the financial crisis of 2008, referred to as ‘the worst financial crisis since 
the Great Depression’.683 However, positive reports are also evident from a case study of 
nearly 2,500 companies carried out by the 2007 Lord & Benoit Report.684 Some believe things 
could have been much worse had the accounting regulations been as lax as the financial 
regulations. It is believed a number of countries adopted similar rules following the US 
Sarbane-Oxley Act, including Canada, South Africa, France and Australia.                                                             
 
What is important is the need to replace the cyclical bursts of criminal proceedings as seen in 
the US and elsewhere, by continuous, low level pressure of private suits in order to keep 
deterrence on a day-by-day rule despite the failures of US laws shown by Enron and similar 
scandals. The design of substantive rules needs to be balanced in an appropriate basis for 
detection and prosecution. Auditors should be subject to adequate level of oversight, 
independent of the entity they audit, and the auditors themselves should possess a high and 
internationally acceptable standard.685 
Following the Italian Parmalat scandal, the European Parliament passed a resolution on 
corporate governance, and supervision of financial services dated 12 February 2004, and the  
Commission adopted on 27 September 2004, a communication addressed to the Council, and 
the European Parliament.686 The communication points out that transparency, supervision and 
oversight have to be improved, especially as far as tax havens are concerned, and law 
enforcement has to be strengthened through increased cooperation amongst agencies and 
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public prosecutors. The communication stresses the need for further regulation concerning 
auditors, corporate advisors, analysts and rating agencies, and money-laundering. (But 
private enforcement was not at issue in the communication). The Parmalat case has also 
influenced the Commission in the drafting of the proposal for a directive on statutory audits of 
annual accounts, and consolidated accounts687 by amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC 
and 83/349/EEC.  
 
In the UK, the new Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has come fully into force as from 
1 April 2014. It has taken over some of the functions of the OFT, and some of the 
responsibilities of the Competition Commission (CC). The CMA is expected to work better for 
consumers, business, and the wider community, and it would be responsible (hopefully) for 
making sure that the markets are open, transparent and dynamic.688 The new streamlined 
body is expected to conduct market studies, probe possible anticompetitive behaviour and 
also investigate mergers that could restrict competition. The CMA’s immediate agenda 
includes a full-scale investigation into the energy companies, something that has so far eluded 
that sector, and which has been a subject of great interest and discussion in the public arena. 
To make the on-line market more effective and to investigate the activities of ‘payday lenders’ 
are on their agenda as well. It is expected the CMA to be a stronger and more effective 
authority, with a better deal for the consumers. However, nearly two years since the CMA 
assuming duties, the NAO has found that while it has made significant progress in making the 
regime more coherent, its business awareness of competition law is low, and while it has 
improved the robustness of its enforcement casework, ‘the system has so far failed to produce 
a substantial flow of enforcement decisions.’689 The NAO has found that the flow rate of cases 
are lower compared to other Member States and the fines also too low. 690 The NAO report 
also shows that the Competition enforcement has taken only 9 per cent of the total workload 
of the CMA.691 
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6.4.2 IOSCO Highlights Need for Transparency in the Market 
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) established a task force 
addressed at coordinating a response to the financial frauds. Its proposals for improvement of 
the financial sector sound sensible,692 and should have been adopted in other areas such as 
business and corporate sectors, but with a genuine intention of effective implementation. It 
would not be beneath the CMA to adopt these proposals, to be the effective regulator it intends 
to be.  
Some of the topmost IOSCO objectives and principles of securities, extracted from its long list 
are as follows:  
• Greater transparency and disclosure throughout markets 
• Balance between unrestrained expansion, innovation and over regulation 
• Appointment of independent directors – (non-IOSCO) 
• Increased internal resources devoted to monitoring market development 
• Identifying emerging risks 
• Engaging with other regulators, both nationally and internationally for robust and 
coordinated framework for market stability, and 
• Avoidance of conflict of interest. 
Further, it states the aim of the objectives and principles should be to promote conditions to 
better incentivise market participants in managing, and price risk appropriately. 
Accordingly, regulators should adopt clear and consistent regulatory processes and powers. 
They should have proper resources and should possess the capacity to perform their functions 
and exercise their powers. They should monitor, mitigate and manage systemic risk within its 
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mandate. Importantly, regulators must be independent and accountable. Fairness must be 
adhered to at all times, and there should be no conflict of interest. Regulation must be reviewed 
regularly, so that inspection, investigation and surveillance powers are up to date. Regulators 
should promote transparency of trading, designed to detect and deter manipulation, and other 
unfair trading practices. Effective and efficient management of large exposures, default risk, 
and market disruption, would reduce costs significantly.693 
The need for legal oversight, observance of compliance regulation, and sufficient incentives 
to promote effective corporate governance cannot be overemphasised in the face of the 
revelations of corporate misbehaviour, since the financial crisis of the 2007/2008, which is 
described as more devastating than the Great Depression. It is now accepted that the crisis 
was the unintended result of deregulation of the banking industry, first in the US, followed 
faithfully by UK and most other European nations, and some eastern nations as well. The stark 
reality of corporate irresponsibility, and individual greed have been exposed in no uncertain 
terms by the way deregulation has enabled systemic unstable financial practices leading to 
outright fraud and exploitation.694          
It is apparent that the OFT has had to spend a considerable length of time in order to ascertain 
the relevant market in the OFT cases, sometimes with much opposition from the defendants, 
who were also leniency recipients.695 It is, therefore, necessary to have a transparent market 
structure for enforcement authorities to quickly spot the areas of concentration, so as to enable 
proactive intervention. Market structure can be defined as the organisational and other 
characteristics of a market. Sudden increase in activity in a given market could be a good 
signal for a watchful enforcement agency to intervene.  
In order to prevent future crises, there is a need to rethink afresh, by putting in place 
transparent governance procedures in the market rather than focussing on profits, and profit 
alone goals. Steady progress is what competition needs, not fast moving grab as you go 
encouragement by rewards, and immunity from punishment offered by indulgent regulatory 
measures. 
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It is manifest from the OFT investigations that detection of cartels through Leniency is not the 
success it has been claimed by its proponents. It is also apparent that there are procedural 
problems that allow colluders to escape with low penalties or no penalties at all at the end of 
long and arduous investigations, particularly where immunity is granted. The appeal procedure 
before the CAT appears to be more of a second trial, with new witnesses being called and 
cross-examined, putting the OFT at a disadvantage, although, some such new evidence 
before the CAT has brought to light that leniency recipients have not revealed all at the OFT 
investigations. On the other hand, victims are prevented from accessing information due to 
confidentiality afforded to colluders under leniency agreements. 
Both the OFT investigations and the CAT appeals are generally lengthy, with much detail of 
every event and evidence given, which led the CA to make the observation in Football Kit696 
that it is sufficient to present the relevant facts succinctly. Another important comment from 
the CA was that no balanced argument could be made by the co-defendants as against any 
submissions made by the full leniency recipient to the OFT, since the OFT does not provide 
the reasons for granting full immunity to that applicant. 
In addition to the cases being protracted, there are also far fewer cases than expected 
compared to the cost involved, which has been a concern for the BIS, resulting in the reforms 
to create the new CMA.697 The concern expressed by BIS is evidence that the OFT’s 
enforcement record is weak. As a number of the economists have found from their laboratory 
experiments, there is no incentive for cartelists to self-report if there is no robust enforcement 
taking place.698 The protracted nature of the cases also may well discourage potential leniency 
applicants. 
The redaction of considerable amounts of details from the public version of the case records 
of the OFT investigations makes it difficult to arrive at a fair judgement of the procedural 
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framework. Secrecy of the leniency documents, coupled with redactions from the case records 
of important details may only reveal half the story. 
As revealed in the Football kit699 and VAA700 cases, there is a question about relying on the 
evidence of Leniency witnesses. In the former, both Umbro and Allsports did not reveal all 
information to the OFT as required, and even lied to the CAT, while in the latter case a large 
amount of evidence had been not disclosed to the OFT by the full immunity applicant VAA, 
thereby breaching the leniency agreements. 
Some of the OFT cases, such as the Construction Industry701 only came to light after the cartel 
has ended. Although it is useful as a warning to others, a great deal of resources had to be 
used merely to impose some insignificant fines (reduced on appeal by the CAT). The cost 
(resources) incurred in these cases seem to be huge compared to the meagre fines imposed. 
Such resources could have been better used in interventionary actions against live cartels, in 
order to prevent likely further harm by those cartels.  
The OFT’s calculation procedure has also been heavily criticised by the CAT in some of the 
cases, despite the CAT itself has not given any calculus for its own decisions on reducing the 
OFT imposed fines. In reality, the OFT penalties never reached the maximum 10 percent 
turnover allowed, but further reductions were granted for mitigating factors as per the five step 
Guidance, even accommodating compliance procedures being introduced by the defendant 
companies. The OFT penalties imposed are insufficient for effective deterrence of cartels. As 
the Deloitte report702 points out, a more effective deterrence mechanism would be the threat 
of criminal prosecution. Streamlining and strengthening criminal sanctions is a far better 
enforcement method than a lukewarm fining procedure, and it would make way for prosecuting 
senior officers who have played a key role as seen in most of the OFT cases. 
The important conclusion to be drawn from the pattern of leniency applications by these cases, 
studied in Chapter 6, is that undertakings do not rush out with leniency applications in order 
to confess and seek immunity. Of the 22 cases where leniency was applied (two other cases 
being applications for clearance), only one leniency applicant came forward willingly703 prior 
to the instigation of an investigation by the OFT. Two other applicants came forward because, 
one had already been found out by another legal entity,704 and the other was aware that they 
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would come under investigation in another jurisdiction.705 Another came forward just before 
notifying its intention to go into a merger.706 All the rest of the cases came to light through 
informers outside of the cartels or a few who were directly affected by those infringements. 
Thus applicants ‘racing to obtain immunity’707 has not happened in the OFT cases. 
The surprising outcome of the analysis of these cases is that, there were considerable amount 
of documentary evidence which the OFT was able to seize in all the cases which belies the 
claim that evidence is difficult to obtain in cartel cases. Hence, this outcome in effect destroys 
the very basis of the introduction of the Leniency Programme.  
After the Italian Parmalat708 revelations, the Commission adopted a resolution which points 
out the importance of improving transparency, supervision and oversight. The UK’s new CMA 
has also expressed its intention to make sure that the markets are open, transparent and 
dynamic.709 The IOSCO has also placed its top priority to be greater transparency and 
disclosure throughout markets. As long as market operations remain in a closed environment 
it will be a barrier for enforcement authorities to intervene and defuse problem areas early. It 
is, therefore, paramount that markets are open and transparent for effective detection and 
deterrence of anticompetitive behaviour rather than expecting infringers to come forward and 
confess on their own accord. 
The next chapter examines the effect of leniency on private actions by victims of cartel activity 
by businesses, owing to confidentiality and non-disclosure afforded to leniency documents 
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How Leniency Jeopardises Enforcement of Victim Redress  
 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine another detrimental effect of granting leniency to 
offending parties where the enforcement of competition law is concerned. Much emphasis has 
been made by regulators of the importance of private actions as a parallel enforcement 
procedure in facilitating competition in the market.710 After the important rulings in Delimitis711 
and Automec II,712 the Commission adopted its Notice on cooperation with national courts, 
thereby employing the use of soft law as an approach for harmonisation.713  
Despite the emphasis on private actions being a deterrent and a compensatory mechanism in 
the enforcement of competition law, private actions remain the least used mode of 
enforcement in the UK, and the EU. One of the reasons, if not the main reason for victims’ 
inability to make use of private enforcement is the barrier to access vital documents to prove 
their claims. In principle, even in a ‘follow on’ action the claimant has to prove that the harm 
caused to her was a direct result of the proven infringement.714 Therefore, the burden of 
submitting relevant evidence in a damages claim rests with the victim. The privilege of 
nondisclosure afforded to infringers who have broken the law, but are granted leniency for 
                                                          
710 Mario Monti, ‘Private litigation as a key complement to public enforcement of competition rules and the first 
conclusions on the implementation of the new Merger Regulation’ 17 Sept 2004, Speech at ABA 8th Annual 
conference, Fiesole, SPEECH/04/403; Neelie Kroes, ‘Enhancing Actions for Damages for Breach of Competition 
Rules in Europe’ 22 September 2005, New York, SPEECH/05/533; Neelie Kroes, ‘Consumers at the heart of EU 
Competition Policy’ 22 April 2008, Strasbourg, SPEECH/08/212; Neelie Kroes, ‘Consumer welfare: more than a 
slogan’ 21 October 2009, Brussels, SPEECH/09/486 < ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/index_theme_35.html 
>accessed 01.01.2015. 
711 See Case C-234/89 Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Braeu AG [1991] ECR I-935.  
712 See Case T-24/90 Automec Srl v Commission [1992] ECR II-2223.    
713 Notice on the Cooperation between National Courts and the Commission in Applying Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty, OJ 1993 C39/6.  
714 Albion Water v Dwr Cymru [2013] CAT 6; 2 travel v Cardiff Bus [2012] CAT 1; Devenish v Sanofi-Aventis and 
others [2008] EWCA (Civ) 1086. 
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cooperation in the investigation against them, can be a stumbling block in obtaining the 
necessary evidence for a victim’s claim. The cartel participants are thus protected from details 
of their wrong doing being given to anyone without their prior consent. Two recent cases 
discussed in this chapter together with the latest development by way of the new Commission 
Directive on Antitrust Damages715 illustrate the complexity of the Leniency policy, and the 
difficulty it poses for victims’ right in bringing successful private actions. 
7.1.1 Individual Right for Damages   
The right for damages actions by victims of competition law infringements is well established 
since the judgement in Courage v Crehan716 where the Court of Justice held that: 
‘Indeed, the existence of such a right strengthens the working of the Community 
competition rules and discourages agreements or practices, which are frequently 
covert, which are liable to restrict or distort competition. From that point of view, actions 
for damages before the national courts can make a significant contribution to the 
maintenance of effective competition in the Community.’717  
The right of an individual for restitution for injury suffered is enshrined in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as an inalienable human right, and the Commission 
(although not yet a signatory to the ECHR) has emphasised that it respects and observes the 
rules contained within the ECHR.718 In this regard, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union appears to have encompassed the rules governing the ECHR. 
Moreover, the Commission has made a recommendation for collective redress to enforce the 
rights granted to citizens and companies under EU law, notably consumer protection, 
competition, and other areas, to improve access to justice.719 
                                                          
715 Commission Directive, Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
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5.12.2014. 
716 Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and others, (2001) ECR I-
6297.  
717 Ibid, para 27. 
718 CJEU has refused EU’s accession to ECHR yet again in a ruling in December 2014, (Opinion 2/13); See 
CJEU Press Release No. 180/14, 18 December 2014; Michael Cross, ‘EU court snubs human rights accession’ 
The Law Society Gazette, 18 December 2014.  
719 Commission Press Release, ‘Commission recommends Member States to have collective redress 
mechanisms in place to ensure access to justice’ 11 June 2013 < 







7.2 Modernisation Regulation 1/2003 and Private Enforcement 
After the modernisation and decentralisation (EC) Regulation 1/2003 reform, it was expected 
that private actions would play a pivotal role in aiding the enforcement of Article 101 (and 102) 
by means of actions for damages before national courts.720 The Commission regards such 
private enforcement as a useful and necessary adjunct to public enforcement by the 
Commission and the NCAs.721 It was expected private actions to be a means of enforcement 
complementary to public enforcement, thereby enhancing and maximising the number of 
overall competition law enforcement.722 The Commission has stressed the importance of the 
role that the national courts should play in the enforcement of competition law by emphasising 
the advantage of private actions by victims in order to bring more ‘claims’ to the courts.723 The 
claims could include award of damages, legal costs and interim measures. Private competition 
law claims may arise in many contexts, as for example some claims could arise from franchise 
agreements, distribution agreements, partial function joint ventures or licensing 
agreements.724  
Notwithstanding the often quoted Courage, and the emphasis on the part of the EU, private 
damages enforcement has remained almost non-existent in the EU, as opposed to the widely 
used private actions in the US. The study by Ashurst found astonishing diversity and total 
underdevelopment in damages actions in the EU.725 The study has revealed only around 60 
judgements in damages cases in 25 Member States. Of these only 28 judgements resulted in 
                                                          
720 Recital 7 of Regulation 1/2003; White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules 
{SEC(2008) 404}, {SEC(2008) 405, {Sec(2008) 406}; Case C-213/89 R v Secretary of State, ex parte Factortame 
[1990] ECR 1-2433; Joined Cases C-6/90 & 9/90 Francovich and others v Italy [1991] ECR 1-5357; Case C-
128/92 HJ Banks v British Coal Corporation [1994] ECR 1-1209. 
721 Commission (EC) Staff Working Paper SEC 2005 1732, para 15; Case 253/00 Munoz v Frumar [2002] ECR 1-
7289, opinion of AG Geelhoed.  
722 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECE 1; Stephen Weathrill, Cases and Materials on EU Law, (7th edn, 
OUP 2005), p 99. 
723 Commission (EC) Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Article 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty [2004] OJ C101/65. 
724 Case 161/84 Pronuptia [1986] ECR 353; Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission 
[1966] ECR 382; Case COMP/37.730 Re The Agreement between Deutsche Lufthansa AG and Austrian Airlines 
OJ [2002] L242/25; [2003] 4 CMLR 252; Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss v Benetton [1999] ECR 1-3055. 
725 Denis Waelbroeck, Donald Slater and Gil Even-Shoshan, ‘Study on the conditions of claims for damages in 
case of infringement of EC competition rules’ Comparative Report, Ashurst, 31 August 2004 < 




award of damages. Among the reasons is the difficulty in accessing the evidence which would 
be mainly in the possession of the infringer, coupled with an obligation to present all evidence 
on filing a claim. Hence, there is a large risk for an individual victim getting involved in an 
action that could take years to resolve, and a great deal of expense in addition, with an 
outcome that may ultimately come to nothing. 
At national level, there has been various reforms designed to facilitate private competition law 
enforcement in the Member States, such as the UK’s EA 02, the 7th amendment of the German 
Law against Restraints of Competition (GWB),726 and new legislation in Bulgaria,727 the Czech 
Republic,728 Denmark,729 Hungary730 and Italy.731 Nevertheless, there appear to be far too 
many obstacles on the way to successful private actions. 
In Arkin, the High Court decided that the plaintiff who continued trading although he knew that 
he was losing his business, may take the form of contributory fault, and therefore the chain of 
causation was broken which excluded the defendant’s liability for damages.732 In Enron Coal, 
again the claimant failed as the Court of appeal upheld the CAT decision, stating that the 
claimant needs to adduce clear evidence of causation and loss to recover damages.733 This 
case illustrates that ‘but for’ (the infringement), the claimant has to prove that he would have 
been in a more favourable position. This could only happen if enforcement authorities make 
findings that the infringement concerned actually caused damages to specific companies. This 
is unlikely to happen in infringement decisions, where findings on specific effects are not 
generally required for the enforcement authority to make an infringement decision and, impose 
sanctions.734  
In Sweden, the national court struggled to establish causation and quantifying harm caused 
by an exclusionary breach.735 In a claim against British Airways, the UK Court of Appeal 
                                                          
726 Helmut Bergman and Frank Rohling, ‘The new German antitrust Act gives way to damages actions (Gesetz 
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733 Enron Coal Services Ltd v English Welsh & Scottish Railway Ltd [2009] CAT 36; [2011] EWCA Civ 2; The 
claimant sought to rely on s 58 CA 98. 
734 See Chapter 5 (OFT decisions). 
735 Jacob Lundstrom, ‘The Stockholm District Court awards damages in private antitrust case for abuse of 
dominant position (Europe Investor Direct a.o./VPC)’ 20 November 2008, e-Competitions, n 22902. 
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rejected the claim of a plaintiff’s ‘representative action’ on behalf of other un-named victims as 
well, invoking Civil Procedure Rule 19.6.736 This is in contrast to some other EU jurisdictions, 
such as the Netherlands where the 2005 Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Claims737 
appears to allow US style actions in cartel damages claims.738  
The CAT rejected cartel damages claims by Deutsche Bahn and other claimants against 
Morgan Crucible on the ground that the actions were out of time.739 Under the CAT’s Rules, it 
was deemed that a claim for damages must be brought within two years ‘from the end of the 
period specified in s 47A (8) of CA 98.’ However, noting that its decision in the case 
contradicted one of its earlier judgements, the CAT granted Deutsche Bahn leave to appeal 
to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal reversed the CAT’s judgement, disagreeing with 
the CAT’s narrow interpretation, thereby permitting the limitation period to be extended 
pending appeals against Commission Decisions before the European Courts or even where 
the Decision could still be appealed. Fortunately for the victims, the time limitation has now 
been rectified under CRA 15, to bring it in line with that of the High Court, which is 6 years. 
In a more positive approach, in Bord na Mona,740 the High Court found that an injured party 
may bring a ‘hybrid’ claim (neither a pure follow-on claim nor a pure stand-alone claim), 
provided that the claim does not run contrary to the Commission decision.       
In the meantime, the German Supreme Court allowed a de facto class action, confirming the 
permissibility of ‘bundled’ antitrust damages actions, similar to opt-in actions.741 Another  
development is in respect of disclosure, where in the French Ma Liste case, the Commercial 
Court in Paris ordered the French competition authority, the Autotité de la Concurrence to 
disclose documents relating to the settlement of an antitrust investigation in the context of a 
private damages action.742 This decision is important because normally it is more difficult for 
                                                          
736 Emerald supplies Ltd & Another v British Airways Plc [2009] EWHC 741 (Ch); [2010] EWCA Civ 1284; [2010] 
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a victim to prove harm (or impossible) when an investigation by an NCA settles an 
investigation, and therefore no formal finding of an infringement takes place.  
In the UK, s 60 of CA 98 requires domestic law to be interpreted and applied consistently with 
EU law, and includes a specific reference to ‘the civil liability of an undertaking for harm caused 
by its infringement of Community law.’743 Initially, CA 98 did not make specific references to 
third party actions in the civil courts. However, in the debate in the House of Lords on the CA 
98 Bill, Lord Simon confirmed that ‘It is true that third parties have rights to seek damages in 
the courts as a result of actions here.’744 Nevertheless, s 58 of CA 98 makes only oblique 
references to third party actions. The EA 02 introduced a new s 58A into CA 98, clarifying the 
link between public enforcement and private rights. It is now expressly recognised that there 
may be proceedings before the courts in which damages may be claimed. The original s 58 
applies to all claims, it may be that s 58A will do so as well, if not s 58A will do little more than 
explaining the effect of s 58.745  
Any court in the UK is bound by decisions of the OFT or the CAT to the effect that relevant 
provisions of the CA 98 have been infringed. Other than actions for damages or monetary 
relief there is no reference to claims for other forms of relief under those provisions.  However, 
CRA 15 has empowered the CAT to grant injunctions, create a fast-track procedure for 
straight-forward follow on damages, and has brought the CAT in par with the High court in 
dealing with damages claims. Importantly, CRA 15 has widened the CAT’s jurisdiction by 
enabling it to hear both ‘follow on’ and ‘stand-alone’ damages actions, which can take the form 
of either ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’ Collective proceedings,746 subject to certain conditions. But under 
the new CRA 15 reforms, no exemplary damages will be awarded to victims, as has happened 
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7.2.1 Pfleiderer Decision 
Since the CJEU decision in Pfleiderer748 much analysis by lawyers and commentators alike 
have taken place regarding leniency documents, due to the mixed message it sent across the 
Member States.749 The decision concerned the confidentiality clauses in leniency 
programmes, and the right of victims to have access to leniency documents to enable them to 
institute private actions.750 The CJEU ruled in the case, that EU law does not prohibit access 
to leniency documents by third parties seeking damages, and that such access should be a 
matter for the national court of each Member State to decide on a case by case basis, by 
weighing the arguments in favour and against disclosure of documents submitted under 
leniency programmes.  
The case originated in Germany with an application to the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel 
Office) by the victim of a cartel infringement, requesting for the documents of the investigation 
in which the infringer was granted leniency. Pfleiderer, a customer, was seeking full access to 
the file from Bundeskartellamt, in relation to its 2008 cartel decision imposing a fine of 62 
million euros on three European manufacturers of décor paper, to enable him to file an action 
for damages. The Bundeskartellamt refused access to the relevant documents, and seized 
them. Pfleiderer sued the Bundeskartellamt and on 3 February 2009, the Bonn Amtsgericht 
(the District Court of Bonn) ordered the authority to grant access of the leniency documents to 
Pfleiderer, not including confidential business information, legal documents or 
correspondence through the ECN. The Court ruled that Pfleiderer was an aggrieved party 
according to German law, and had a legitimate interest in accessing the documents in order 
to recover damages in a private action. The court then stayed the decision pending a reference 
                                                          
 
748 Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, [2011] ECR 1-5161. 
749 See Bruce Wardhaugh, ‘Cartel Leniency and Effective Compensation in Europe: The Aftermath of Pfleiderer’ 
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also other leniency material including contemporaneous documents. In its 2004 Notice on cooperation with 
national courts in the EU, (OJ C101/54  27/04/2004), the Commission states that, ‘it will not transmit to national 
courts information voluntarily submitted by a leniency applicant without the consent of that applicant.’ (para 26). 
Such information covers both oral statements and pre-existing documents submitted by the leniency applicant. In 
its 2006 Leniency Notice, the EC does not deal with disclosure of leniency material directly. 
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made under Article 267 TFEU (ex 234 EC), by the Amstsgericht Bonn in Germany to the 
CJEU, to ascertain whether such access to leniency documents would be compatible with EU 
law.751   
The CJEU found that ‘neither the provisions of the EC Treaty on competition nor Regulation 
1/2003, lay down common rules on leniency or common rules on the right of access to 
documents relating to a leniency procedure.’752 The CJEU further noted that the Commission 
Notices, and the Model Leniency Programmes within the ECN, are not binding on Member 
States.753 Thus, in the absence of any binding provision under EU law, it is for the Member 
States to establish, and apply, national rules on the right of access by persons adversely 
affected by a cartel, to documents relating to leniency procedures. However, the CJEU also 
ruled that in establishing such national rules, the Member States ‘may not render the 
implementation of European Union law ‘impossible or excessively difficult’754 or “jeopardise 
the effective application” of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.755 
The CJEU’s decision was in contrast to the opinion of Advocate General Mazak,756 who in 
December 2010 issued his opinion advising against giving claimants full access to documents 
supplied under national leniency programmes. He was of the opinion that it could also lead to 
non-cooperation between leniency applicants and NCAs. A-G Mazak proposed that a 
distinction must be made between pre-existing documents, and incriminating statements 
made by firms after entering into a leniency agreement. He opined that pre-existing documents 
should be disclosed because denying access to those would be in conflict with the 
fundamental right to a fair trial and effective remedy, but any incriminating statements made 
under a leniency agreement should be protected from disclosure.  
Competition authorities from seven European national governments also objected to the CJEU 
decision, stressing the importance of leniency programmes in investigating cartels and, that 
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disclosure of leniency documents could deter companies from participating in those 
programmes.757 
In the Pfleiderer judgement, in June 2011, while recognising the fact that allowing access to 
the documents could compromise leniency programmes, the CJEU also had to balance that 
with the well-established right of individuals to claim damages for competition law 
infringements. The Court took into consideration the judgements in Courage758 and 
Manfredi759 in arriving at its decision.760   
The responsibility of deciding the feasibility of allowing access to leniency documents was 
therefore thrown back at national courts, so that the NCAs must consider such applications 
on a case by case basis, taking into account all the relevant facts in each case.   
The situation is different where the leniency procedure has taken place before the European 
Commission, as jurisdiction over litigation between a company and the Commission is 
reserved exclusively to the EU courts in Luxembourg. An aggrieved company is therefore 
precluded from applying to a national court to obtain a judicial order compelling the 
Commission to transmit the file of a leniency applicant, nor can it apply to that court for an 
order against the Commission, under current EU law. However, while no court has jurisdiction 
over the Commission to issue an injunctive order against it, the Commission nonetheless must 
comply with EU law. In this respect, the Pfleiderer decision is not limited to NCAs and national 
courts alone, but logically, the ruling encompasses the Commission as well. According to the 
CJEU’s Pfleiderer decision, EU competition rules do not preclude, ‘a person who has been 
adversely affected by an infringement of European Union competition law and is seeking to 
obtain damages from being granted access to documents relating to a leniency procedure 
involving the perpetrator of that infringement.’761 On the one hand, the Commission cannot be 
                                                          
 
757 See Pierre Kirch, Jeremy Evans and Michelle Littleken, ‘The future of leniency: Plantiffs in pursuit’ (2011) 
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ordered by a court to produce documents to an aggrieved third party, but on the other hand, 
it must comply with EU law. 
National law governs in the absence of binding EU regulation on a subject, but the Member 
States must ensure that national laws do not jeopardise the effective application of the EU 
competition rules.762 The CJEU acknowledged the important role played by leniency 
programmes in ensuring effective enforcement of EU competition law, and the potential for 
disclosure of materials provided under such programmes to undermine their effectiveness. 
Nevertheless, the CJEU found that this concern must be balanced against the need to ensure 
that individuals harmed by anticompetitive behaviour can obtain effective redress through 
national legal systems, which could also make a significant contribution to EU competition law 
enforcement.   
The problem for Leniency Programmes arising from this decision is that it could discourage 
applicants coming forward to self-report, the principal attraction of being the first to do so is 
enabling them to receive complete protection from public liability. The fear is that this decision 
may create a doubt in the minds of those who wish to reveal their cartel involvement, because 
any evidence they provide through leniency applications could later be used against them by 
private damages claims. The CJEU has clearly increased the tension between leniency and 
private enforcement by the decision in Pfleiderer.  
This tension was increased by the European Commission’s determination to facilitate private 
actions with the publication of a Green Paper, a White Paper, a  consultation on Collective 
Redress, and also a consultation on Quantifying Harm.763 The argument arising from the 
Pfleiderer decision is that while it makes sense to allow access to leniency documents to an 
injured party if she is entitled to damages under the law, it also casts doubt on infringing firms 
coming forward with leniency applications if they fear that their applications might later be used 
against them in private actions. Cauffman raised this issue, that an increasing number of 
damages actions may undermine leniency programmes, even though leniency and damages 
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actions, at least to a certain extent, serve the same purpose of increasing compliance with 
competition rules.764  
The CJEU’s ruling raises as many questions as it answers because it fails to give specific 
guidance on what factors the national courts should take into account. One such question had 
been whether national law could treat NCA decisions as binding proof of an infringement. This 
position has now been clarified by the subsequent Commission Directive affirmatively.765  
Since the Pfleiderer judgement, a resolution of the Heads of the European Competition 
Authorities in May 2012, stressed the importance of the protection of leniency material in the 
context of civil damages actions.766 Subsequently, the Commission proposed in June 2013, a 
New Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions in the EU, which includes a range of safeguards 
aimed at protecting sensitive cartel evidence from disclosure to cartel victims, which means 
leniency corporate statements and settlement submissions shall never be disclosed.767 To 
promote consistent application of the EU competition rules, and to increase legal certainty, the 
Directive extends to final infringement decisions by NCAs or a national review court.768 The  
Directive which came into force in 2014, after due procedure, appears to have turned back on 
the Pfleiderer judgement, quashing any hope of victims accessing leniency documents. 
7.2.1.1 National Grid 
Following the ruling in Pfleiderer, the UK High Court had to consider a similar issue in  National 
Grid,769 involving a follow-on damages action brought by National Grid against a number of 
defendants (including ABB, Alstom, Areva and Siemans). The action arose following a 
Commission investigation and decision relating to a cartel in the Gas Insulated Switchgear 
(GIS) sector.770 Alleging loss due to inflated prices by the cartel, National Grid sought 
disclosure from ABB and Siemans for: a) the confidential version of the Commission’s 
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765 Under the new Directive on damages actions adopted by European Parliament on 17 June 2013, NCA 
decisions are deemed binding proof of an infringement.  
766 Resolution of the Meeting of the Heads of the European Competition Authorities of 23 May 2012, Protection of 
leniency material in the context of civil damages actions. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/leniency_material_protection_en_pdf> last accessed 27.11.2015. 
767 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union, COM(2013) 404 final, Strasbourg, 11.6.2013.  
768 Art 16 of Regulation 1/2003; See Case C-199/11 European Community v Otis and others [2012] ECR 1-0000. 
769 National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd and others [2012] EWHC 869 (Ch). 
770 Case COMP/F/38.899 – Gas Insulated Switchgear; See also Julia Tew, ‘Siemens AG and others v 
Commission (Gas Insulated Switchgear): The Difficulties Faced by Appellants Seeking to Challenge Leniency 
Evidence’ Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, (2014) 5(5) 273–275. 
195 
 
decision, b) responses to the Commission’s Statement of Objections and, c) responses to the 
Commission’s requests for information in relation to the cartel. 
The part of the National Grid’s application for disclosure was adjourned by the court in order 
to seek observations from the Commission as to whether it was an issue to be determined by 
the UK court, and if so, what factors should be taken into account by a national court. Written 
observations on these issues were sent by the Commission to the High Court in November 
2011, and published subsequently. In summary, the Commission when exercising its 
discretion (and the percentage of weight that should be given to those factors), argued that 
disclosure of leniency documents should only be granted where the documents are relevant 
to establish the claimant’s damages claim, and that the relevant information cannot be 
obtained from an alternative source. Further, the whistleblower evidence, in particular the ‘oral 
statement’ should be the source of last resort. 
The High Court, in its judgement relating to the National Grid’s application, given in April 2012, 
approached the balancing exercise required by the decision in Pfleiderer by considering the 
factors argued to be relevant at the hearing, and the factors raised by the Commission in its 
written submission. Roth J dealt with four factors in the main: First, the court did not accept 
that the defendants had a ‘legitimate expectation’ that their leniency statements would be 
protected from disclosure, because the Leniency Notices issued by the Commission clearly 
stated that leniency status cannot protect a party from any civil law consequences of antitrust 
infringements. Second, the court accepted that it was relevant to consider whether ‘disclosure 
would increase the leniency applicants’ exposure to liability compared to the other parties that 
did not seek leniency. However, the court held that this was not so, based on the facts in 
National Grid. Third, the court considered the possible deterrent effect of a disclosure order 
on potential leniency applicants in relation to cartels that could be uncovered. But the court 
took the view that given the scale of fines imposed by the Commission, participants in serious 
cartels would still be motivated to apply for leniency. Fourth, and the final factor was 
proportionality. The court accepted that proportionality was a relevant factor in determining 
whether or not to order disclosure, by identifying the availability of information from other 
sources.  
The court held that National Grid did not have other reasonable means of obtaining the 
information needed to make its case. In the present case therefore, Roth J ordered disclosure 
of only a limited number of redacted passages from the confidential version of the 
Commission’s decision. These included certain passages from responses to Commission’s 
information requests explaining some of the existing documents, and the operation of the 
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cartel. All other documents sought for disclosure by the claimant were not allowed. The court 
determined that some disclosure of the leniency documents should be provided but that did 
not follow that all requested documents should be disclosed.771 
This decision is in contrast to the decision of the German court in Pfleiderer where, on referral 
back from the CJEU, the German court ruled against the disclosure of leniency documents 
requested by the victim.  
The ruling in the National grid may indicate a more claimant friendly attitude by the UK courts 
which has been lacking in the enforcement of Competition law in the EU. It also raises the 
possibility of claimants considering a pattern of ‘forum shopping’ based on the most 
advantageous jurisdiction to institute their private damages claims. 
The Commission’s Director-General for Competition, Alexander Italianer, has said that only 
25 per cent of the antitrust infringements found by the Commission have been followed by civil 
claims in the past eight years by Member States, and that most of them were brought in the 
UK, Germany, and the Netherlands where procedures are perceived to be more favourable.772 
He reiterated that the Commission’s aims were; 1) to remove existing barriers to effective 
redress for victims of antitrust infringements and, 2) to regulate the interaction between public 
and private enforcement of EU antitrust rules, in particular to protect the effectiveness of EU 
and national leniency programmes.   
Neelie Kroes has emphasised that the obligation to compensate the victims of antitrust 
infringement could not have a chilling effect on the leniency programmes of the European 
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7.2.1.2 The Commission’s New Directive on Damages Actions and Leniency 
The EU Draft Directive published in June 2013 proposed the rules to be adopted by Member 
States in damages claims under EU antitrust law.774 The Directive was passed by the 
European Parliament in April 2014, and subsequently adopted by the Council in November 
2014.775 The Member States will have to incorporate the Directive into their legal systems 
within two years.776      
The new Directive sets out clear limits on the types of documents that claimants can have 
access to. What may not be disclosed specifically are; a) corporate leniency statements 
and, b) settlement submissions. Thus, the new Directive addresses the issue of access to 
leniency papers by claimants in damages actions by stating that Leniency statements, and 
other submissions prepared by a company during the competition law procedure admitting 
guilt, should not be used in civil actions against the company that made them. Other 
documents such as responses to information requests, and Statement of Objections can be 
relied upon once the proceedings by the competition authorities are closed.    
Aside from leniency, one notable measure in the Directive is the rule that an infringement 
finding by an NCA decision constitutes irrebuttable proof of that infringement, which all 
Member States will have to adopt. It fulfils the requirement of illegality, a prerequisite for 
liability, thus enabling subsequent claims for civil damages by victims.777 
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Andreas Schwab, the German MEP who guided the directive through parliament, says a 
particular improvement is the introduction of voluntary compensation payments to be 
considered as a mitigating factor when competition authorities establish the fine.778 EU 
Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia welcomed the Parliament’s decision, and says it 
will help the right to compensation a reality by removing practical obstacles that victims 
currently face. However, the Commission is of the view that due to widely diverging national 
rules across Europe, chances of victims to obtain compensation greatly depend on which 
Member State they happen to live in. Meanwhile, enforcers will be pleased to see leniency 
regimes strengthened through better protection of documents. 
The Directive is expected to benefit plaintiffs because of a general presumption of harm, and 
the presumption that both direct and indirect purchasers suffer harm from a cartel. But 
presumption of harm concerns Assimakis Komninos. He says it is problematic in relation to 
cartels by object in which no anticompetitive effect is proven, ‘I would not have a problem with 
this provision if it were applicable only in a cartel that has been implemented and produced 
effects.’779 Bernd Meyring of Linklaters believes it is a finely balanced compromise between 
different positions, adding that, ‘Achieving this despite strong lobbying by plaintiffs, 
defendants, and regulators in different directions is a good result’, but he opines, ‘… the last 
minute amendment which  provides for beneficial  treatment of small and medium 
undertakings compared  to other defendants when it comes to their liability, does not sit well 
with general competition and civil law principles, nor is it in line with equal treatment.’780 Others 
fear it will accelerate the trend of competition litigation, and move ever closer to the parallel 
administrative, and civil enforcement seen in the US.781  
While the Directive aims to introduce minimum procedural standards across EU, some 
jurisdictions such as the UK, Germany and the Netherlands will remain more attractive than 
others for private damages. In particular, UK is likely to become increasingly claimant friendly 
with the proposed introduction of a US-style ‘opt-out’ system for Collective actions,782 a 
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proposal rejected by the EU. However, Peyer argues that, ‘… the Damages Directive does not 
provide enough incentives to encourage more claims.’783 
The UK’s CAT is preparing for the probable new regime set out under CRA 15, and in March 
2014 published draft procedural rules for Collective proceedings claims. Peter Roth, president 
of the CAT, has said prompt publication of the full text of infringement decisions would be a 
great help to parties seeking follow-on damages.784 
How the new Directive may be reconciled with the decision in Pfliederer will remain in the 
hands of the judges of the particular legal system in each Member State. The Directive on 
Antitrust Damages is a binding document on the Member states, but they are bound to take 
account of CJEU decisions also. After the Pfleiderer decision, Almunia raised concerns, calling 
for legislation to protect the leniency programme, but also ensuring the right to private 
damages actions.785 In the meantime, the EU General Court overturned a Commission 
decision denying an application by EnBW, a German energy distributor access to leniency 
documents (which related, as did National Grid, to the GIS cartel).786   
The Commission is obliged under Article 30 of Regulation 1/2003 to publish its decisions in 
competition infringement cases. Article 30 orders the Commission to publish the names of the 
parties and the main content of the decision, including any penalties imposed. It shall however, 
have regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business 
secrets. In addition to this mandatory publication in the Official Journal, the Commission 
voluntarily publishes a non-confidential version of the decision itself.787  
In principle, EU citizens and those residing in the EU can also have access to the documents 
held by the Commission under Article 15 (3) TFEU (ex 255 EC), and the Transparency 
Regulation (1049/2001). Although there are exceptions to the rule under Article 4, an 
overriding public interest will ensure the disclosure of a document. The applicability of 
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Regulation 1049/2001 in Competition Law has been confirmed by the General Court in 
Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau.788 However, the Commission in its Leniency Notice reiterates 
its concern over disclosure of documents and statements received under the Leniency Notice 
which could undermine certain public and private interests, such as the protection of the 
purpose of inspections and investigations, as stipulated in Article 4 of Regulation 1049/2001. 
According to the Commission, potential applicants would be dissuaded from cooperating with 
Commission investigations if they fear they are likely to be exposed to private civil actions 
owing to disclosure of their leniency documents. 
By the new Directive on antitrust damages, the Commission attempts to draw the line in this 
long running debate, on whether allowing the disclosure of leniency documents is compatible 
with public enforcement through leniency programmes. The Directive appears to lean heavily 
on public enforcement through leniency, and thereby sending a conflicting message to that 
advocated by the CJEU in Pfleiderer ruling, and confirmed consequently by the ruling in Donau 
Chemie789 in June 2013. In the latter case however, a clarification was made, in that a national 
law enforcing a blanket refusal is liable to prevent damages actions being brought. The CJEU 
concluded that the principle of effectiveness under EU law does preclude a national rule such 
as the Austrian one concerned in that case.790 This is in keeping with the EU law which is 
intended to give rights to individuals,791 as emphasised in Courage792 and Manfredi,793 and to 
give full effect, and protect individuals by national courts. 
The CJEU has recognised consistently in a number of judgements the procedural, remedial, 
and institutional autonomy of the Member States to identify the courts, the procedures and the 
remedies that are necessary for the exercise of the EU law rights at national level.794 The 
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CJEU has also imposed limits and safeguards upon that autonomy, by its principles of ‘equality 
and effectiveness’. 
In the UK, the former OFT has stressed that confidentiality in the leniency submissions are 
safeguarded from disclosure to protect its leniency programme. However, the OFT/CMA has 
to comply with any order by a court or the CAT, to disclose information notwithstanding the 
confidentiality of such documents.795 In Argos and Littlewoods,796 the CAT ordered the 
disclosure of certain documents Hasbro submitted to the OFT (in the hope of obtaining 
leniency), to the other parties in the appeal case. In that case, the CAT cited an earlier order 
the CAT made on ‘Confidentiality’ in respect of disclosure of business sensitive material in 
Aberdeen Journals Ltd.797 The CAT has also ordered disclosure relating to the calculation of 
turnover in Umbro,798 The CAT stated in Argos and Littlewoods that ‘the grant of leniency 
under the OFT’s guidelines does not provide an absolute guarantee of indefinite 
confidentiality.’799 In view of the CJEU’s Pfleiderer decision, NCAs may be able to view 
disclosure on a case by case basis, notwithstanding that the Commission has strengthened 
its attempt at safeguarding leniency documents by its latest Directive on damages actions. 
After the Parmalat scandal in Italy, Ferrarini and Guidici observe that, ‘… the Italian and EU 
experiences show deficiencies as to private enforcement which materially contributed to the 
recent scandals in Europe and led the aggrieved investors (and Parmalat’s Extraordinary 
Administrator) to seek relief in US courts.’800 They believe, therefore, that reference to US 
institutions in the area of private enforcement, like class actions and discovery rules, seems 
justified despite the failures of US law shown by Enron801 and similar scandals. Hence, they 
argue that the design of substantive rules needs to be balanced by appropriate enforcement 
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mechanisms.802 Ferrarini and Guidi conclude that the efficient US private enforcement system 
moves the enforcers to be faster and more reactive than their European counterparts.803 
Italy has since adopted a class actions mechanism in 2010, designed in the model of the US 
system, but with the difference that the claim should be of homogeneous interest to the whole 
group. It is an ‘opt-in’ system which enables investors to claim even where they cannot show 
that they relied specifically on misleading or false statements when investing. However only 
actual damages can be claimed and not punitive damages.804  
 
The modern day leniency programme emanated from the US, understandably, since antitrust 
laws were first introduced in the US as early as 1890, under the Sherman Act in order to 
control monopolies which operated as ‘trusts’. Although the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed 
by the Congress in 1890, a leniency policy was not adopted until 1978, to encourage self-
reporting by those who were engaged in antitrust infringements. The US DoJ claimed that 
considerably more cartels were discovered by their ‘Leniency Program’ which led many 
countries eventually to adopt leniency policies styled according to or similar to that of the US 
DoJ.805 The DoJ operates a criminal sanctions based antitrust enforcement procedure, along 
with civil sanctions, which has resulted in a robust enforcement system,806 with private actions 
playing a large part in antitrust enforcement. The Clayton Act, which offers the successful 
plaintiff treble damages,807 often makes such private litigation quite attractive. However, the 
US 2004 ACPERA limits the damages recoverable from a corporate amnesty applicant to the 
harm actually inflicted i.e. to single and not treble damages, if the court finds the defendant 
has cooperated with the plaintiffs in claiming compensation as against the other defendants. 
Such de-trebling is applicable only if the defendant assists the plaintiff. This feature where a 
defendant undertakes to compensate the victim where possible is a distinct condition in the 
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US leniency policy compared with the EU and the UK systems. Nevertheless, there is still 
possibility for private damages actions against such a defendant if harm has been caused to 
third parties who may be in different states resulting in the defendant paying multiple 
damages.808  Bill Baer has said, ‘Since the 19th Century, the United States has relied on a 
combination of federal, state and private enforcers to combat anticompetitive conduct.’809 
Further, he adds, ‘A high volume of private litigation in the United States means a constant 
flow of new competition law decisions.’810 
In the US, s 1 of the Sherman Act of 1890, although it has varied substantially over the years, 
is still in force and treats every contract or commerce in restraint of trade or conspiracy to do 
so in the US or with foreign nationals as illegal. Any such act is deemed to be a felony and 
carry heavy fines or imprisonment. The Sherman Act operates within a wider legal sphere than 
the antitrust law of the EU, and the rules relating to its enforcement are found in federal law. 
Cartels are treated as bad at any level and any individuals convicted are severely punished. 
The two most significant aspects that have developed over the years are the ‘rule of reason’ 
and the ‘per se’ rule.811 Courts treat certain agreements as illegal per se with virtually no factual 
enquiry, i.e. naked price-fixing, bid-rigging, and market allocation. Such agreements are per 
se illegal irrespective of the level of the fixed price.812 The prosecution has to show only that 
the defendant participated knowingly in a conspiracy to engage in the act in question. The US 
court has moved resale price maintenance (RPM) from per se prohibition to the rule of reason 
category.813 All horizontal antitrust violations are treated as illegal by the US courts unless it 
takes the form of ‘ancillary restraint’ operating as a part of an agreement that falls within the 
rule of reason and is pro-competitive.814  
In the EU, by contrast, the system of competition law enforcement is substantially a self-
contained one. The rules have mainly emerged within the context of the competition law 
process. The same can be said of the UK civil competition enforcement, but as regards 
criminal sanctions, it operates within the wider context of the national criminal law. The most 
distinguishing feature between US and UK criminalisation of competition law is that in the US 
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an action for anticompetitive behaviour will either be civil or criminal. There is no simultaneous 
use of both avenues by public enforcers. In the UK, both civil and criminal enforcement could 
be applied separately in respect of the same infringement.815 
Decentralisation under Regulation 1/2003, although meant to pave the way for more private 
enforcement by the NCAs, did not dramatically change the outlook for more private actions. 
The reason for this can be laid at the feet of problems due to weaknesses in the substantive 
and procedural framework for civil litigation in the EU, as they have to grapple with complex 
legal and economic circumstances which are not limited to the specific cases under litigation 
but refer to whole markets. BIS observes, ‘… antitrust cases often involve complex issues of 
law and analysis, and require the careful identification of relevant facts and the weighing of 
evidence. They will only rarely be straightforward or easy cases to resolve.’816 
In the UK, there appears to be a reluctance to accept administrative decisions over and above 
those of civil procedure rules also, irrespective of the Commission Notice on cooperation.817 
This is well displayed in the House of Lords decision in Inntrepreneur and Crehan,818 where 
the learned judges went through the case with a fine tooth comb, and decided to take a narrow 
approach, thereby overturning the much celebrated Court of Appeal decision in Courage.819 
With regard to private damages actions in the UK, the one and only consumer action brought 
so far before the CAT has been the Consumers Association’s (now called ‘Which?’) action 
against JJB Sports plc.820 That action, however, was withdrawn as the parties agreed on a 
settlement, as a result there is no room for observing how a private damages action before 
the CAT would have been dealt with. One could point to the Cardiff Bus decision, where 
exemplary damages were awarded for the first time to a claimant for damages before the CAT, 
as the result of a ‘follow on action’ based on an infringement decision by the OFT under 
Chapter II CA 98.821 That case differs significantly from the class action brought by the 
Consumers’ Association in that the party claiming damages was a competing company.  There 
have been at least three other damages claims brought before the CAT, under s 47A and s 
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47B of CA 98, that have been settled.822 As settlement agreements are confidential, and not 
available to the public, there is no way of examining these claims. 
After the JJB settlement, the only private action brought since CA 98 came into force, the head 
of legal affairs at ‘Which?’ Deborah Prince, said that she was never going to bring any 
collective action under the ‘opt-in’ system, as it was very time consuming and expensive, and 
was not worth the trouble in the end. She believed an ‘opt-out’ model was more suitable than 
the ‘opt-in’ system under which the action had to be brought at the time.823  
Under the new reforms brought in by the ERRA 13 and the CRA 15, the position has changed, 
and victims will now be able to choose an opt-out Collective action for damages, provided 
certain conditions are met. The results of the new changes can only be observed over a period 
of time. Meanwhile, a recent collective action filed under the new rules before the CAT, by 
former chief Financial Services Ombudsman as the proposed representative, of the class of 
UK consumers that have suffered loss over fees charged by MasterCard, was dismissed by 
the CAT.824 
7.2.1.3 Conclusion 
Private actions for damages are deemed to be a parallel deterrence mechanism against 
potential cartel formation. The CJEU has emphasised the individual’s right to redress in the 
landmark case Courage v Crehan. Private actions were expected to strengthen compliance 
alongside public enforcement. However, private actions appear to be the least used EU wide. 
The problem faced by victims is that they are required to prove that the harm caused to them 
was a direct result of the infringement, but have difficulty in obtaining documents which are 
key to ensuring effective enforcement of private damages actions. The reason for this difficulty 
is that infringers are given confidentiality over their business secrets and leniency applications.  
In the UK, there appears to be also a reluctance by the courts to accept administrative 
decisions over and above those of civil procedure rules. This is well displayed in the House of 
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<www.lawyer.com/competition-which?/1007296.article> accessed 10.07. 2014. 
 
824 See Walter Merricks CBE v Mastercard Inc and Others [2017] CAT 16. 
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Lords decision in Inntrepreneur v Crehan,825 whereby the much celebrated Court of Appeal 
decision in Courage was overturned. Decentralisation under Regulation 1/2003 has a greater 
risk of divergent application of the EU competition enforcement rules, particularly if the 
enforcement functions of investigation, decision making and enforcement may be carried out 
by the same enforcement authority.826 More importantly, the new Commission Directive on 
damages actions which intends to encourage more private actions, may enhance the 
opportunities for divergence by national courts, with the claimants unable to access leniency 
documents which may be crucial to their cases.827 The Directive has decreed that leniency 
documents should never be disclosed, as opposed to the decision in Pfleiderer which left it for 
NCA’s to decide on a case by case basis. A solution may be found if a mechanism with rules 
for case allocation and consistent application of EU antitrust law is set up, respecting the 
principles of judicial independence, and procedural autonomy. However, as long as courts 
look upon antitrust private actions in isolation, disregarding the wider issues of competition in 
the market, private actions in the UK will remain a distant expectation.828 Moreover, Collective 
actions as introduced by the CRA 15 in themselves will not be an alternative enforcement in 
order to achieve optimal deterrence. This is particularly so, minus the necessary tools such as 
access to evidence, and funding for potential victims. A victim who is in a position to bring an 
action is first faced with the question of nondisclosure, and lack of transparency by companies, 
which obfuscates the chance of obtaining the required evidence, particularly where leniency 
has been granted to a guilty party. The consumer, as victim, is not always aware of the harm 
caused to him as the consumer only sees a small piece of the jigsaw puzzle, which fact needs 
to be taken seriously by the policy makers.829  
Although private actions are an effective tool to steer companies towards compliance with 
antitrust law, it is difficult to fathom the development of private actions in the UK (or the EU) to 
the extent it has in the USA, for fear of ‘flood gates opening’. As it stands, competition policy 
in the EU and the UK appears more geared towards protecting the institutions of competition, 
                                                          
 
825 See n 818. 
 
826 Wouter P J Wils, ‘The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative 
Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis’ (2004) 27 (2) World Competition 201-224. 
 
827 Ibid; The new EC Directive on damages actions was passed by European Parliament on 17 June 2014. 
 
828 The Commission provides funding for training judges in EC competition law developments and assessing 
economic evidence, but there is no Commission associated training network. (There are, however, the Association 
of European Competition Law judges and the European Judicial Training Network which are not linked to the 
Commission). It may be said that unlike enforcement authorities, courts do not enjoy broad investigatory powers, 
and in any event lack the power to investigate non-parties to the action or the industry as a whole.     
829 See Eduardo Reyes ‘Competition law isn’t up to the job’ The Law Society Gazzette, 09.08.2016. 
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rather than the protection of consumer rights which remain an incidental subsidiary aim of 
competition enforcement.830 It can safely be presumed that it would take decades before 
private actions in antitrust claims become a useful or effective mechanism in deterring 
anticompetitive behaviour in the UK or the EU.  
This Chapter has illustrated that leniency, far from helping the customer or the consumer, in 
reality restricts them from taking action against colluding firms that cause them harm. 
Therefore, the expectation that private actions would enhance enforcement of competition law 
has not materialised. Hence, the second objective stated in the Introduction of this thesis that 
leniency hinders private enforcement has been met. The next chapter will deal with the third 
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8.1 Contribution to Knowledge and Value Added by this Thesis 
 
The UK competition enforcement authority has introduced a Leniency Programme in 
accordance with the EU Leniency Notice,831 as a complementary enforcement method in order 
to enhance the detection and deterrence of anticompetitive behaviour prohibited under 
Chapter I, Competition Act 1998. This research sought to ascertain the efficacy of the Leniency 
Programme by a study of the cases decided and published by the UK’s former principal 
enforcement authority, the OFT (currently the CMA), over a period of twelve years. The 
findings illustrate that the Leniency Programme has not been able to meet the desired increase 
in the detection of Chapter I prohibitions in the UK. 
The legal frame work within which Chapter I prohibitions are dealt with under the UK 
competition law, though strong,832 it has been revealed that the UK has reported fewer antitrust 
cases than a number of other Member States in the EU.833 This is despite that the former 
Department of Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) has hailed UK’s competition regime as 
world class.834 
The most serious competition infringements occur as a result of business agreements 
between two or more economic entities with the intention of accumulating a higher profit at the 
expense of consumers who use their products and services. These agreements, referred to 
as cartels, are usually informal and can be mere verbal or implied terms using coded 
messaging or signals. Thus, cartels operate in secret, making it difficult for enforcement 
authorities to detect them. Therefore, a Leniency Programme has been put in place hoping 
                                                          
831 See n 7. 
832 See sec 1.3 and sec 2.4.2. 
833 See sec 5.1. 
834 See n 132. 
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that it would encourage colluding firms to come forward and disclose their cartel activities in 
exchange for immunity from prosecution or reduction in fines. 
In the UK, the Leniency Programme has been hailed as the bedrock of competition 
enforcement by the BIS itself.835 However, it is evident from the decided cases that very rarely 
have colluders ventured out to disclose such activities unless there was a good chance of 
getting caught. The architects of Leniency in competition enforcement appear to have largely 
ignored this aspect of cartel behaviour. This thesis has provided evidence by examining the 
cartel investigations and decisions made by the UK’s former principal enforcement authority, 
the OFT, that leniency is not an efficient method of detecting cartels. 
This work illustrates by exploring and analysing decided cases that the role played by leniency 
in the enforcement of competition law in the UK is very limited, contrary to the view held by its 
proponents. The results of the study contribute towards highlighting the limitations in relying 
on leniency as an essential tool in antitrust enforcement, revealing the reasons for UK’s poor 
record of antitrust cases as acknowledged by the BIS.836  
By examining Chapter I, CA 98 cases decided by the OFT, over a period of 12 years, since 
CA 98 came into force, this research has shown that the Leniency Programme does not serve 
to make businesses engaged in anticompetitive behaviour rush forward with applications in 
order to divulge their anticompetitive behaviour in return for immunity. The study has also 
illustrated that notwithstanding the secrecy of cartel activity, the colluders leave behind a trail 
of evidence which the regulators have the authority, and the capacity to seize, thereby 
disproving the claim that obtaining evidence in cartel cases is difficult without leniency. Further, 
the research has shown that granting leniency does not save the limited resources of the 
enforcement authorities, as claimed, because instead of being able to dispose of the cases 
expediently owing to defendants coming forward and providing the evidence, investigations 
had taken an inordinate length of time, the Tobacco837 case being one example. Despite 
granting leniency with full immunity, the protracted nature of the investigations takes up the 
limited resources, and time, away from direct intervention and investigations by regulators 
which would otherwise have raised the risk for potential infringers, thereby motivating 
compliance and self-policing by businesses. Importantly, it is also apparent from the study, 
that confidentiality granted to Leniency applicants has become a barrier for victims in obtaining 
vital evidence needed, to bring private actions for compensation.  
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Hence, the research has illustrated that relying on leniency programmes to deter 
anticompetitive behaviour by businesses, overlaps and undermines the active (ex officio) 
enforcement of competition law. These findings negate the hitherto held position by the 
enforcement authorities and other interested groups that leniency contributes massively in 
detecting anticompetitive behaviour.838 
The OFT cases demonstrate that applying the penalty procedure can be complex,839 adding 
a different dimension to it at the appeal stage, in particular. Even when the OFT decision is 
upheld on liability, the CAT has often reduced the fines so that the defendants seem to be let 
off lightly. Such lenient treatment of infringers can only be counterproductive. An effective 
competition regime needs to root out anti-competitive activity and provide a significant 
deterrent effect. The decisional complexity and delay add to inefficiency and cost, which 
probably resulted in OFT reporting fewer antitrust cases than some other Member States. 
The complexity in reaching a fair balance between the infringement and the penalty is further 
illustrated by various economic theories relating to Leniency granted to cartel participants.840 
Chapter 3 shows how economists keep experimenting on mainly the formation and 
destabilisation of cartels in the context of how participants react to Leniency Programmes. The 
varying number of results produced by these experiments though interesting, could give rise 
to confusion where decisions on cartels are concerned, because designing a leniency 
programme to suit complex factors such as different localities, product markets or industries, 
and political and cultural differences in those localities would not be feasible. Economic theory 
alone can often be abstract, and reliant on assumptions that are not always realistic, therefore, 
it needs to connect with real life situations. Despite these drawbacks, economic theories 
present circumstances around the functioning of cartels that could lead to formulating better 
solutions for deterrence. In that sense, Harrington and Chang state a truth when they find that 
Leniency programmes can be counterproductive when penalties are not severe enough, and 
the amount of resources saved by prosecuting a leniency case is not large enough.841  
The cases investigated and published by the UK’s principal enforcement authority under 
Chapter I, CA 98, between 2001 and April 2012 numbering 24 are illustrative of a set pattern 
adopted by the authority in deciding such cases, under a penalty Guidance. Out of the 24 
cases, two were applications for clearance not involving leniency,842 one of them later turning 
                                                          
838 See n 12, n 23, n 24 and n 25. 
839 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
840 See Chapter 3. 
841 See sec 3.4.  
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into a full investigation due to a complaint received by the enforcement authority.843 Most of 
the rest of the 22 cases dealt with involved price fixing. In the construction sector cases, the 
offences concerned bid rigging or cover pricing in the main, involving a large number of 
construction companies, with the OFT selecting only some which had sufficient weight of 
evidence for investigation. At the time the investigations started, the Construction Industry844 
cartels had come to an end sometime ago. In these cases, the CAT even observed that as 
those practices were widely used in the industry they should not be taken as serious 
offences,845 even though the damage could not be easily assessed by the OFT in the cases 
due to the continuous nature of the harm to the victims who were essentially local authorities. 
Significantly, of all the OFT investigations over a twelve-year period there has been only one 
leniency applicant who seemingly volunteered to approach the OFT before any looming 
investigation.846 Two others applied as they were aware investigations were likely.847 Another 
made the application just prior to giving notice of a merger.848 All other eighteen cases made 
applications only after the OFT started an investigation. Despite the enforcement authorities’ 
dependence on the Leniency Programme, this illustrates colluders are not enthusiastic about 
coming forward with confessions of their anticompetitive activities. These cases have 
demonstrated the actual operation of Leniency in the enforcement of the UK competition law, 
exposing the limited role it plays in detecting cartels. 
Incredibly, even after total immunity has been granted, some defendants were found to have 
concealed evidence, or lied at the investigation stage.849 The unreliability in the evidence 
provided by some of the leniency applicants, was discovered only at the appeal stage.850 In 
the Airline Fuel Surcharge case, it was later found that the immunity recipient VVA had not 
disclosed a large number of email evidence to the OFT.851 Further, even when leniency 
applicants were supposedly cooperating fully, the cases have dragged on for years,852 which 
meant that the OFT’s scarce resources were stretched to the limit,853 thereby negating the 
costless assertion as one of the reasons for leniency policy.854 This position was aggravated 
by several of those who were granted leniency by way of reduction in fines, appealing the OFT 
                                                          
843 Ibid, sec 5.14. 
844 Ibid, sec 5.24. 
845 Ibid. 
846 Ibid, sec 5.15. 
847 Ibid, sections 5.9 and 5.11. 
848 Ibid, sec. 5.25. 
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850 See sec 5.5.  
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decisions. The length of a case adds to the cost, and the authorities are left with less time for 
ex officio investigations. 
The surprise finding from the study of the cases was the amount of documentary evidence 
that the OFT was able to recover in all the cases which again destroys the claim that hard 
evidence is not available in cartel cases. The authorities have the power to enter premises 
and seize such documentary evidence as has happened in many of the OFT cases. 
It is also noteworthy that those companies granted full immunity are protected from criminal 
prosecution or any other penalties imposed on them. Thus the infringing companies can keep 
the profits of their illegal activities on leniency being granted, and they also gain the additional 
reward of not having to pay any costs towards the investigation proceedings. This complete 
exemption from all liability appears to defeat the enforcement authorities’ attempt at 
deterrence of anticompetitive behaviour. Moreover, although in most of the cases senior 
officials were involved, the OFT did not see fit to prosecute any, except in the failed VAA case, 
nor was any action to bring at least a disqualification order was taken against any of them.855  
Leniency also has posed problems for victims in instituting private actions due to inaccessibility 
of evidence which is safeguarded by confidentiality clauses. Leniency comes with the proviso 
of nondisclosure of the Leniency documents other than with the consent of the party or parties 
providing them, which prevents victims accessing them in private actions. While in 
Pfleiderer,856 the CJEU left open for the national courts to determine whether relevant material 
could be made available to a victim, and the English court has made use of that decision in 
National Grid,857 a subsequent EU Directive has decreed that leniency documents should 
never be disclosed.858 
It is amply demonstrated by this research, particularly by the OFT cases in Chapter 5, that the 
Leniency policy does not play a major role in detecting anticompetitive behaviour. Nor does 
Leniency appear to stop new cartels forming.859 It therefore raises the question why 
enforcement authorities adhere steadfastly to such a policy of rewarding cartel participants. 
The clue can be discerned from Lord Simon’s emphasis on the critical importance in 
minimising burdens on business, during the House of Lords debate.860 He has stated that the 
UK competition law has been made to align with the corresponding Commission prohibitions 
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for that very reason.861 It is, therefore, questionable whether the much repeated ‘consumer 
welfare’ paradigm by regulators was at the heart of competition law. Indeed, the single market 
was the core goal of the Treaty of Rome, with building a single market taking shape from 1958, 
and key decisions taken by government ministers with little reference to public opinion.862  
As shown in Chapter 3 of this thesis, economic theorists have highlighted the difficulty in 
making a proper empirical assessment of the extent to which cartels exist due to lack of data 
on the hidden infringements. The economic theories have variants that do not definitively show 
that leniency produces the desired effect. In fact, some of the theories show that leniency can 
lead to increased cartel activity.863 As explained in Chapter 6, the ineffectiveness of leniency 
is apparent by the fact that more and more cartels appear unabated despite high fines.864 In 
the US, long jail terms being imposed for cartel infringements have not given rise to an 
abatement of new cartel formation either.865 Therefore, it is unfortunate that both enforcers 
and economists appear to be simply paying lip service to the concept of maintaining a 
competitive market, whether it be domestic or global, by leaning heavily on Leniency policy to 
detect antitrust infringements. 
The principle of applying Leniency by different enforcement authorities in cartel cases is the 
same in different jurisdictions, while there are certain operational and punishment 
differences.866 There are differences among member states of the EU itself in this regard, 
paving the way for forum shopping. This is a drawback for effective use of leniency as markets 
work in a globalised environment with many multinational corporations operating around the 
world having networks, branches, subsidiaries, and sometimes under different trade names. 
Where punishment for anticompetitive behaviour is concerned, it is apparent that the US leads 
the way, with private actions taking a lead. There is robust implementation of both 
administrative and criminal sanctions in the US antitrust regime. Yet full convergence is not 
likely to happen with the EU, and even less likely worldwide, given different sovereignty 
safeguards, laws, and the enforcement agencies. 
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UK enforcement authorities’ penalty Guidance which is fashioned according to EU guidelines 
is unduly complicated, and has given rise to much criticism. This is an area which needs to be 
made simple and coherent, so that the defendants can have a fair assessment of the penalty 
they will have to pay, and perhaps minimise the chances of appealing on penalty grounds 867 
On the other hand, it would be far better to do away with the penalty Guidance as it stands, 
and have a separate competent Committee decide on the penalty to be imposed once the 
breach is proved. Members can be chosen from the same enforcement authority or the court 
may make an order as it thinks fit in that regard. A number of cases that appealed the OFT 
decisions, have done so mainly on the penalty issue. Appeals have also lengthened the 
duration of the cases unduly. Notably, the NAO has observed that there is a perception among 
Regulators and the OFT (now CMA) that the UK enforcement system, including the likelihood 
of appeal to be an onerous process.868  
As antitrust investigations are essentially administrative in the UK, bar the potential criminal 
cases which may or may not take place separately, it would fare better if an inquisitorial 
method is adopted for the contested antitrust cases. This is more so since the CAT, which has 
adopted an adversarial stance in the past, has now been empowered to hear stand-alone 
antitrust cases also.869 Not only does the adversarial nature of these arguments distort the 
primary intention of antitrust law, but also it invariably lengthens the procedure giving rise to 
an unacceptable duration for a case to be concluded.  
 
Tribunals and courts should be able to place an emphasis on the central aim of maintaining 
competition in the market. Decisions must take keen account of the impact of distortion in the 
market, and the damage caused to the economy which in turn is injurious to the consumer. 
Courts should be concerned not only with the economic effect of anticompetitive behaviour 
but also with non-economic effects, and take into account any injury to social or domestic 
interests, and other concerns emanating from a breach. Taking into account the whole 
package from a policy point of view can direct the judges’ attention to the question of 
justification of the court’s decision. The approach taken by Lord Reid in Esso Petroleum is 
more appropriate in this regard.870  
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8.2 Options for Reform 
This thesis has found that Leniency is not an efficient detection method in antitrust 
enforcement in the UK, contrary to the view held by its proponents. One of the arguments put 
forward by the proponents of Leniency Programmes, is that it will help the limited resources 
available to the enforcement authorities. This may well be true in some instances, but the UK’s 
decided cases have shown that it is not so most of the time. Therefore, the available resources 
should be utilised in a more meaningful way where concentrations are greater, than spreading 
it out equally in lesser, smaller investigations.871 This can be achieved by setting up a 
comprehensive market surveillance mechanism. That way resources could be utilised more 
usefully. The best way, it is suggested, to keep up with the working of the market is enabling 
businesses to set up an open and transparent governance structure. The BIS has already 
passed an Act of parliament to attain this end to a certain extent with regard to small 
businesses.872 What is needed is a similar, but more encompassing regulatory legislation to 
oversee the operation of larger corporations that may or may not have links around the globe. 
Transparency has become the byword of almost all other areas of governance, the Freedom 
of Information Act 2000 being the prime example, as it should be, and therefore, corporate 
governance should not be an exception. It is noteworthy that IOSCO has set out transparency 
as one of the important factors in their objectives and principles.873 
With transparency, individual responsibility could be traced, so that individuals can be 
identified and prosecuted if culpable. The inclusion of independent members, and employees 
nominated by or voted for by the employees themselves as board members may also help 
towards reducing blatant anticompetitive activities. Corporations must have the oversight of 
independent auditors who have no links with the companies they are entrusted with 
overseeing. Companies could be asked to provide quarterly reports of their business 
involvements including profit targets allowing transparency of their business dealings. Tax 
returns could be one of the ways of determining a firm’s profits. 
Such steps must be backed up by a strong enforcement system, whereby once convicted of 
an antitrust breach, the defendant should be either fined a mandatory fine of the firm’s total 
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profits for every year of the violation or bring criminal charges against those involved, or both, 
depending on the severity of the damage caused. In extreme cases, the system should not be 
averse to implementing both fining, and prosecution of individuals, with regard to the same or 
connected violations. For repeat offenders, an effective method will be to disqualify them from 
operating at least in the market in respect of which the infringement was committed.  
Nevertheless, prevention is better than cure. Constant market surveillance and monitoring by 
regulators, auditors, consumer organisations in coordination rather than separately would 
yield a better outcome in this regard. It would, perhaps, encourage companies if a rating or 
ranking system is put in place whereby companies are graded according to their compliance 
procedures. This means those undertakings that are found to have observed compliance to 
the full, in accordance with the applicable measures, can be given gold standard. It would be 
in the interest of companies to aspire to attain gold standard, and consumers and customers 
will be able to do their research according to the rankings before dealing with a company at a 
glance (if they are looking for a quick guide). If such companies were found to have committed 
a breach subsequently, their high ranking should be revoked, and sanctions imposed 
promptly.  
Transparency is the key word, as market transparency contributes to an effective price 
formation process, and to the integrity of markets. It can facilitate detection of potential risks, 
and help contain panic in times of stress. Transparency, and disclosure will help regulators 
identify concentrations of risk that may warrant further regulatory or legislative responses. 
Hiding behind the cloak of ‘sensitive and confidential business secrets’ can encourage 
collective behaviour which can lead to widespread losses with adverse consequences for the 
economy. It is also important to keep in check the global linkages of companies when 
collecting data for analytical purposes. Thus a well-functioning central mechanism should be 
put in place to oversee competition in the market which will lead to innovation, and fair prices, 
contributing towards maintaining a healthy economy.  
In order to maintain the credibility of enforcement, fair process is essential which must be 
followed by soundly reasoned evidence based decisions. However, enforcement authorities 
work within a statutory framework which limits their ability to improving competition in the 
market. Hence, it is important that businesses are confident in themselves to function fairly as 
well as freely. This can only be achieved if businesses could be open, transparent and 
dynamic.874 Further, businesses should be willing to discuss their roles including their 
problems with the authorities, professionals and advisers. In the absence of such 
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understanding, and dialogue, distrust will prevail and the fear (of ‘getting caught’) would 
inevitably result in the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ of anticompetitive behaviour. It is suggested, that 
the new UK Competition Network (UKCN),875 created by the CMA might be an appropriate 
venue that can be developed into accommodate an advisory board to assist businesses by 
the appointment of competent and experienced staff. 
Only transparency and disclosure will establish standards that will permit the market place to 
contribute constructively to policing excessive risk taking. The regulators can only identify 
concentrations of risk if the tools of transparency and disclosure are available. 
Leniency, although a weak mechanism, could still be used in extreme cases where a colluding 
party who is in a weaker position than the others, such as a distributor or retailer who has 
been coerced to enter into a cartel (for example, by a manufacturer), who does so for fear of 
losing his business.876 In fact, it should only be used as a ruse to motivate lower level 
whistleblowers such as employees, and those who have been coerced due to their 
dependence on the business that the colluders provide. Therefore, vertical agreements are 
where leniency should be considered. 
8.3 Coordinated Market Surveillance is Key 
The alternative solution proposed by this thesis, is therefore composed of a composite 
structure, enabling transparency in the market. Possible measures leading towards 
accomplishing that could involve:  
    Setting up a market surveillance mechanism where separate areas of industry are covered 
by independent auditors who will not be paid by those industries. Setting up a public register 
where all those who control a given business must register their interests including those who 
have control by virtue of the number of shares held by them in that business.877 Businesses 
must submit their profit margins including the actual profits gained every quarter year to the 
revenue office so that there is transparency, and problems such as money laundering, and 
concentrations could be spotted early. A dispute-resolution panel or board consisting of 
regulators or other competent persons should be appointed that can assist businesses that 
need direction and help in solving their particular major marketing problems which are out of 
their control in the main. Assistance could be made available for any other business-connected 
matters that businesses wish to seek advice on. More importantly, all these measures must 
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be interconnected so as to form a central mechanism whereby information is relayed quickly 
for regulators to take action promptly. 
Enforcement authorities must use their regulatory powers vigorously when investigating 
anticompetitive behaviour, and be vigilant in detecting trouble spots rather than rely on 
leniency applications. Therefore, careful monitoring is essential in order to avoid the mistakes 
that occurred in cases such as Enron and Parmalat.878 In any event, criminal prosecutions 
must be at the forefront of dealing with cartel participants after proper investigations and 
conviction. Businesses should be stripped of their right to confidentiality with regard to their 
business secrets on being found guilty of a breach of competition law, and individual liability 
imposed on those who are responsible for the breach. Those responsible must be made 
answerable, irrespective of whether the responsible person or persons have left the business 
concerned. Leniency should only be afforded in extreme situations such as to a victim of 
coercion, and whistleblowers who are strictly non participants, but may be subject to 
victimisation by the business concerned.  
 
It may well be that these measures could sound draconian in the ears of businesses who 
believe in their right to business secrets, and still in the throw of ‘too big to fail’ mind set. It is 
for the enforcement authorities to inform, educate, and alleviate that fear by offering help and 
support to businesses experiencing difficulties. Therefore, it is essential that the most suitable 
individuals are appointed to the relevant positions who will be of sound business sense, and 
free of conflict of interest. Negotiation and settlements may be preferable to costly 
investigations from the enforcement authority’s point of view, but settlement measures taken 
must be made available to the public without any confidentiality compromises, so that victims 
can seek remedial action against those responsible for harm caused to them. If consumer 
welfare is at the heart of competition law, nothing should be kept secret from consumers where 
collusion occurs. That should be the first principle of competition law. Law breakers should be 
punished severely once convicted. Therefore, criminal prosecution must be at the forefront of 
dealing with cartel participants who ‘prevent, restrict, or distort’ competition in the market.  
If the enforcement authorities are vigilant, with quick intervention in problem areas, and the 
penalties are severe enough, the markets will look after themselves stimulating growth by 
selecting the most efficient firms, without adding cost to the public purse. Competitive markets 
with discipline will bring about efficiency, making companies more productive and innovative 
leading to lower prices, benefiting the consumers. 
                                                          






8.4 Future Research 
Further research is important for new ways to detect and deter anticompetitive activities, as 
undertakings are bound to contrive novel ways to facilitate cartels. One aspect that needs 
clarification in detecting cartels, is parallel behaviour. So far, an answer to what constitutes 
parallel behaviour, that can be identified as anticompetitive in order to bring a successful 
investigation has been lacking.   
There are several other areas of interest where economic laboratory tests could help, one 
being a sound method of assessing damages due to cartel activity in a given market, together 
with a better penalty calculation procedure which corresponds to the damage caused. 
Economists whose laboratory tests produce numerous variations of how best to apply leniency 
could also use their skills, perhaps, in developing an alternative and effective enforcement 
method of competition law that can weather the fast changing global economic conditions. In 
doing so, factors such as ethics, environment, and human rights could also be taken into 
consideration together with transparency, in keeping with the growing global concern around 
such criteria for corporate governance. These factors were under discussion at the Global Law 
Summit held in 2015, addressed by experts from around the world in varying fields of law and 
business.879  
Compliance is another area for research as current regulations do not appear to be taken 
seriously by businesses. Perhaps, compliance should be at the forefront of enforcement rather 
than the allure of leniency and immunity for colluders. Another important area is the antitrust 
investigation or prosecution procedure which needs streamlining for faster and successful 
results which can increase the deterrent effect of the antitrust prohibitions. A starting point 
could be delving into the reasons for not using EA 02 in bringing criminal prosecutions more 
vigorously in the UK, particularly in view of the BIS agreeing that a ‘prosecutorial system would 
likely provide greater efficiency’ and fairness, in its response to the Options for Reform 
consultation.880 
                                                          
879 Global Law Summit held in London, February 2015. The Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre, and Central 
Hall Westminster, London. 




Researching problems faced by emerging nations wishing to adopt competition law or those 
that already have adopted competition law but are facing various obstacles881 can provide 
food for thought in further enhancing effective enforcement of competition law. Forming 
institutions by themselves, however, will not invariably lead to good or effective enforcement 
unless there is an active and efficient mechanism for overview of the market structure.882  
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